Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:06:25 BST CiteULike: Tag embodied http://www.citeulike.org/tag/embodied CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/200340 <i>(01 September 2004)</i> Where the Action Is : The Foundations of Embodied Interaction (Bradford Books) Paul Dourish (01 September 2004) 2005-05-14T21:46:04-00:00 2004 The MIT Press cognition context design embodied hci interaction media sociocognitive sociocultural http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/377973 <i>Brain and Cognition, Vol. 56, No. 1. (October 2004), pp. 100-106.</i><br /><br />Recent experimental research in the field of neurophysiology has led to the discovery of two classes of visuomotor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. In light of these studies, we propose here an overview of two classical themes in the cognitive science panorama: James Gibson's theory of affordances and Eleanor Rosch's principles of categorization. We discuss how theoretical perspectives and neuroscientific evidence are converging towards the current paradigm of embodied cognition. From this perspective, we discuss the role of action and simulation in cognitive processes, which lead to the perceptual recognition of objects, and actions and to their conceptual categorization. At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive science meets neurophysiology Francesca Garbarini Mauro Adenzato doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2004.06.003 Brain and Cognition, Vol. 56, No. 1. (October 2004), pp. 100-106. 2005-11-02T13:59:49-00:00 2004 Brain and Cognition 56 1 100 106 affordances categorization cognition embodied gibson neurocognitive perception situated http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/484079 <i>(02 November 2000)</i><br /><br />How did our minds evolve? Can evolutionary considerations illuminate the question of the basic architecture of the human mind? These are two of the main questions addressed in Evolution and the Human Mind by a distinguished interdisciplinary team of philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists and archaeologists. The volume will be of great interest to all researchers and students interested in the evolution and nature of the mind. Evolution and the Human Mind : Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition (02 November 2000) 2006-01-28T16:14:27-00:00 2000 Cambridge University Press cognition embodied evolution mind psychology http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/484083 <i>(02 May 2002)</i><br /><br />What makes science possible? Specifically, what features of the human mind, of human cognitive development, and of human social arrangements permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. What makes science possible? Specifically, what features of the human mind, of human cognitive development, and of human social arrangements permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. The Cognitive Basis of Science (02 May 2002) 2006-01-28T16:42:53-00:00 2002 Cambridge University Press congnitive embodied philosophy psychology reasoning science testimony http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/377831 <i>Mathematical Cognition, Vol. 4, No. 2. (1 September 1998), pp. 85-101.</i><br /><br />The cognitive science of mathematics is the study of mathematical ideas from the perspective of research on our largely unconscious everyday conceptual systems as they are embodied in the human brain. A major result is that most everyday abstract ideas are metaphorical in nature that is, they involve inference-preserving mappings from one conceptual domain to another. Many mathematical ideas are metaphorical in this respect, as when we conceptualise numbers metaphorically as points on a line, or when we conceptualise lines metaphorically as sets of points. The concept of continuity is metaphorical as well. In everyday thought, (natural) continuity is understood in terms of a trajectory of motion, as it was in mathematics until the late nineteenth century. From a cognitive perspective, what Dedekind and Weierstrass really did was to introduce new metaphors for natural continuity. That is, they conceptualised continuity for lines and for functions in terms of two new and radically different concepts: gaplessness for lines, and preservation of closeness for functions. But the mathematical community has incorrectly seen Weierstrass as having done something different: defining the essence of the concept of continuity. This mistake has confused generations of mathematics students and has led to a misleading, counterintuitive, and cognitively untenable view of what continuity is. What Did Weierstrass Really Define? The Cognitive Structure of Natural and epsilon-delta Continuity Rafael Núñez George Lakoff Mathematical Cognition, Vol. 4, No. 2. (1 September 1998), pp. 85-101. 