Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain Export

@article{citeulike:2826510, abstract = {The false belief task commonly used in the study of theory of mind (ToM) requires participants to select among competing responses and inhibit prepotent responses, giving rise to three possibilities: (1) the false belief tasks might require only executive function abilities and there may be no domain-specific component; (2) executive control might be necessary for the emergence of ToM in development but play no role in adult mental state inferences; and (3) executive control and domain-specific ToM abilities might both be implicated. We used fMRI in healthy adults to dissociate these possibilities. We found that non-overlapping brain regions were implicated selectively in response selection and belief attribution, that belief attribution tasks recruit brain regions associated with response selection as much as well-matched control tasks, and that regions associated with ToM (e.g., the right temporo-parietal junction) were implicated only in the belief attribution tasks. These results suggest that both domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in adult ToM.}, author = {Saxe, Rebecca and Schulz, Laura E. and Jiang, Yuhong V.}, citeulike-article-id = {2826510}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470910601000446}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18633794}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=18633794}, doi = {10.1080/17470910601000446}, journal = {Social Neuroscience}, keywords = {brain, executive\_function, false\_belief, inhibition, mindreading, theory\_of\_mind}, number = {3}, pages = {284--298}, posted-at = {2009-05-03 08:19:12}, priority = {5}, publisher = {Psychology Press}, title = {Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470910601000446}, volume = {1}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2826510 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2826510 N2 - The false belief task commonly used in the study of theory of mind (ToM) requires participants to select among competing responses and inhibit prepotent responses, giving rise to three possibilities: (1) the false belief tasks might require only executive function abilities and there may be no domain-specific component; (2) executive control might be necessary for the emergence of ToM in development but play no role in adult mental state inferences; and (3) executive control and domain-specific ToM abilities might both be implicated. We used fMRI in healthy adults to dissociate these possibilities. We found that non-overlapping brain regions were implicated selectively in response selection and belief attribution, that belief attribution tasks recruit brain regions associated with response selection as much as well-matched control tasks, and that regions associated with ToM (e.g., the right temporo-parietal junction) were implicated only in the belief attribution tasks. These results suggest that both domain-general and domain-specific cognitive resources are involved in adult ToM. IS - 3 JF - Social Neuroscience EP - 298 TI - Reading minds versus following rules: Dissociating theory of mind and executive control in the brain PB - Psychology Press VL - 1 SP - 284 KW - brain KW - executive_function KW - false_belief KW - inhibition KW - mindreading KW - theory_of_mind AU - Saxe, Rebecca AU - Schulz, Laura AU - Jiang, Yuhong PY - 2006/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470910601000446 ER -