Thu, 24 Jul 2008 23:20:23 BST CiteULike: Tag biases http://www.citeulike.org/tag/biases CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/tinkha/article/356470 <i>Inf. Manage., Vol. 39, No. 8. (September 2002), pp. 625-645.</i> Improving information requirements determination: a cognitive perspective Glenn Browne V Ramesh doi:10.1016/S0378-7206(02)00014-9 Inf. Manage., Vol. 39, No. 8. (September 2002), pp. 625-645. 2005-10-20T15:49:26-00:00 2002 Inf. Manage. 0378-7206 39 8 625 645 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. biases cognition information requirements http://www.citeulike.org/user/shupsy/article/789164 <i>Science, Vol. 313, No. 5787. (4 August 2006), pp. 684-687.</i><br /><br />Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the manner in which options are presented. This so-called "framing effect" represents a striking violation of standard economic accounts of human rationality, although its underlying neurobiology is not understood. We found that the framing effect was specifically associated with amygdala activity, suggesting a key role for an emotional system in mediating decision biases. Moreover, across individuals, orbital and medial prefrontal cortex activity predicted a reduced susceptibility to the framing effect. This finding highlights the importance of incorporating emotional processes within models of human choice and suggests how the brain may modulate the effect of these biasing influences to approximate rationality. Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain. B De Martino D Kumaran B Seymour RJ Dolan doi:10.1126/science.1128356 Science, Vol. 313, No. 5787. (4 August 2006), pp. 684-687. 2006-08-07T22:43:13-00:00 2006 Science 1095-9203 313 5787 684 687 biases decision-making neuropsychology rationality http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1371280 <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2. (February 1976), pp. 178-183.</i><br /><br />Conducted a naturalistic study on Halloween to assess the effects of 3 deindividuation variables (anonymity vs nonanonymity, alone vs group, and groups with or without a child who was made responsible for the group's actions) on stealing by children. Concealed raters unobtrusively observed approximately 1,300 trick-or-treating children who were assigned to various conditions and given an opportunity to steal candy and money. Significantly more stealing was observed under conditions of anonymity and in the presence of a group. There was also an Anonymity-Group interaction. Altered responsibility affected the transgression rate only when both the leader and members were anonymous. The highest rates of stealing occurred among anonymous children in groups with altered responsibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved) Effects of deindividuation variables on stealing among Halloween trick-or-treaters Edward Diener Scott Fraser Arthur Beaman Roger Kelem Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 2. (February 1976), pp. 178-183. 2007-06-07T20:11:24-00:00 1976 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 33 2 178 183 biases deindividuation psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1370755 <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4, Part 1. (April 1968), pp. 319-323.</i><br /><br />INVESTIGATED POSTDECISIONAL DISSONANCE REDUCTION PROCESSES FOLLOWING A COMMITMENT TO BET ON A HORSE IN THE NATURAL SETTING OF A RACE TRACK. IN EXP. 1, 69 $2 WIN BETTORS RATED THE CHANCE THAT THE HORSE THEY HAD SELECTED WOULD WIN THE FORTHCOMING RACE, AND 72 OTHER SS PROVIDED RATINGS IMMEDIATLEY AFTER MAKING A $2 WIN BET. ON A 7-POINT RATING SCALE PREBET SS GAVE A MEDIAN RATING OF 3.48, CORRESPONDING TO A "FAIR CHANCE OF WINNING"; POSTBET SS GAVE A MEDIAN RATING OF 4.81, CORRESPONDING TO A "GOOD CHANCE OF WINNING." THIS DIFFERENCE WAS SIGNIFICANT BEYOND THE .01 LEVEL. THE GENERAL FINDINGS WERE REPLICATED IN EXP. II IN WHICH HARNESS RACE PATRONS RATED HOW CONFIDENT THEY FELT ABOUT THEIR SELECTED HORSE JUST BEFORE OR JUST AFTER BETTING. RESULTS FROM BOTH STUDIES PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR FESTINGER'S THEORY IN A REAL LIFE SETTING AND INDICATE THAT DISSONANCE REDUCING PROCESSES MAY OCCUR RAPIDLY FOLLOWING COMMITMENT TO A DECISION. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved) POSTDECISION DISSONANCE AT POST TIME Robert Knox James Inkster Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4, Part 1. (April 1968), pp. 319-323. 2007-06-07T15:55:23-00:00 1968 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 4, Part 1 319 323 biases psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/278468 <i>The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1991), pp. 193-206.</i> Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias Daniel Kahneman Jack Knetsch Richard Thaler The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1991), pp. 193-206. 2005-08-11T08:21:57-00:00 1991 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 1 193 206 biases effect endowment psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1370969 <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1. (May 2006), pp. 1-10.</i><br /><br />This paper challenges the common assumption that economic agents know their tastes. After reviewing previous research showing that valuation of ordinary products and experiences can be manipulated by non-normative cues, we present three studies showing that in some cases people do not have a pre-existing sense of whether an experience is good or bad--even when they have experienced a sample of it. Tom Sawyer and the construction of value Dan Ariely George Loewenstein Drazen Prelec Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1. (May 2006), pp. 1-10. 2007-06-07T17:07:12-00:00 2006 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60 1 1 10 biases psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1371150 <i>Acta Psychologica, Vol. 47, No. 2. (February 1981), pp. 143-148.</i><br /><br />In this study subjects were asked about their competence as drivers in relation to a group of drivers. The results showed that a majority of subjects regarded themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average driver in each group respectively. This result was compared with similar recent findings in other fields. Finally, the consequences for planning and risk taking of seeing oneself as more competent than others were discussed briefly. Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Ola Svenson Acta Psychologica, Vol. 47, No. 2. (February 1981), pp. 143-148. 2007-06-07T18:33:45-00:00 1981 Acta Psychologica 47 2 143 148 biases psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1370476 <i>The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (1994), pp. 255-270.</i><br /><br />This paper tests the conjecture that the divergence of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) for identical goods is driven by the degree of substitution between goods. In contrast to well-known results for market goods with close substitutes (i.e., candy bars and coffee mugs), our results indicate a convergence of WTP and WTA measures of value. However, for a nonmarket good with imperfect substitutes (i.e., reduced health risk), the divergence of WTP and WTA value measures is persistent, even with repeated market participation and full information on the nature of the good. Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept Jason Shogren Seung Shin Dermot Hayes James Kliebenstein The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (1994), pp. 255-270. 2007-06-07T14:28:05-00:00 1994 The American Economic Review 84 1 255 270 biases effect endowment psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/100015 <i></i> Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Amos Tversky Daniel Kahneman 2005-02-21T15:33:59-00:00 biases psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/nkelly/article/479008 <i>(30 April 1982)</i><br /><br />The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Individual chapters discuss the representativeness and availability heuristics, problems in judging covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage inference, social perception, medical diagnosis, risk perception, and methods for correcting and improving judgments under uncertainty. About half of the chapters are edited versions of classic articles; the remaining chapters are newly written for this book. Most review multiple studies or entire subareas of research and application rather than describing single experimental studies. This book will be useful to a wide range of students and researchers, as well as to decision makers seeking to gain insight into their judgments and to improve them. Judgment under Uncertainty : Heuristics and Biases Daniel Kahneman (30 April 1982) 2006-01-24T21:39:04-00:00 1982 Cambridge University Press behavioural biases heuristics psychology trading http://www.citeulike.org/user/jryall/article/363963 <i>Vol. 34, No. 1. (March 2002), pp. 33-37.</i> Learning styles and performance in the introductory programming sequence Lynda Thomas Mark Ratcliffe John Woodbury Emma Jarman doi:10.1145/563340.563352 Vol. 34, No. 1. (March 2002), pp. 33-37. 2005-10-24T23:40:48-00:00 2002 0097-8418 34 1 33 37 ACM Press assessment biases education felder learning-styles reasons-for-leaving http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1678996 <i>Pers Soc Psychol Rev, Vol. 5, No. 2. (1 May 2001), pp. 156-168.</i><br /><br />Research on lay theories suggests that people who begin the task of social perception with different starting assumptions follow different cognitive paths and reach different social endpoints. In this article, we show how laypeople's fixed (entity) versus dynamic (incremental) theories of human nature foster different meaning systems for interpreting and respondingto the same group information. Using research with adults and children, in the United States and East Asia, and concerning familiar and novel groups, wedocument how these theories influence susceptibility to stereotyping, perceptions of group homogeneity, the ultimate attribution error, intergroup bias,and discriminatory behavior. Further, we discuss social-cultural factors that produce and perpetuate these theories as well as why and when these theories are maintained and changed. The implications of this work for reducing stereotyping and intergroup conflict are considered. 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0502_6 Static Versus Dynamic Theories and the Perception of Groups: Different Routes to Different Destinations Sheri Levy Jason Plaks Ying-Yi Hong Chi-Yue Chiu Carol Dweck doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0502_6 Pers Soc Psychol Rev, Vol. 5, No. 2. (1 May 2001), pp. 156-168. 2007-09-20T13:12:36-00:00 2001 Pers Soc Psychol Rev 5 2 156 168 biases impressionformation intergrouprelations review socialpsychology stereotypes theory http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1637862 <i>The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 3. (2007), pp. 81-104.</i> Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior Benartzi Shlomo Thaler H Richard doi:10.1257/089533007781798294 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 3. (2007), pp. 81-104. 2007-09-09T00:38:21-00:00 2007 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 0895-3309 21 3 81 104 American Economic Association biases cognitivepsychology economics heuristics http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1645245 <i>University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 147, No. 3. (1999), pp. 613-675.</i> Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and beyond Cass Sunstein University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 147, No. 3. (1999), pp. 613-675. 2007-09-11T19:07:11-00:00 1999 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 147 3 613 675 biases disclosure fairness heuristics justice politics power transparency http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1659128 <i>Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 5. (2001), pp. 168-172.</i><br /><br />For many purposes, people need a reasonably good idea of what other people know. This article presents an argument and considers evidence that people use their own knowledge as a basis for developing models of what specific other people know in particular, that they tend to assume that other people know what they know. This is a generally useful heuristic, but the assumption is often made uncritically, with the consequence that people end up assuming that others have knowledge that they do not have. The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads Raymond Nickerson doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00141 Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 5. (2001), pp. 168-172. 