2005-11-02T12:47:50-00:00 1998 Mathematical Cognition 1354-6791 4 2 85 101 cognition convergence embodied ijceell06 learning limit mathematics metaphor http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/377829 <i>(02 August 2001)</i><br /><br />If Barbie thinks math class is tough, what could she possibly think about math as a class of metaphorical thought? Cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Rafael Nuñez explore that theme in great depth in <I>Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being</I>. This book is not for the faint of heart or those with an aversion to heavy abstraction--Lakoff and Nuñez pull no punches in their analysis of mathematical thinking. Their basic premise, that all of mathematics is derived from the metaphors we use to maneuver in the world around us, is easy enough to grasp, but following the reasoning requires a willingness to approach complex mathematical and linguistic concepts--a combination that is sure to alienate a fair number of readers.<p> Those willing to brave its rigors will find <I>Where Mathematics Comes From</I> rewarding and profoundly thought-provoking. The heart of the book wrestles with the important concept of infinity and tries to explain how our limited experience in a seemingly finite world can lead to such a crazy idea. The authors know their math and their cognitive theory. While those who want their abstractions to reflect the real world rather than merely the insides of their skulls will have trouble reading while rolling their eyes, most readers will take to the new conception of mathematical thinking as a satisfying, if challenging, solution. <I>--Rob Lightner</I> Renowned linguist George Lakoff pairs with psychologist Rafael Nuñez in the first book to provide a serious study of the cognitive science of mathematical ideas. <P>This book is about mathematical ideas, about what mathematics means-and why. Abstract ideas, for the most part, arise via conceptual metaphor-metaphorical ideas projecting from the way we function in the everyday physical world. <I>Where Mathematics Comes From</I> argues that conceptual metaphor plays a central role in mathematical ideas within the cognitive unconscious-from arithmetic and algebra to sets and logic to infinity in all of its forms. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being George Lakoff Rafael Núñez (02 August 2001) 2005-11-02T12:40:59-00:00 2001 Basic Books cognition embodied ijceell06 learning mathematics http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/321098 <i>(1991), pp. 569-595.</i><br /><br />Computers and Thought are the two categories that together define Artificial Intelligence as a discipline. It is generally accepted that work in Artificial Intelligence over the last thirty years has had a strong influence on aspects of computer architectures. In this paper we also make the converse claim; that the state of computer architecture has been a strong influence on our models of thought. The Von Neumann model of computation has lead Artificial Intelligence in particular directions.... Intelligence Without Reason Rodney Brooks (1991), pp. 569-595. 2005-09-15T13:08:57-00:00 1991 569 595 Morgan Kaufmann publishers Inc.: San Mateo, CA, USA ai alife cognition embodied situated http://www.citeulike.org/user/yish/article/145621 <i>Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 57, No. 3. (January 2004), pp. 303-321.</i> PME Special Issue: Bodily Activity and Imagination in Mathematics Learning Ricardo Nemirovsky Marcelo Borba Cara Dimattia Ferdinando Arzarello Ornella Robutti Marty Schnepp Daniel Chazan Chris Rasmussen Jennifer Olszewski Kevin Dost James Johnson Nilce Scheffer doi:10.1007/s10649-004-5933-4 Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 57, No. 3. (January 2004), pp. 303-321. 2005-04-01T23:49:23-00:00 2004 Educational Studies in Mathematics 0013-1954 57 3 303 321 Kluwer Academic Publishers cognition embodied learning mathematics http://www.citeulike.org/user/thjung/article/14096 <i>Research Policy, Vol. 32, No. 10. (December 2003), pp. 1881-1895.</i> The economic effects of basic research: evidence for embodied knowledge transfer via scientists' migration C Zellner doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(03)00080-5 Research Policy, Vol. 32, No. 10. (December 2003), pp. 1881-1895. 2004-12-28T15:56:29-00:00 2003 Research Policy 0048-7333 32 10 1881 1895 Elsevier Science embodied knowledge transfer http://www.citeulike.org/user/sguada/article/2147460 <i>(1998)</i><br /><br />This paper describes an implemented computational model of lexical development for the case of action verbs. A simulated agent is trained by an informant labeling the agent's actions #here hand motions#, and the system learns to both label and carry out similar actions. The verb learning model is placed in the broader context of the NTL project on embodied natural language and its acquisition. Based on experimental results and projections to the full range of early lexemes, a... Extending embodied lexical development D Bailey N Chang J Feldman S Narayanan (1998) 2007-12-19T17:24:53-00:00 1998 embodied lakoff metaphors schemas http://www.citeulike.org/user/sguada/article/480673 <i>Brain and Language, Vol. 89, No. 2. (May 2004), pp. 385-392.