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Moral Hazard and Observability

by: Bengt Holmstrom
The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1. (1979), pp. 74-91.

X Abstract

The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.

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