2007-09-14T21:53:37-00:00 2001 Current Directions in Psychological Science 10 5 168 172 biases cognitivepsychology communication heuristics review socialpsychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1645236 <i>Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 4. (1999), pp. 683-768.</i><br /><br />An availability cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse. The driving mechanism involves a combination of informational and reputational motives: Individuals endorse the perception partly by learning from the apparent beliefs of others and partly by distorting their public responses in the interest of maintaining social acceptance. Availability entrepreneurs-activists who manipulate the content of public discourse-strive to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their agendas. Their availability campaigns may yield social benefits, but sometimes they bring harm, which suggests a need for safeguards. Focusing on the role of mass pressures in the regulation of risks associated with production, consumption, and the environment, Professors Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein analyze availability cascades and suggest reforms to alleviate their potential hazards. Their proposals include new governmental structures designed to give civil servants better insulation against mass demands for regulatory change and an easily accessible scientific database to reduce people's dependence on popular (mis)perceptions. Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation Timur Kuran Cass Sunstein Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 4. (1999), pp. 683-768. 2007-09-11T19:03:51-00:00 1999 Stanford Law Review 51 4 683 768 biases cognitivepsychology diffusion heuristics innovation politics power review risk socialmovements socialpsychology sociology http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1678984 <i></i><br /><br />In this target article, we present evidence for a new model of individual differences in judgments and reactions. The model holds that people's implicit theories about human attributes structure the way they understand and react to human actions and outcomes. We review research showing that when people believe that attributes (such as intelligence or moral character) are fixed, trait-like entities (an entity theory), they tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of these fixed traits ("I failed the test because I am dumb" or "He stole the bread because he is dishonest"). In contrast, when people believe that attributes are more dynamic, malleable, and developable (an incremental theory), they tend to focus less on broad traits and, instead, tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioral or psychological mediators ("I failed the test because of my effort or strategy" or "He stole the bread because he was desperate"). The two frameworks also appear to foster different reactions: helpless versus mastery-oriented responses to personal setbacks and an emphasis on retribution versus education or rehabilitation for transgressions. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for personality, motivation, and social perception. Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions: A World from Two Perspectives Carol Dweck Chi-Yue Chiu Ying-Yi Hong 2007-09-20T13:06:40-00:00 biases heuristics judgment laytheory review socialpsychology theory http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1659066 <i>Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, No. 3. (2006), pp. 281-295.</i><br /><br />Abstract  Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others George Loewenstein Don Moore Roberto Weber doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, No. 3. (2006), pp. 281-295. 2007-09-14T21:38:53-00:00 2006 Experimental Economics 9 3 281 295 biases cognitivepsychology communication experiment heuristics http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1645251 <i>The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2. (2000), pp. 1059-1103.</i><br /><br />Cost-benefit analysis is often justified on conventional economic grounds, as a way of preventing inefficiency. But it is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds--as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition. Poor judgments, by individuals and societies, can result from certain heuristics, from informational and reputational cascades, from thinking processes in which benefits are "on screen" but costs are not, from ignoring systemic effects of one-shot interventions, from seeing cases in isolation, and from intense emotional reactions. Cost-benefit analysis serves as a corrective to these cognitive problems. In addition, it is possible to arrive at an incompletely theorized agreement on cost-benefit analysis--an agreement that does not depend on controversial arguments (for example, the view that willingness to pay should be the basis for all social outcomes) and that can attract support from a variety of reasonable views. There is discussion as well of the role of distributional weights and other equitable factors in cost-benefit analysis. The conclusion is that the best argument for cost-benefit analysis is rooted in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis Cass Sunstein The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2. (2000), pp. 1059-1103. 2007-09-11T19:10:02-00:00 2000 The Journal of Legal Studies 29 2 1059 1103 biases cognitivepsychology heuristics politics power risk http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1659054 <i>The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 5. (1989), pp. 1232-1254.</i><br /><br />In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed. The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis Colin Camerer George Loewenstein Martin Weber doi:10.2307/1831894 The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 5. (1989), pp. 1232-1254. 2007-09-14T21:36:26-00:00 1989 The Journal of Political Economy 97 5 1232 1254 biases cognitivepsychology communication experiment socialpsychology