</i> Embodied meaning in a neural theory of language Jerome Feldman Srinivas Narayanan doi:10.1016/S0093-934X(03)00355-9 Brain and Language, Vol. 89, No. 2. (May 2004), pp. 385-392. 2006-01-25T18:38:47-00:00 2004 Brain and Language 89 2 385 392 embodied language meaning nets neural http://www.citeulike.org/user/sguada/article/2388359 <i>(2002)</i><br /><br />Language is about symbols and those symbols must be grounded in the physical environment during human development. Most recently, there has been an increased awareness of the essential role of inferences of speakers' referential intentions in grounding those symbols. Experiments have shown that these inferences as revealed in eye, head and hand movements serve as an important driving force in language learning at a relatively early age. The challenge ahead is to develop formal models of... A computational model of embodied language learning C Yu D Ballard (2002) 2008-02-16T10:13:41-00:00 2002 embodied language learning perception http://www.citeulike.org/user/ricmilne/article/2807537 <i>Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3. (1996), pp. 575-610.</i><br /><br />This paper is about the interaction between patients and medical technology, and uses ethnographic data drawn from fieldwork in infertility clinics to question the humanist argument that selves need to be protected from technological objectification to ensure agency and authenticity. It argues that objectification is only antithetical to personhood in specific circumstances. Non-reductive manifestations of objectification make possible a notion of agency not opposed by, but pursued in objectification. The dependence of science and technology on social, individual and political factors has been quite extensively worked out in the science and technology studies literature. The dependence of selves on technology has received less attention. In other literatures that take the construction of the person seriously, the role of technology in that process is typically under-emphasized. This paper attempts to link the initiatives of these literatures by adding an ontological connection between technology and selves. A notion of 'ontological choreography' is developed to describe the processes of forging functional trails of compatibility that create and maintain the referentiality between things of different kinds - like persons and reproductive technologies. Ontological Choreography: Agency through Objectification in Infertility Clinics Charis Cussins doi:10.2307/285701 Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 3. (1996), pp. 575-610. 2008-05-17T13:47:09-00:00 1996 Social Studies of Science 26 3 575 610 Sage Publications, Ltd. agency embodied embodiment http://www.citeulike.org/user/ricmilne/article/2289555 <i>Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 2. (1 May 2002), pp. 255-274.</i><br /><br />In this article I discuss just why travel takes place. Why does travel occur, especially with the development of new communications technologies? I unpack how corporeal proximity in diverse modes appears to make travel necessary and desirable. I examine how aspects of conversational practice and of `meetings' make travel obligatory for sustaining `physical proximity'. I go on to consider the roles that travel plays in social networks, using Putnam's recent analysis of social capital. The implications of different kinds of travel for the distribution of such social capital are spelled out. I examine what kinds of corporeal travel are necessary and appropriate for a rich and densely networked social life across various social groups. And in the light of these analyses of proximity and social capital, virtual travel will not in a simple sense substitute for corporeal travel, since intermittent co-presence appears obligatory for many forms of social life. However, virtual travel does seem to produce a strange and uncanny life on the screen that is near and far, present and absent, and it may be that this will change the very nature of what is experienced as `co-presence'. I conclude by showing how issues of social inclusion and exclusion cannot be examined without identifying the complex, overlapping and contradictory mobilities necessarily involved in the patterning of an embodied social life. 10.1177/0038038502036002002 Mobility and Proximity John Urry doi:10.1177/0038038502036002002 Sociology, Vol. 36, No. 2. (1 May 2002), pp. 255-274. 2008-01-25T14:53:07-00:00 2002 Sociology 36 2 255 274 embodied mobility movement mundane sociology technology http://www.citeulike.org/user/quek/article/785584 <i>Commun. ACM, Vol. 44, No. 3. (March 2001), pp. 58-60.