CiteULike: Tag decision-making

Mobile decision support for transplantation patient data

Andreas Krause — 2007-07-30T09:48:07-00:00

International Journal of Medical Informatics, Vol. 73, No. 5. (15 June 2004), pp. 461-464.

In high-critical medical fields instant information delivery is essential. Task-flow analyses within the transplantation unit of the Technische Universitat Munchen revealed that valuable time could be saved in pre-transplantation management being able to retrieve data of organ receivers ubiquitously. Inspired by this clinical scenario, a mobile application was designed and implemented providing surgeons with decision-relevant information on potential organ receivers. It assists them in considering the prospects of forthcoming organ transplantations and facilitates decision making and documentation with regard to high security demands. The described system services three organ receiver lists and is used by the surgeons in every transplantation procedure. After a 6-month period of clinical usage, the system has been evaluated in terms of handling, clinical benefit and total time savings. Intuitive, ubiquitous access to decision-relevant patient data and authenticated documentation were the major improvements with average total time savings of 50 min in comparison to the old system.

Facilitating mobile decision making

Mohamed Sharaf — 2007-07-30T09:46:19-00:00

(2002), pp. 45-53.

Environments That Make Us Smart: Ecological Rationality

Peter Todd — 2007-06-16T13:12:40-00:00

Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 3. (June 2007), pp. 167-171.

Traditional views of rationality posit general-purpose decision mechanisms based on logic or optimization. The study of ecological rationality focuses on uncovering the "adaptive toolbox" of domain-specific simple heuristics that real, computationally bounded minds employ, and explaining how these heuristics produce accurate decisions by exploiting the structures of information in the environments in which they are applied. Knowing when and how people use particular heuristics can facilitate the shaping of environments to engender better decisions.

The Ecological Rationality of Simple Group Heuristics: Effects of Group Member Strategies on Decision Accuracy

Reimer — 2006-05-03T15:33:56-00:00

Theory and Decision, Vol. 60, No. 4. (June 2006), pp. 403-438.

The use of recognition in group decision-making

Torsten Reimer — 2007-09-19T01:58:33-00:00

Cognitive Science, Vol. 28, No. 6. ( 2004), pp. 1009-1029.

Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) [Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109 (1), 75-90] found evidence for the use of the recognition heuristic. For example, if an individual recognizes only one of two cities, they tend to infer that the recognized city has a larger population. A prediction that follows is that of the less-is-more effect: Recognizing fewer cities leads, under certain conditions, to more accurate inferences than recognizing more cities. We extend the recognition heuristic to group decision-making by developing majority and lexicographic models of how recognition information is used by groups. We formally show when the less-is-more effect is predicted in groups and we present a study where three-member groups performed the population comparison task. Several aspects of our data indicate that members who can use the recognition heuristic are, not in all but in most cases, more influential in the group decision process than members who cannot use the heuristic. We also observed the less-is-more effect and found that models assuming that members who can use the recognition heuristic are more influential better predict when the effect occurs.

Simplicity: a unifying principle in cognitive science?

Nick Chater — 2007-09-20T01:45:52-00:00

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 1. (January 2003), pp. 19-22.

Much of perception, learning and high-level cognition involves finding patterns in data. But there are always infinitely many patterns compatible with any finite amount of data. How does the cognitive system choose `sensible' patterns? A long tradition in epistemology, philosophy of science, and mathematical and computational theories of learning argues that patterns `should' be chosen according to how simply they explain the data. This article reviews research exploring the idea that simplicity drives a wide range of cognitive processes. We outline mathematical theory, computational results and empirical data that underpin this viewpoint.

A Theory of Problem-Solving Behavior

Irving Tallman — 2004-11-22T00:17:30-00:00

Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 3. (1993), pp. 157-177.

In this paper we develop a formal, testable theory of problem-solving behavior with special relevance to individuals and small groups. The theory is consistent with principles drawn from operant behavior and social exchange theories but also incorporates elements of cognitive psychology. Problem solving is defined as a nonroutine activity oriented toward changing an undesirable state of affairs. The focus on change differentiates problem solving from coping, which is oriented toward relieving feelings of stress. A decision-making model is presented, which takes the problem-solving process through its latter stages. The theory is based on two axioms and three theorems pertaining to the process of decision making. These axioms and theorems serve as the foundation for deriving 14 theorems that establish the antecedent conditions affecting decisions relevant to each of four stages in the problem-solving process. This theory is distinguished from other problem-solving theories in its effort to account for conditions leading to awareness of problems and in its emphasis on generic problem-solving processes rather than on the effectiveness of problem-solving outcomes.

A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice

Herbert Simon — 2006-12-15T09:58:58-00:00

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1. (1955), pp. 99-118.

