Reputation helps solve the /`tragedy of the commons/'
Nature, Vol. 415, No. 6870. (24 January 2002), pp. 424-426.
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that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher profits for all players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility.
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