</i> The paradox of place Thomas Horan doi:10.1145/365181.365196 Commun. ACM, Vol. 44, No. 3. (March 2001), pp. 58-60. 2006-08-04T05:06:56-00:00 2001 Commun. ACM 0001-0782 44 3 58 60 ACM Press embodied place http://www.citeulike.org/user/majak/article/3578 <i>IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 16, No. 5. (September 2001), pp. 16-22.</i> Language Games for Autonomous Robots Luc Steels doi:10.1109/5254.956077 IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 16, No. 5. (September 2001), pp. 16-22. 2004-12-14T10:50:48-00:00 2001 IEEE Intelligent Systems 1094-7167 16 5 16 22 IEEE Educational Activities Department dynamics embodied game guessing heads language semiotic talking http://www.citeulike.org/user/lkunze/article/459714 <i>(13 November 1992)</i><br /><br /><I>The Embodied Mind </i>provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors - argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.<br /> <br /> Francisco Varela is Director of Research at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and Professor of Cognitive Science and Epistemology, CREA, at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. Evan Thompson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Eleanor Rosch is Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience Francisco Varela Evan Thompson Eleanor Rosch (13 November 1992) 2006-01-08T06:22:07-00:00 1992 The MIT Press buddhism cognition embodied mind science http://www.citeulike.org/user/lkunze/article/901136 <i>Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 149, No. 1. (September 2003), pp. 91-130.</i><br /><br />The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus. Embodied Cognition: A field guide Michael Anderson doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7 Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 149, No. 1. (September 2003), pp. 91-130. 2006-10-17T07:43:47-00:00 2003 Artificial Intelligence 149 1 91 130 ai cognition embodied philosophy symbolgrounding http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/892465 <i>(28 December 1996)</i><br /><br />Traditionally, human cognition has been seen and studied as existing solely "inside" a person, irrelevant to the social, physical, and artifactual context in which cognition takes place. This book reexamines the nature of cognition and proposes that a clearer understanding of human cognition would be achieved if it were conceptualized and studied as distributed among individuals; knowledge is socially constructed through collaborative efforts toward shared objectives within cultural surroundings, and that information is processed among individuals and the tools and artifacts provided by culture. The contributors to this thought-provoking text enhance their arguments by offering examples from daily life and educational activities. Researchers in a number of social and scientific fields will welcome this book. Distributed Cognitions: Psychological and Educational Considerations (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives) (28 December 1996) 2006-10-11T08:43:36-00:00 1996 Cambridge University Press compsci distributed embodied learning mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1034756 <i>Brain and Mind, Vol. V4, No. 2. (2003), pp. 215-228.</i> Cognitive Informatics, Distributed Representation and Embodiment Antony Bryant doi:10.1023/A:1025409729387 Brain and Mind, Vol. V4, No. 2. (2003), pp. 215-228. 2007-01-11T02:07:09-00:00 2003 Brain and Mind V4 2 215 228 compsci distributed embodied mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/401403 <i>(29 July 1988)</i><br /><br />In this innovative study, Jean Lave moves the analysis of one particular form of cognitive activity--arithmetic problem-solving--out of the laboratory and into the domain of everyday life. In so doing, she shows how mathematics in the "real world", such as that entailed in grocery shopping or dieting, is, like all thinking, shaped by the dynamic encounter between the culturally-endowed mind and its total context, a subtle interaction that shapes both the human subject and the world within which it acts. Cognition in Practice : Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life (Learning in Doing S.) Jean Lave (29 July 1988) 2005-11-19T18:10:45-00:00 1988 Cambridge University Press distributed embodied empirical hps mathematics mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1109256 <i>(11 August 1995)</i><br /><br />Covering a fast-expanding application of psychology, Environmental Psychology provides an interdisciplinary approach to the interactions of human psychology and behavior with environmental influences. Accessible to students yet comprehensive for use in instruction, this text engages the reader with a probing look at environmental psychology, from its origins and theoretical roots to current research topics and construct application. A thorough introduction to a field with broad practical appeal, Environmental