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<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 23:16:14 BST</pubDate>


	<title>CiteULike: Tag counterfactuals</title>
	<description>CiteULike: Tag counterfactuals</description>


	<link>http://www.citeulike.org/tag/counterfactuals</link>
	<dc:publisher>CiteULike.org</dc:publisher>
	<dc:language>en-gb</dc:language>
	<dc:rights>Copyright &#169; 2004-2008 citeulike.org</dc:rights>
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        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214190"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214054"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/241075"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1941092"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1923805"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/163439"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/1818759"/>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1391737"/>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214190">
    <title>On the psychology of 'if only': Regret and the comparison between factual and counterfactual outcomes</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214190</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 97, No. 2. (July 2005), pp. 152-160.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;People experience regret when they realize that they would have been better off had they decided differently. Hence, a central element in regret is the comparability of a decision outcome with the outcomes forgone. Up to now, however, the comparison process that is so essential to the experience of regret has not been the subject of psychological research. In this article, we tune in on the comparison dependency of regret. We argue that factors that reduce the tendency to compare attenuate regret, and demonstrate that uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes (Experiment 1), and incomparability of counterfactual and factual outcomes (Experiments 2 and 3) produce such effects.</description>
    <dc:title>On the psychology of 'if only': Regret and the comparison between factual and counterfactual outcomes</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Eric van Dijk</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Marcel Zeelenberg</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.04.001</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 97, No. 2. (July 2005), pp. 152-160.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-05-30T13:16:30-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>97</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>152</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>160</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>anticipation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>choice</prism:category>
    <prism:category>comparison</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
    <prism:category>emotion</prism:category>
    <prism:category>expectation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>regret</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214054">
    <title>Expectations and emotions of Olympic athletes</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214054</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 4. (July 2005), pp. 438-446.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In an often-cited study about counterfactuals, Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) found that bronze medalists appeared happier than silver medalists in television coverage of the 1992 Summer Olympics. Medvec et al. argued that bronze medalists compared themselves to 4th place finishers, whereas silver medalists compared themselves to gold medalists. These counterfactuals were the most salient because they were either qualitatively different (gold vs. silver) or categorically different (medal vs. no medal) from what actually occurred. Drawing on archival data and experimental studies, we show that Olympic athletes (among others) are more likely to make counterfactual comparisons based on their prior expectations, consistent with decision affect theory. Silver medalists are more likely to be disappointed because their personal expectations are higher than those of bronze medalists. We provide a test between expectancy-based versus category-based processing and discuss circumstances that trigger each type of processing.</description>
    <dc:title>Expectations and emotions of Olympic athletes</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Peter Mcgraw</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Barbara Mellers</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Philip Tetlock</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.09.001</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 4. (July 2005), pp. 438-446.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-05-30T09:12:42-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>41</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>438</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>446</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>emotion</prism:category>
    <prism:category>expectation</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/241075">
    <title>Differences in the cognitive accessibility of action and inaction regrets</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/241075</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This paper investigates the temporal pattern of experienced regret and provides insight into the underlying factors leading to differential cognitive accessibility of actions and inactions over time. Across three studies, we find increased cognitive accessibility of inactions in the long term with no difference in the accessibility of actions and inactions in the short term. We find support for the depth of impact, breadth of impact, and frequency of thought as explanations for this differential accessibility.</description>
    <dc:title>Differences in the cognitive accessibility of action and inaction regrets</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Priyali Rajagopal</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Sekar Raju</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Rao Unnava</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.05.003</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-06-30T21:10:08-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationName>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>In Press, Corrected Proof</prism:volume>
    <prism:category>affect</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
    <prism:category>regret</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1941092">
    <title>The Philosophy of Philosophy</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1941092</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(28 January 2008)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The second volume in the &#60;i&#62;Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy&#60;/i&#62;, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. &#60;br&#62;&#60;ul&#62;&#60;br&#62;&#60;li&#62;Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson &#60;br&#62;&#60;li&#62;Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy &#60;br&#62;&#60;li&#62;Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking &#60;br&#62;&#60;li&#62;Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing&#60;/li&#62;&#60;/ul&#62;</description>
    <dc:title>The Philosophy of Philosophy</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Timothy Williamson</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>(28 January 2008)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-11-20T03:44:32-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2008</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publisher>Blackwell</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>conditionals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>epistemology</prism:category>