Introduction, 99.--I. Some general features of rational choice, 100.--II. The essential simplifications, 103.--III. Existence and uniqueness of solutions, 111.--IV. Further comments on dynamics, 113.--V. Conclusion, 114.--Appendix, 115.

Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior

Nick Chater — 2006-03-16T14:03:01-00:00

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 90, No. 1. (January 2003), pp. 63-86.

Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer and Todd (1999a) argue that reasoning involves “fast and frugal” algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this view, based on: (A) the importance of the environment; (B) the existence of cognitive limitations; and (C) the fact that an algorithm with no apparent rational basis, Take-the-Best, succeeds in an judgment task (judging which of two cities is the larger, based on lists of features of each city). We reconsider (A)-(C), arguing that standard patterns of explanation in psychology and the social and biological sciences, use rational norms to explain why simple cognitive algorithms can succeed. We also present new computer simulations that compare Take-the-Best with other cognitive models (which use connectionist, exemplar-based, and decision-tree algorithms). Although Take-the-Best still performs well, it does not perform noticeably better than the other models. We conclude that these results provide no strong reason to prefer Take-the-Best over alternative cognitive models.

Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from "how" to "what"

Tamar Avnet — 2008-04-07T20:00:29-00:00

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 39, No. 5. (September 2003), pp. 525-530.

Regulatory fit is experienced when people pursue a goal in a manner that sustains their regulatory orientation. Previous research on promotion and prevention orientations has found that regulatory fit increases people's perception that a decision they made was "right," which in turn transfers value to the decision outcome, including being willing to pay more for a product than those who chose the same product without regulatory fit ([Higgins, 2000]; Higgins et al., in press). We predicted that the effect of regulatory fit on monetary value could be generalized to locomotion and assessment orientations. Participants were willing to pay over 40% more for the same book-light when it was chosen with a strategy that fit their regulatory orientation (assessment/"full evaluation"; locomotion/"progressive elimination") than when it was chosen with a non-fit strategy.

Distinguishing Gains from Nonlosses and Losses from Nongains: A Regulatory Focus Perspective on Hedonic Intensity

Lorraine Idson — 2007-09-28T14:00:41-00:00

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 36, No. 3. (May 2000), pp. 252-274.

We find that the pleasure of a gain is generally greater than the pleasure of a nonloss and that the pain of a loss is generally greater than the pain of a nongain. These patterns were found when participants reported both how they would feel if these outcomes were to happen (Studies 1 and 2) and how they actually felt when they happened (Study 3). Our results also suggest that it is stronger cheerfulness (rather than quiescence) that underlies the greater pleasure of a gain and stronger agitation (rather than dejection) that underlies the greater aversiveness of a loss. This set of findings is predicted by our regulatory focus conceptualization of how gain (promotion success) and nongain (promotion failure) versus nonloss (prevention success) and loss (prevention failure) differ in whether they are experienced in relation to a maximal goal or a minimal goal, respectively. Implications for models of emotional experiences and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are discussed.

Testing sociometer theory: Self-esteem and the importance of acceptance for social decision-making

Danu Anthony — 2007-04-05T08:18:29-00:00

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 3. (May 2007), pp. 425-432.

The present study examined the sociometer's role in guiding social behavior. The authors hypothesized that low self-esteem people (LSEs), but not high self-esteem people (HSEs), base their social decision-making on acceptance. Undergraduate participants were invited to join a social group and were led to believe that acceptance either was guaranteed, or was likely but not guaranteed. HSEs always were eager to join the group, whereas LSEs were keen to join the group only when acceptance was guaranteed. Furthermore, mediation analyses indicated that LSEs' willingness to join the group was dependent on their anticipated social outcomes, which were contingent on acceptance from the group, whereas acceptance did not affect HSEs' decision-making. These results support a sociometer account of social decision-making.

Modeling intra-household interactions and group decision-making

Chandra Bhat — 2005-07-26T13:23:44-00:00

Transportation, Vol. 32, No. 5. (September 2005), pp. 443-448.