Psychology cultivates a sound understanding of human reaction to and interactions with increasingly multifaceted environments. For students of applied psychologies, as well as ergonomics, environmental planning, and environmental studies, this clearly written and interesting textbook also discusses issues of special relevance to students in urban studies and public planning. Environmental Psychology: A Psycho-social Introduction Mirilia Bonnes Gianfranco Secchiaroli (11 August 1995) 2007-02-16T02:42:47-00:00 1995 Sage Publications Ltd cultural embedded embodied externalism mind request urban http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/971050 <i>(01 December 2001)</i><br /><br /><I>The Mind's Provisions</I> accomplishes something unusual: it bridges the cultural and intellectual gap between Anglo-American "analytic" philosophy and Continental thought. French philosopher Vincent Descombes meets analytic philosophy on its turf when he critiques cognitivism and, more generally, the theory of mind that sees mental states as nothing more than the physical workings of the brain. Descombes reasons in the crisp, orderly style that is characteristic of analytic philosophy, and he systematically and convincingly rejects the limiting features of cognitivism. <p> Though Descombes makes his argument carefully, his intellectual scope is wider than the dull parsing and logical hairsplitting that renders much contemporary philosophy uninteresting. For instance, he is adept with the anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the structuralism of Louis Dumont, and the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, in addition to more analytic thinkers like John Searle. In the end, Descombes liberates our thoughts, feelings, and beliefs from reduction to the mechanical workings of brain chemistry and stimuli. Instead, he argues, meaning and mentality are intimately connected with our social contexts and with ourselves, not just our mental hardware. <I>--Eric de Place</I> <p>Vincent Descombes brings together an astonishingly large body of philosophical and anthropological thought to present a thoroughgoing critique of contemporary cognitivism and to develop a powerful new philosophy of the mind.</p><p>Beginning with a critical examination of American cognitivism and French structuralism, Descombes launches a more general critique of all philosophies that view the mind in strictly causal terms and suppose that the brain--and not the person--thinks. Providing a broad historical perspective, Descombes draws surprising links between cognitivism and earlier anthropological projects, such as Lévi-Strauss's work on the symbolic status of myths. He identifies as incoherent both the belief that mental states are detached from the world and the idea that states of mind are brain states; these assumptions beg the question of the relation between mind and brain.</p><p>In place of cognitivism, Descombes offers an anthropologically based theory of mind that emphasizes the mind's collective nature. Drawing on Wittgenstein, he maintains that mental acts are properly attributed to the person, not the brain, and that states of mind, far from being detached from the world, require a historical and cultural context for their very intelligibility.</p><p>Available in English for the first time, this is the most outstanding work of one of France's finest contemporary philosophers. It provides a much-needed link between the continental and Anglo-American traditions, and its impact will extend beyond philosophy to anthropology, psychology, critical theory, and French studies.</p> The Mind's Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism Vincent Descombes Stephen Schwartz (01 December 2001) 2006-12-01T23:52:10-00:00 2001 Princeton University Press cultural embodied mind rationality http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/480658 <i>PLoS Biol, Vol. 3, No. 3. (March 2005)</i><br /><br />Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically. Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system. M Iacoboni I Molnar-Szakacs V Gallese G Buccino JC Mazziotta G Rizzolatti doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0030079 PLoS Biol, Vol. 3, No. 3. (March 2005) 2006-01-25T18:17:08-00:00 2005 PLoS Biol 1545-7885 3 3 embodied mind neuron prediction http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1137777 <i>(31 January 1996)</i><br /><br /><i>A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action</i> presents a comprehensive and detailed theory of early human development based on the principles of dynamic systems theory. Beginning with their own research in motor, perceptual, and cognitive development, Thelen and Smith raise fundamental questions about prevailing assumptions in the field. They propose a new theory of the development of cognition and action, unifying recent advances in dynamic systems theory with current research in neuroscience and neural development. In particular, they show how by processes of exploration and selection, multimodal experiences form the bases for self-organizing perception-action categories.