Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D

by: Derek J Clark, Kai A Konrad

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol. 54, No. 5. (1 May 2008), pp. 969-981.

View FullText article

HighWire

Reviews [Write a review of this article]

There are no reviews of this article

Find related articles from these CiteULike users

RFID deployment (group), Knowledge_Economy_Reform (group), Global_patent_pools (group), Global_health_enterprise_architecture (group), e-maintenance (group), jago

Find related articles with these CiteULike tags

institution-design, ipr, rd, risk-articulation

Abstract

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873

@article{citeulike:2787330, abstract = {Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R\&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R\&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R\&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R\&D can be to hold up a rival. 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873}, author = {Clark, Derek J. and Konrad, Kai A. }, citeulike-article-id = {2787330}, journal = {MANAGEMENT SCIENCE}, keywords = {institution-design, ipr, rd, risk-articulation}, month = {May}, number = {5}, pages = {969--981}, posted-at = {2008-05-12 09:05:28}, priority = {2}, title = {Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R\&D}, url = {http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/54/5/969}, volume = {54}, year = {2008} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2787330 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2787330 TI - Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D JF - MANAGEMENT SCIENCE VL - 54 IS - 5 SP - 969 EP - 981 N2 - Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873 KW - institution-design KW - ipr KW - rd KW - risk-articulation AU - Clark, Derek AU - Konrad, Kai PY - 2008/05/01/ UR - http://mansci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/54/5/969 ER -

RIS BibTeX