Going Visual: Using Images To Enhance Productivity, Decision-Making And Profits

Alexis Gerard — 2005-06-13T07:03:26-00:00

(11 February 2005)

How and why to make visual communication a powerful competitive tool<br> From digital cameras and camera phones to videoconferencing, visual communication technology is changing not only personal lives but global business relationships and communities of interest. Visual communication is an essential tool for every corporation-in any industry-that wants to stay competitive.<br> Going Visual demonstrates how businesses can harness the power of digital images and video to communicate comprehensively and unambiguously. Through real-world success stories the authors outline a clear, simple, five-step plan for developing a Visual Communication Strategy that will sharpen every organization's competitive edge and improve its bottom line.<br> Alexis Gerard (San Mateo, CA) is the founder of Future Image Inc., an imaging technology think tank whose clients include Adobe, Canon, Eastman Kodak, IBM, Intel, Procter & Gamble, and Sony. He previously held executive positions in new technologies marketing at Apple Computer. Bob Goldstein (Los Angeles, CA) has been the president and founder of ZZYZX Visual Systems, president of the Altamira Group, and a visual communication consultant to such companies as Eastman Kodak, Apple, Oracle, Microsoft, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard. Gerard and Goldstein have coauthored articles in Red Herring and Forbes. How and why to make visual communication a powerful competitive tool From digital cameras and camera phones to videoconferencing, visual communication technology is changing not only personal lives but global business relationships and communities of interest. Visual communication is an essential tool for every corporation-in any industry-that wants to stay competitive. Going Visual demonstrates how businesses can harness the power of digital images and video to communicate comprehensively and unambiguously. Through real-world success stories the authors outline a clear, simple, five-step plan for developing a Visual Communication Strategy that will sharpen every organization's competitive edge and improve its bottom line.

The framing effect and risky decisions: Examining cognitive functions with fMRI

Cleotilde Gonzalez — 2005-03-23T22:07:38-00:00

Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1. (February 2005), pp. 1-20.

The "framing effect" is observed when the description of options in terms of gains (positive frame) rather than losses (negative frame) elicits systematically different choices. Few theories explain the framing effect by using cognitive information-processing principles. In this paper we present an explanatory theory based on the cost-benefit tradeoffs described in contingent behavior. This theory proposes that individuals examining various alternatives try to determine how to make a good decision while expending minimal cognitive effort. For this study, we used brain activation functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to evaluate individuals that we asked to choose between one certain alternative and one risky alternative in response to problems framed as gains or losses. Our results indicate that the cognitive effort required to select a sure gain was considerably lower than the cognitive effort required to choose a risky gain. Conversely, the cognitive effort expended in choosing a sure loss was equal to the cognitive effort expended in choosing a risky loss. fMRI revealed that the cognitive functions used by the decision makers in this study were localized in the prefrontal and parietal cortices of the brain, a finding that suggests the involvement of working memory and imagery in the selection process.

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

Robyn Leboeuf — 2007-06-11T18:31:39-00:00

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 16, No. 2. (2003), pp. 77-92.

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within-subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high-NC, compared to low-NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain.

Chun Siong Soon — 2008-04-15T16:21:46-00:00

Nature neuroscience (13 April 2008)

There has been a long controversy as to whether subjectively 'free' decisions are determined by brain activity ahead of time. We found that the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness.

Intuitive evaluation of likelihood judgment producers: evidence for a confidence heuristic

Paul Price — 2005-05-31T21:52:55-00:00

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 17, No. 1. (16 December 2003), pp. 39-57.

This research tests the hypothesis of Yates et al. (1996) that people prefer judgment producers who make extreme confidence judgments. In each of three experiments, college students evaluated two fictional financial advisors who judged the likelihood that each of several stocks would increase in value. One of the advisors (the moderate advisor) was reasonably well calibrated and the other (the extreme advisor) was overconfident. In all three experiments, participants tended to prefer the extreme advisor. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the advisors' confidence influenced participants' perception of their knowledge, and Experiment 3 showed that it influenced their perception of the number of categorically correct judgments they made. Both of these variables were, in turn, related to participants' preferences. Experiment 3 also suggested that need for cognition and right-wing authoritarianism are positively related to preference for the extreme advisor. A quantitative model is presented, which captures the basic pattern of results. This model includes the assumption that people use a confidence heuristic; they assume that a more confident advisor makes more categorically correct judgments and is more knowledgeable. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Perceived Risk and Worry: The Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Fly

Rochelle Bergstrom — 2005-01-16T00:26:31-00:00

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 9. (September 2004), 1846.

Most decision-making models rely on affect-free variables to understand the decisions that people make. We tested an affectively-loaded variable—worry—as a predictor of decision making in an affectively laden context: willingness to fly after 9/11. College students rated their willingness to fly to New York City or Washington, DC, in a study conducted 34 days after 9/11. They also recorded their beliefs about the likelihood that more terrorist attacks would occur, the severity of such attacks if they were to occur, and how much they worried about flying. Finally, they made these estimates for similar others. Results showed that worry was the most powerful predictor of one's own and similar others' willingness to fly. These findings suggest that models of how people make decisions may sometimes need to take feelings into account.

Predicting risk sensitivity in humans and lower animals: risk as variance or coefficient of variation.