    <prism:category>gettier</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intuitions</prism:category>
    <prism:category>metaphysics</prism:category>
    <prism:category>modality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>modal_logic</prism:category>
    <prism:category>philosophy</prism:category>
    <prism:category>thought_experiments</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1923805">
    <title>Counterfactual Scorekeeping</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1923805</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 30 (2007), pp. 329-360.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Orthodoxy has it that counterfactuals cannot be treated as strict conditionals. But there is a loophole: if the strictness is a function of context then maybe they can be so treated. I argue for a loophole analysis that treats ‘would’-counterfactuals as strict conditionals that are duals to ‘might’- counterfactuals. Most of the work lies in getting straight about the interaction between context and semantic value. I treat it as a general feature of the dynamics of conversational score.</description>
    <dc:title>Counterfactual Scorekeeping</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Anthony Gillies</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1007/s10988-007-9018-6</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 30 (2007), pp. 329-360.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-11-15T20:01:20-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2007</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Linguistics and Philosophy</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>30</prism:volume>
    <prism:startingPage>329</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>360</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>context_sensitivity</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>modals</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/163439">
    <title>Causation</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/163439</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 17. (1973), pp. 556-567.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Causation</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>David Lewis</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 17. (1973), pp. 556-567.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-04-18T08:05:57-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1973</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>The Journal of Philosophy</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>70</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>17</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>556</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>567</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>causation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/1818759">
    <title>INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION, COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS, AND LAWS OF NATURE</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/calsaleh/article/1818759</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Philosophical Studies, Vol. 85, No. 1. (1 November 1996), pp. 1-36.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION, COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS, AND LAWS OF NATURE</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Marc Lange</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1023/A:1017926103678</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Philosophical Studies, Vol. 85, No. 1. (1 November 1996), pp. 1-36.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-10-25T05:17:18-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1996</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Philosophical Studies</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>85</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>36</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>causality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>causation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>laws_of_nature</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1391737">
    <title>Parsing 'If'-Sentences</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1391737</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 4. (1984), pp. 145-153.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Parsing 'If'-Sentences</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>VH Dudman</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 4. (1984), pp. 145-153.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-06-15T10:13:19-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1984</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Analysis</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>44</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>145</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>153</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>conditionals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/67537">
    <title>Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/67537</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Analysis, Vol. 64, No. 284., 299.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Jonathan Schaffer</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00501.x</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Analysis, Vol. 64, No. 284., 299.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2004-12-28T18:34:32-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationName>Analysis</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0003-2638</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>64</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>284</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>299</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:publisher>Blackwell Publishing</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>causation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1394909">
    <title>Useful counterfactuals</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1394909</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(1999)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Counterfactual conditional sentences can be useful in articial intelligence as they are in human aairs. In particular, they allow reasoners to learn from experiences that they did not quite have. Our tools for making inferences from counterfactuals permit inferring sentences that are not themselves counterfactual. This is what makes them useful. A simple class of useful counterfactuals involves a change of one component of a point in a space provided with a cartesian product structure. We...</description>
    <dc:title>Useful counterfactuals</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>T Costello</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>J Mccarthy</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>(1999)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-06-17T10:11:20-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1999</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1391783">
    <title>The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/azraeljimenez/article/1391783</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 5. (1947), pp. 113-128.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Nelson Goodman</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 5. (1947), pp. 113-128.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-06-15T10:58:08-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1947</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>The Journal of Philosophy</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>44</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>113</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>128</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>conditionals</prism:category>
    <prism:category>counterfactuals</prism:category>
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