<br /> <br /> Thelen and Smith offer a radical alternative to current cognitive theory, both in their emphasis on dynamic representation and in their focus on processes of change. Among the first attempt to apply complexity theory to psychology, they suggest reinterpretations of several classic issues in early cognitive development.<br /> <br /> The book is divided into three sections. The first discusses the nature of developmental processes in general terms, the second covers dynamic principles in process and mechanism, and the third looks at how a dynamic theory can be applied to enduring puzzles of development.<br /> <br /> <i>Cognitive Psychology series</i> A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action (Cognitive Psychology) Esther Thelen Linda Smith (31 January 1996) 2007-03-03T09:37:06-00:00 1996 The MIT Press dynamicalsystems embodied learning mind neuron http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/636543 <i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 4. (April 2006), pp. 141-142.</i> Detecting deception by manipulating cognitive load Aldert Vrij Ronald Fisher Samantha Mann Sharon Leal doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.003 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 4. (April 2006), pp. 141-142. 2006-05-16T02:44:40-00:00 2006 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 4 141 142 communication compsci embodied epistemology mind parsimony http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/689826 <i>(19 October 1995)</i><br /><br />Although researchers have long been aware that the species-typical architecture of the human mind is the product of our evolutionary history, it has only been in the last three decades that advances in such fields as evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, and paleoanthropology have made<br>the fact of our evolution illuminating. Converging findings from a variety of disciplines are leading to the emergence of a fundamentally new view of the human mind, and with it a new framework for the behavioral and social sciences. First, with the advent of the cognitive revolution, human nature<br>can finally be defined precisely as the set of universal, species-typical information-processing programs that operate beneath the surface of expressed cultural variability. Second, this collection of cognitive programs evolved in the Pleistocene to solve the adaptive problems regularly faced by our<br>hunter-gatherer ancestors--problems such as mate selection, language acquisition, cooperation, and sexual infidelity. Consequently, the traditional view of the mind as a general-purpose computer, tabula rasa, or passive recipient of culture is being replaced by the view that the mind resembles an<br>intricate network of functionally specialized computers, each of which imposes contentful structure on human mental organization and culture. The Adapted Mind explores this new approach--evolutionary psychology--and its implications for a new view of culture. The Adapted Mind : Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture Jerome Barkow Leda Cosmides John Tooby (19 October 1995) 2006-06-08T13:56:20-00:00 1995 Oxford University Press, USA amazon compsci embodied evolution mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1137745 <i>(15 September 2000)</i><br /><br />The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. What is it? What does it take to have it? What does it presuppose in what can be understood? In the first group of essays John Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence. Intelligibility comes to the fore in a set of "metaphysical" pieces on analog and digital systems and supervenience. In the third set of papers Haugeland elaborates and then undermines a battery of common presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation. Finally, the fourth and most recent group of essays confronts the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood. The necessary interdependence between personality and intelligence is developed and explained, specifically in the conditions of the possibility of objective scientific knowledge. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind John Haugeland (15 September 2000) 2007-03-03T08:40:14-00:00 2000 Harvard University Press discretisation distributed embodied metaphor mind rationality request http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/502473 <i>(14 November 1996)</i><br /><br />While most psychologists agree that understanding cause-effect relationships is fundamental to the study of cognition, exactly how those relationships should be interpreted is open to serious debate. In Causal Cognition, leading experts from a range of disciplines--including philosophy,<br>anthropology, and comparative, social, and developmental psychology--come together to offer an interdisciplinary, cutting-edge account of the field. Reflecting on a range of topics, from the role and forms of causal knowledge (both in animal and human cognition) to the development of human causal<br>understanding, the various contributors highlight areas where different approaches converge and conflict. The result is an insightful status report of a fascinating subject that will appeal to students and researchers across the social sciences. Causal Cognition : A Multidisciplinary Approach Dan Sperber David Premack Ann Premack (14 November 1996) 2006-02-12T15:51:31-00:00 1996 (A Fyssen Foundation Symposium) Oxford University Press, USA amazon embodied folk mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/850741 <i>Behav Brain Sci, Vol. 24, No. 6. (December 2001)</i><br /><br />How should biological behaviour be modelled? A relatively new approach is to investigate problems in neuroethology by building physical robot models of biological sensorimotor systems. The explication and justification of this approach are here placed within a framework for describing and comparing models in the behavioural and biological sciences. First, simulation models--the representation of a hypothesis about a target system--are distinguished from several other relationships also termed "modelling" in discussions of scientific explanation. Seven dimensions on which simulation models can differ are defined and distinctions between them discussed: 1. Relevance: whether the model tests and generates hypotheses applicable to biology. 2. Level: the elemental units of the model in the hierarchy from atoms to societies. 3. Generality: the range of biological systems the model can represent. 4. Abstraction: the complexity, relative to the target, or amount of detail included in the model. 5. Structural accuracy: how well the model represents the actual mechanisms underlying the behaviour. 6. Performance match: to what extent the model behaviour matches the target behaviour. 7. Medium: the physical basis by which the model is implemented. No specific position in the space of models thus defined is the only correct one, but a good modelling methodology should be explicit about its position and the justification for that position. It is argued that in building robot models biological relevance is more effective than loose biological inspiration; multiple levels can be integrated; that generality cannot be assumed but might emerge from studying specific instances; abstraction is better done by simplification than idealisation; accuracy can be approached through iterations of complete systems; that the model should be able to match and predict target behaviour; and that a physical medium can have significant advantages. These arguments reflect the view that biological behaviour needs to be studied and modelled in context, that is, in terms of the real problems faced by real animals in real environments. Can robots make good models of biological behaviour? B Webb Behav Brain Sci, Vol. 24, No. 6. (December 2001) 2006-09-20T07:06:35-00:00 2001 Behav Brain Sci 0140-525X 24 6 compsci embodied mind modelling robot simulation http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/848416 <i>pp. 533-557.</i><br /><br />Theories of diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning typically seek to account for either the formal semantics of diagrams, or for the advantages which diagrammatic representations hold for the reasoner over other forms of representation. Regrettably, almost no theory exists which accounts for both of these issues together, nor how they affect one another. We do not attempt to provide such an account here. We do, however, seek to lay out larger context than is generally used for examining the processes of using diagrams in reasoning or communication. A context in which detailed studies of sub-problems, such as the formal semantics or cognitive impact of specific diagrammatic systems, may be embedded.Accounts of the embedding of sentential logics in the computational processes of reasoners and communicators are relatively well developed from several decades of research in AI. Analogies between the sentential and the graphical cases are quite revealing about both similarities and differences. To provide a structure for the `grand context' of diagrammatic representation and reasoning, and to clarify the relations between its component problems, we examine carefully these analogies and the decomposition they provide of subproblems for analysing diagrammatic reasoning. Theories of Diagrammatic Reasoning: Distinguishing Component Problems C Gurr pp. 533-557. 2006-09-18T04:23:09-00:00 533 557 cld embodied mind modelling transdisciplinary visualisation http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/889887 <i>Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 8, No. 6. (June 2004), pp. 280-285.