EU Weber — 2005-02-20T19:43:47-00:00

Psychol Rev, Vol. 111, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 430-445.

This article examines the statistical determinants of risk preference. In a meta-analysis of animal risk preference (foraging birds and insects), the coefficient of variation (CV), a measure of risk per unit of return, predicts choices far better than outcome variance, the risk measure of normative models. In a meta-analysis of human risk preference, the superiority of the CV over variance in predicting risk taking is not as strong. Two experiments show that people's risk sensitivity becomes strongly proportional to the CV when they learn about choice alternatives like other animals, by experiential sampling over time. Experience-based choices differ from choices when outcomes and probabilities are numerically described. Zipf's law as an ecological regularity and Weber's law as a psychological regularity may give rise to the CV as a measure of risk.

Finding useful questions: on bayesian diagnosticity, probability, impact, and information gain.

JD Nelson — 2005-11-17T02:14:27-00:00

Psychol Rev, Vol. 112, No. 4. (October 2005), pp. 979-999.

Several norms for how people should assess a question's usefulness have been proposed, notably Bayesian diagnosticity, information gain (mutual information), Kullback-Liebler distance, probability gain (error minimization), and impact (absolute change). Several probabilistic models of previous experiments on categorization, covariation assessment, medical diagnosis, and the selection task are shown to not discriminate among these norms as descriptive models of human intuitions and behavior. Computational optimization found situations in which information gain, probability gain, and impact strongly contradict Bayesian diagnosticity. In these situations, diagnosticity's claims are normatively inferior. Results of a new experiment strongly contradict the predictions of Bayesian diagnosticity. Normative theoretical concerns also argue against use of diagnosticity. It is concluded that Bayesian diagnosticity is normatively flawed and empirically unjustified. ((c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved).

Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion

Baba Shiv — 2005-05-30T21:05:40-00:00

Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 6. (June 2005), pp. 435-439.

Can dysfunction in neural systems subserving emotion lead, under certain circumstances, to more advantageous decisions? To answer this question, we investigated how normal participants, patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions related to emotion (target patients), and patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions unrelated to emotion (control patients) made 20 rounds of investment decisions. Target patients made more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their investments than the normal participants and control patients. When normal participants and control patients either won or lost money on an investment round, they adopted a conservative strategy and became more reluctant to invest on the subsequent round; these results suggest that they were more affected than target patients by the outcomes of decisions made in the previous rounds.

When Things Don't Add Up: The Role of Perceived Fungibility in Repeated-Play Decisions

Michael Dekay — 2005-08-24T16:49:40-00:00

Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 9. (September 2005), pp. 667-672.

Previous research on repeated-play decisions has focused on choices with fungible outcomes. We investigated the perceived fungibility of outcomes over repeated plays of risky prospects in several situations, as well as the relationship between perceived fungibility and preferences for taking risks in those situations. Perceived fungibility varied substantially across participants and situations, with outcomes experienced by different people (e.g., medical outcomes for different patients) receiving lower scores than outcomes experienced by a single person. Higher perceived fungibility was associated with more favorable evaluations of repeated plays of risky prospects with positive expectations. Additionally, perceived fungibility moderated the effect of repetition, such that the increased attractiveness of repeated plays relative to a single play was diminished when perceived fungibility was low. Although evaluating the overall distribution of outcomes is arguably rational when monetary outcomes accrue to one person, treating each play as a separate event may be more appropriate when outcomes are not viewed as fungible.

Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,

Gerd Gigerenzer — 2005-05-23T14:31:04-00:00

Psychological Review, Vol. 103, No. 4. (October 1996), pp. 650-669.

Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, the authors held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures (e.g., multiple regression). The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference.

Matching Behavior and the Representation of Value in the Parietal Cortex

Leo Sugrue — 2005-02-01T17:44:21-00:00

Science, Vol. 304, No. 5678. (18 June 2004), pp. 1782-1787.

Psychologists and economists have long appreciated the contribution of reward history and expectation to decision-making. Yet we know little about how specific histories of choice and reward lead to an internal representation of the "value" of possible actions. We approached this problem through an integrated application of behavioral, computational, and physiological techniques. Monkeys were placed in a dynamic foraging environment in which they had to track the changing values of alternative choices through time. In this context, the monkeys' foraging behavior provided a window into their subjective valuation. We found that a simple model based on reward history can duplicate this behavior and that neurons in the parietal cortex represent the relative value of competing actions predicted by this model.

The impact of the certainty context on the process of choice.

J Dickhaut — 2005-02-22T22:43:58-00:00

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Vol. 100, No. 6. (18 March 2003), pp. 3536-3541.

