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Position auctions

by: Hal R. Varian
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25, No. 6. (December 2007), pp. 1163-1178.

X Abstract

I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by Shapley-Shubik, Demange-Gale-Sotomayer and Roth-Sotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction can be calculated explicitly and some known results can be sharpened. I provide some empirical evidence that the Nash equilibria of the position auction describe the basic properties of the prices observed in Google's ad auction reasonably accurately.

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This article has been bookmarked 2 times, initially on 2008-07-04.

2008-12-16 User forrest_yang
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