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<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2008 07:08:57 BST</pubDate>


	<title>CiteULike: Group: ACS - with tag adaptive</title>
	<description>CiteULike: Group: ACS - with tag adaptive</description>


	<link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/tag/adaptive</link>
	<dc:publisher>CiteULike.org</dc:publisher>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2898885"/>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2762005"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2688302"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/957865"/>

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<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2898885">
    <title>Evidence accumulation in decision making: unifying the &#34;take the best&#34; and the &#34;rational&#34; models.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2898885</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Psychonomic bulletin &#38; review, Vol. 11, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 343-352.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugal take the best (TTB) model and the alternative rational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates as soon as any evidence in favor of a decision is found and the rational approach as a sequential-sampling process that terminates only when all available information has been assessed. The unified TTB and RAT models were tested in an experiment in which participants learned to make correct judgments for a set of real-world stimuli on the basis of feedback, and were then asked to make additional judgments without feedback for cases in which the TTB and the rational models made different predictions. The results show that, in both experiments, there was strong intraparticipant consistency in the use of either the TTB or the rational model but large interparticipant differences in which model was used. The unified model is shown to be able to capture the differences in decision making across participants in an interpretable way and is preferred by the minimum description length model selection criterion.</description>
    <dc:title>Evidence accumulation in decision making: unifying the &#34;take the best&#34; and the &#34;rational&#34; models.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>MD Lee</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>TD Cummins</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Psychonomic bulletin &#38; review, Vol. 11, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 343-352.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-06-16T15:19:54-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2004</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Psychonomic bulletin &#38; review</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1069-9384</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>11</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>343</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>352</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>adaptive</prism:category>
    <prism:category>bounded-rationality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/546289">
    <title>Re-visions of rationality?</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/546289</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January 2005), pp. 11-15.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The appeal of simple algorithms that take account of both the constraints of human cognitive capacity and the structure of environments has been an enduring theme in cognitive science. A novel version of such a boundedly rational perspective views the mind as containing an 'adaptive toolbox' of specialized cognitive heuristics suited to different problems. Although intuitively appealing, when this version was proposed, empirical evidence for the use of such heuristics was scant. I argue that in the light of empirical studies carried out since then, it is time this 'vision of rationality' was revised. An alternative view based on integrative models rather than collections of heuristics is proposed.</description>
    <dc:title>Re-visions of rationality?</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>BR Newell</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.005</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 9, No. 1. (January 2005), pp. 11-15.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-03-10T16:12:06-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Trends Cogn Sci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1364-6613</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>11</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>15</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>adaptive</prism:category>
    <prism:category>bounded-rationality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2762005">
    <title>Adaptationism and Optimality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology)</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2762005</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(11 June 2001)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The theory of adaptationism argues that natural selection contains sufficient explanatory power in itself to account for all evolution. However, there are differing views about the efficiency, or optimality, of the adaptation model of explanation. If the adaptationism theory is applied, are energy and resources being used as optimally as possible? Adaptationism and Optimality combines contributions from biologists and philosophers, and offers a systematic treatment of foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues surrounding the theory of adaptationism.</description>
    <dc:title>Adaptationism and Optimality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology)</dc:title>

    <dc:source>(11 June 2001)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-05-06T16:48:08-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2001</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publisher>Cambridge University Press</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>adaptive</prism:category>
    <prism:category>methdology</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2688302">
    <title>Information Foraging</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2688302</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Psychological Review, Vol. 106, No. 4. (1 October 1999), pp. 643-675.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Information foraging theory is an approach to understanding how strategies and technologies for information seeking, gathering, and consumption are adapted to the flux of information in the environment. The theory assumes that people, when possible, will modify their strategies or the structure of the environment to maximize their rate of gaining valuable information. The theory is developed by (a) adaptation (rational) analysis of information foraging problems and (b) a detailed process model (adaptive control of thought in information foraging [ACT-IF]). The adaptation analysis develops (a) information patch models, which deal with time allocation and information filtering and enrichment activities in environments in which information is encountered in clusters; (b) information scent models, which address the identification of information value from proximal cues; and (c) information diet models, which address decisions about the selection and pursuit of information items. ACT-IF is instantiated as a production system model of people interacting with complex information technology.</description>
    <dc:title>Information Foraging</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Peter Pirolli</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Stuart Card</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.643</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Psychological Review, Vol. 106, No. 4. (1 October 1999), pp. 643-675.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-04-18T16:23:09-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1999</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Psychological Review</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>106</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>643</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>675</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>adaptive</prism:category>
    <prism:category>information-seeking</prism:category>
    <prism:category>models</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/957865">
    <title>Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/957865</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 5. (2003), pp. 1449-1475.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Daniel Kahneman</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>The American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 5. (2003), pp. 1449-1475.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-11-22T18:27:58-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2003</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>The American Economic Review</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>93</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1449</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1475</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>adaptive</prism:category>
    <prism:category>bounded-rationality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
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