In this study we examine how the introduction of a reference lottery with nonrandom outcomes alters the way in which choices among pairs of lotteries are made, even if it does not alter the choices. We use different domains (some of the lotteries produce gains, other losses) and different contexts (one member of the pair, the reference lottery, may be either risky or certain). In our experiment, the change from gain to loss domain affects choices: subjects are risk averse in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. On the contrary, the context effect of the certain lottery does not affect choices. However, the introduction of the certainty reference lottery affects two behavioral variables, response time and brain activation, in a dramatic way. This result suggests that the certainty lottery promotes a different process through which preferences are revealed, even if the differences among lotteries may not be large enough to induce different choices.

Instructional cues modify performance on the Iowa Gambling Task

Iris Balodis — 2006-03-08T14:54:02-00:00

Brain and Cognition, Vol. 60, No. 2. (March 2006), pp. 109-117.

The current study investigated whether acute alcohol intoxication produces impaired decision-making on tasks assessing ventromedial prefrontal (VMF) cortex functioning and impulsive responding. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a decision-making test targeting the VMF, and the Newman Perseveration Task (NT), a measure of impulsivity. Personality measures of impulsivity were assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). To encourage natural responding on both tasks, participants were falsely informed that the study was examining the effects of alcohol on memory; the impulsivity tasks were presented as 'distractor' tasks. Advantageous performance on the IGT was related to specific instructional cues as well as to knowledge about the experimental purpose. Performance of intoxicated and sober participants did not differ. A subsequent study in which the true purpose of the experiment was revealed confirmed that alcohol does not affect IGT performance. Most importantly, the instruction-sensitivity of the IGT emphasizes the importance of salient cues for decision-making.

State-Dependent Learned Valuation Drives Choice in an Invertebrate

Lorena Pompilio — 2006-03-18T22:08:13-00:00

Science, Vol. 311, No. 5767. (17 March 2006), pp. 1613-1615.

Humans and other vertebrates occasionally show a preference for items remembered to be costly or experienced when the subject was in a poor condition (this is known as a sunk-costs fallacy or state-dependent valuation). Whether these mechanisms shared across vertebrates are the result of convergence toward an adaptive solution or evolutionary relicts reflecting common ancestral traits is unknown. Here we show that state-dependent valuation also occurs in an invertebrate, the desert locust Schistocerca gregaria (Orthoptera: Acrididae). Given the latter's phylogenetic and neurobiological distance from those groups in which the phenomenon was already known, we suggest that state-dependent valuation mechanisms are probably ecologically rational solutions to widespread problems of choice.

Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?

Christopher K Hsee — 2005-12-04T06:07:02-00:00

Trends Cogn Sci (27 November 2005)

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest among psychologists and other social scientists in subjective well-being and happiness. Here we review selected contributions to this development from the literature on behavioral-decision theory. In particular, we examine many, somewhat surprising, findings that show people systematically fail to predict or choose what maximizes their happiness, and we look at reasons why they fail to do so. These findings challenge a fundamental assumption that underlies popular support for consumer sovereignty and other forms of autonomy in decision-making (e.g. marriage choice), namely, the assumption that people are able to make choices in their own best interests.

Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions

Jess Benhabib — 2005-03-15T15:24:05-00:00

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof

We provide a new model of consumption-saving decisions which explicitly allows for internal commitment mechanisms and self-control. Agents have the ability to invoke either automatic processes that are susceptible to the temptation of 'over-consuming,' or alternative control processes which require internal commitment but are immune to such temptations. Standard models in behavioral economics ignore such internal commitment mechanisms. We justify our model by showing that much of its construction is consistent with dynamic choice and cognitive control as they are understood in cognitive neuroscience.The dynamic consumption-saving behavior of an agent in the model is characterized by a simple consumption-saving goal and a cut-off rule for invoking control processes to inhibit automatic processes and implement the goal. We discuss empirical tests of our model with available individual consumption data and we suggest critical tests with brain-imaging and experimental data.

Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex.

ML Platt — 2005-02-01T19:51:55-00:00

Nature, Vol. 400, No. 6741. (15 July 1999), pp. 233-238.

Decision theory proposes that humans and animals decide what to do in a given situation by assessing the relative value of each possible response. This assessment can be computed, in part, from the probability that each action will result in a gain and the magnitude of the gain expected. Here we show that the gain (or reward) a monkey can expect to realize from an eye-movement response modulates the activity of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area, an area of primate cortex that is thought to transform visual signals into eye-movement commands. We also show that the activity of these neurons is sensitive to the probability that a particular response will result in a gain. When animals can choose freely between two alternative responses, the choices subjects make and neuronal activation in this area are both correlated with the relative amount of gain that the animal can expect from each response. Our data indicate that a decision-theoretic model may provide a powerful new framework for studying the neural processes that intervene between sensation and action.

Neural Systems Responding to Degrees of Uncertainty in Human Decision-Making

Ming Hsu — 2006-01-16T11:14:30-00:00

Science, Vol. 310, No. 5754. (9 December 2005), pp. 1680-1683.

Much is known about how people make decisions under varying levels of probability (risk). Less is known about the neural basis of decision-making when probabilities are uncertain because of missing information (ambiguity). In decision theory, ambiguity about probabilities should not affect choices. Using functional brain imaging, we show that the level of ambiguity in choices correlates positively with activation in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, and negatively with a striatal system. Moreover, striatal activity correlates positively with expected reward. Neurological subjects with orbitofrontal lesions were insensitive to the level of ambiguity and risk in behavioral choices. These data suggest a general neural circuit responding to degrees of uncertainty, contrary to decision theory.

NEUROSCIENCE: Emotion and Reason in Making Decisions

Aldo Rustichini — 2006-03-03T16:43:03-00:00

Science, Vol. 310, No. 5754. (9 December 2005), pp. 1624-1625.

On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction

Ap Dijksterhuis — 2006-03-03T16:41:32-00:00

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof

This work compares conscious thought and unconscious thought in relation to quality of choice. Earlier work [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586-598] has shown that people make better choices after engaging in unconscious thought (i.e., unconscious activity during a period of distraction) rather than in conscious thought. However, the evidence was obtained for choices between hypothetical alternatives with quality of choice operationalized normatively. As quality of decision is essentially subjective, in the current experiment participants chose between real objects with quality operationalized as post-choice satisfaction. In a paradigm based on work by Wilson and colleagues [Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339], participants were briefly presented with five art posters, and chose one either (a) immediately, (b) after thorough conscious thinking about each poster, or (c) after a period of distraction. Participants took their favorite poster home and were phoned 3-5 weeks later. As hypothesized, unconscious thinkers were more satisfied with their choice than participants in the other two conditions.

Strategic behavior in monkeys

Amnon Rapoport — 2005-03-27T02:30:42-00:00

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof

In a recent paper, Lee et al. examined adaptive decision-making processes by training monkeys to play a competitive game against a computer programmed to play using various strategies. They found that the monkeys' responses were sensitive to the computer's strategies and consistent with reinforcement learning. Research such as this strongly complements current research in behavioral economics. We propose some potential future directions for this work, and put forward conjectures about what might be learned about decision-making in humans.

The majority rule in individual decision making

Jiao Zhang — 2006-03-03T16:37:26-00:00

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 99, No. 1. (January 2006), pp. 102-111.

This research investigates an understudied decision heuristic, the majority rule. By using the rule, decision makers choose the option superior on most of the available cues. Cues are broadly defined, including advisors and attributes. We propose that decision makers are more likely to use the majority rule when encouraged to employ intra-cue comparison as opposed to intra-option integration, and that their choices are influenced by factors that influence which option appears majority superior. We corroborate the two propositions in four studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we explore two factors that moderate use of the majority rule through facilitating intra-cue comparison or intra-option integration--response mode and information display format. In Studies 3 and 4, we explore two factors that influence choice through influencing which option appears majority-superior--cue-unpacking and cue-regrouping.

Biased memory for prior decision making: Evidence from a longitudinal field study

Rik Pieters — 2006-03-03T16:36:34-00:00

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 99, No. 1. (January 2006), pp. 34-48.

This research reveals systematic effects of outcome and behavior knowledge on memory for prior decision making in a three-wave longitudinal study of retrospective predictions and intentions involving the 1999-2000-millennium change. We demonstrate a pervasive consistency bias in memory for prior decision making, such that not only are remembered predictions more consistent with experienced outcomes than actual predictions, but also that remembered intentions are more consistent with behavior than actual intentions. These new findings reveal how outcome and behavior knowledge jointly influence memory reconstruction, reflecting multiple cue usage, and they identify the contribution of reconstruction processes in memory for prior decision making. Implications for research and theories on memory and decision making are discussed.

Monkeys pay per view: adaptive valuation of social images by rhesus macaques.

RO Deaner — 2005-03-31T16:40:19-00:00

Curr Biol, Vol. 15, No. 6. (29 March 2005), pp. 543-548.

Individuals value information that improves decision making. When social interactions complicate the decision process, acquiring information about others should be particularly valuable []. In primate societies, kinship, dominance, and reproductive status regulate social interactions [] and should therefore systematically influence the value of social information, but this has never been demonstrated. Here, we show that monkeys differentially value the opportunity to acquire visual information about particular classes of social images. Male rhesus macaques sacrificed fluid for the opportunity to view female perinea and the faces of high-status monkeys but required fluid overpayment to view the faces of low-status monkeys. Social value was highly consistent across subjects, independent of particular images displayed, and only partially predictive of how long subjects chose to view each image. These data demonstrate that visual orienting decisions reflect the specific social content of visual information and provide the first experimental evidence that monkeys spontaneously discriminate images of others based on social status.

Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of choice

Paul Glimcher — 2005-03-15T19:55:50-00:00

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof

Over the past half century economists have responded to the challenges of Allais [Econometrica (1953) 53], Ellsberg [Quart. J. Econ. (1961) 643] and others raised to neoclassicism either by bounding the reach of economic theory or by turning to descriptive approaches. While both of these strategies have been enormously fruitful, neither has provided a clear programmatic approach that aspires to a complete understanding of human decision making as did neoclassicism. There is, however, growing evidence that economists and neurobiologists are now beginning to reveal the physical mechanisms by which the human neuroarchitecture accomplishes decision making. Although in their infancy, these studies suggest both a single unified framework for understanding human decision making and a methodology for constraining the scope and structure of economic theory. Indeed, there is already evidence that these studies place mathematical constraints on existing economic models. This article reviews some of those constraints and suggests the outline of a neuroeconomic theory of decision.

Center-of-inattention: Position biases in decision-making

Priya Raghubir — 2006-03-03T16:34:49-00:00

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 99, No. 1. (January 2006), pp. 66-80.

This paper examines centrality of physical position as a cue that leads to systematic biases in people's decisions to retain or eliminate a participant from a group. Termed the "center-stage" effect, we argue that people use their belief that "important people sit in the middle" as a schematic cue that they substitute for individuating performance information for individuals who occupy central positions when the goal is to eliminate all but one of the group members. This leads to the errors of those in center-positions being overlooked: or making them the "centers-of-inattention." Study 1 examines people's lay beliefs regarding positions using two stylized placement tasks (a group interview and classroom seating scenarios). These suggest that people believe that more attention is paid to those in the center than those on the extremes. Study 2 tests the center-stage effect using observational data from a real television show, The Weakest Link. Results show that players assigned at random to central positions are more likely to win the game than those in extreme positions. Study 3, a laboratory experiment manipulating attention paid to the game shows that observers overlook the errors of players in the center to a greater extent than the errors of players in extreme positions. Study 4 replicates the game in the laboratory with direct process measures to show that players playing the game make the same error. Study 5 shows that in a stylized group interview setting, participants who believe that "important people sit in the middle" find the performance of candidates in the extreme position easier to recall than the performance of those in the central position, and are more likely to choose them. Study 6 shows that the "center-stage" effects are weaker when the end-game rule allows for two (vs one) contestants to be retained. Overall results converge to show that the use of the "center-stage" heuristic substitutes for the effortful processing of individuating information, leading to a biased (favorable) assessment of people in the center. Implications for decision-making are discussed.

Motivation concepts in behavioral neuroscience.

KC Berridge — 2005-04-07T14:17:41-00:00

Physiol Behav, Vol. 81, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 179-209.

Concepts of motivation are vital to progress in behavioral neuroscience. Motivational concepts help us to understand what limbic brain systems are chiefly evolved to do, i.e., to mediate psychological processes that guide real behavior. This article evaluates some major motivation concepts that have historic importance or have influenced the interpretation of behavioral neuroscience research. These concepts include homeostasis, setpoints and settling points, intervening variables, hydraulic drives, drive reduction, appetitive and consummatory behavior, opponent processes, hedonic reactions, incentive motivation, drive centers, dedicated drive neurons (and drive neuropeptides and receptors), neural hierarchies, and new concepts from affective neuroscience such as allostasis, cognitive incentives, and reward 'liking' versus 'wanting'.

Decision making.

JD Schall — 2005-02-26T20:54:33-00:00

Curr Biol, Vol. 15, No. 1. (11 January 2005)

Activity in posterior parietal cortex is correlated with the relative subjective desirability of action.

MC Dorris — 2005-02-04T21:13:00-00:00

Neuron, Vol. 44, No. 2. (14 October 2004), pp. 365-378.

Behavioral studies suggest that making a decision involves representing the overall desirability of all available actions and then selecting that action that is most desirable. Physiological studies have proposed that neurons in the parietal cortex play a role in selecting movements for execution. To test the hypothesis that these parietal neurons encode the subjective desirability of making particular movements, we exploited Nash's game theoretic equilibrium, during which the subjective desirability of multiple actions should be equal for human players. Behavior measured during a strategic game suggests that monkeys' choices, like those of humans, are guided by subjective desirability. Under these conditions, activity in the parietal cortex was correlated with the relative subjective desirability of actions irrespective of the specific combination of reward magnitude, reward probability, and response probability associated with each action. These observations may help place many recent findings regarding the posterior parietal cortex into a common conceptual framework.

Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions Under Uncertainty

Barbara Kahn — 2005-05-18T17:55:51-00:00

The Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 15, No. 2. (1988), pp. 265-272.

We present a model for predicting consumers' choices under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity. We use the term ambiguity to distinguish the class of risky decisions for which the odds of an uncertain event are not precisely known. We show that our model predicts different decisions for individuals who are ambiguity averse, ambiguity seeking, or ambiguity indifferent, thus relaxing the constraint imposed on preferences by subjected expected utility theory.

Failure to respond autonomically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal cortex

A Bechara — 2005-11-30T19:11:23-00:00

Cereb. Cortex, Vol. 6, No. 2. (1 March 1996), pp. 215-225.

Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex.

A Bechara — 2005-11-30T19:10:42-00:00

Cognition, Vol. 50, No. 1-3. (n 1994), pp. 7-15.

Following damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, humans develop a defect in real-life decision-making, which contrasts with otherwise normal intellectual functions. Currently, there is no neuropsychological probe to detect in the laboratory, and the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible for this defect have resisted explanation. Here, using a novel task which simulates real-life decision-making in the way it factors uncertainty of premises and outcomes, as well as reward and punishment, we find that prefrontal patients, unlike controls, are oblivious to the future consequences of their actions, and seem to be guided by immediate prospects only. This finding offers, for the first time, the possibility of detecting these patients' elusive impairment in the laboratory, measuring it, and investigating its possible causes.

Decision by sampling

Neil Stewart — 2006-03-03T14:05:41-00:00

Cognitive Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof

We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attribute's subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decision's context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.

Indeterminacy in brain and behavior.

PW Glimcher — 2005-02-22T21:46:23-00:00

Annu Rev Psychol, Vol. 56 (2005), pp. 25-56.

The central goal of modern science that evolved during the Enlightenment was the empirical reduction of uncertainty by experimental inquiry. Although there have been challenges to this view in the physical sciences, where profoundly indeterminate events have been identified at the quantum level, the presumption that physical phenomena are fundamentally determinate seems to have defined modern behavioral science. Programs like those of the classical behaviorists, for example, were explicitly anchored to a fully deterministic worldview, and this anchoring clearly influenced the experiments that those scientists chose to perform. Recent advances in the psychological, social, and neural sciences, however, have caused a number of scholars to begin to question the assumption that all of behavior can be regarded as fundamentally deterministic in character. Although it is not yet clear whether the generative mechanisms for human and animal behavior will require a philosophically indeterminate approach, it is clear that behavioral scientists of all kinds are beginning to engage the issues of indeterminacy that plagued physics at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Discrete coding of reward probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons.

CD Fiorillo — 2005-03-11T16:19:28-00:00

Science, Vol. 299, No. 5614. (21 March 2003), pp. 1898-1902.

Uncertainty is critical in the measure of information and in assessing the accuracy of predictions. It is determined by probability P, being maximal at P = 0.5 and decreasing at higher and lower probabilities. Using distinct stimuli to indicate the probability of reward, we found that the phasic activation of dopamine neurons varied monotonically across the full range of probabilities, supporting past claims that this response codes the discrepancy between predicted and actual reward. In contrast, a previously unobserved response covaried with uncertainty and consisted of a gradual increase in activity until the potential time of reward. The coding of uncertainty suggests a possible role for dopamine signals in attention-based learning and risk-taking behavior.

Neural coding of basic reward terms of animal learning theory, game theory, microeconomics and behavioural ecology.

W Schultz — 2005-02-22T21:51:28-00:00

Curr Opin Neurobiol, Vol. 14, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 139-147.

Neurons in a small number of brain structures detect rewards and reward-predicting stimuli and are active during the expectation of predictable food and liquid rewards. These neurons code the reward information according to basic terms of various behavioural theories that seek to explain reward-directed learning, approach behaviour and decision-making. The involved brain structures include groups of dopamine neurons, the striatum including the nucleus accumbens, the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala. The reward information is fed to brain structures involved in decision-making and organisation of behaviour, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and possibly the parietal cortex. The neural coding of basic reward terms derived from formal theories puts the neurophysiological investigation of reward mechanisms on firm conceptual grounds and provides neural correlates for the function of rewards in learning, approach behaviour and decision-making.