</i><br /><br />Recent studies have provided evidence for mental simulation as a strategy in mechanical reasoning. This type of reasoning can be dissociated from reasoning based on descriptive knowledge in that it depends on different abilities and memory stores, is expressed more easily in gesture than in language, exhibits analog properties, and can result in correct inferences in situations where people do not have correct descriptive knowledge. Although it is frequently accompanied by imagery, mental simulation is not a process of inspecting a holistic visual image in the 'mind's eye'. Mental simulations are constructed piecemeal, include representations of non-visible properties and can be used in conjunction with non-imagery processes, such as task decomposition and rule-based reasoning. Mechanical reasoning by mental simulation. M Hegarty doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.001 Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 8, No. 6. (June 2004), pp. 280-285. 2006-10-09T07:49:24-00:00 2004 Trends Cogn Sci 1364-6613 8 6 280 285 embodied intro mind modelling simulation http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/848411 <i>Trends Neurosci, Vol. 20, No. 12. (December 1997), pp. 553-557.</i><br /><br />Studies of mechanisms of adaptive behavior generally focus on neurons and circuits. But adaptive behavior also depends on interactions among the nervous system, body and environment: sensory preprocessing and motor post-processing filter inputs to and outputs from the nervous system; co-evolution and co-development of nervous system and periphery create matching and complementarity between them; body structure creates constraints and opportunities for neural control; and continuous feedback between nervous system, body and environment are essential for normal behavior. This broader view of adaptive behavior has been a major underpinning of ecological psychology and has influenced behavior-based robotics. Computational neuroethology, which jointly models neural control and periphery of animals, is a promising methodology for understanding adaptive behavior. The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system, body and environment. HJ Chiel RD Beer Trends Neurosci, Vol. 20, No. 12. (December 1997), pp. 553-557. 2006-09-18T04:13:06-00:00 1997 Trends Neurosci 0166-2236 20 12 553 557 ecology embodied mind neuron rationality request http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1218717 <i>(07 August 2002)</i><br /><br />In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. Each paper is followed by a reply by the subject. An exciting feature of this collection is the transcribed discussion among all the contributors following each exchange. This is the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analysed by the leading thinkers in the field. Philosophy of Mental Representation Hugh Clapin (07 August 2002) 2007-04-10T03:50:14-00:00 2002 Oxford University Press, USA embodied learning mind modelling transdisciplinary http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/889880 <i>J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, Vol. 18, No. 5. (September 1992), pp. 1084-1102.</i><br /><br />Reaction-time and eye-fixation data are analyzed to investigate how people infer the kinematics of simple mechanical systems (pulley systems) from diagrams showing their static configuration. It is proposed that this mental animation process involves decomposing the representation of a pulley system into smaller units corresponding to the machine components and animating these components in a sequence corresponding to the causal sequence of events in the machine's operation. Although it is possible for people to make inferences against the chain of causality in the machine, these inferences are more difficult, and people have a preference for inferences in the direction of causality. The mental animation process reflects both capacity limitations and limitations of mechanical knowledge. Mental animation: inferring motion from static displays of mechanical systems. M Hegarty J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, Vol. 18, No. 5. (September 1992), pp. 1084-1102. 2006-10-09T07:40:40-00:00 1992 J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 0278-7393 18 5 1084 1102 diagram embodied inferring mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1137426 <i>Developmental Review, Vol. 25, No. 3-4. ( 2005), pp. 278-298.</i><br /><br />Traditional approaches to cognitive development concentrate on the stability of cognition and explain that stability via concepts segregated from perceiving acting. A dynamic systems approach in contrast focuses on the self-organization of behavior in tasks. This article uses recent results concerning the embodiment of cognition to argue for a dynamic systems approach. The embodiment hypothesis is the idea that intelligence emerges in the interaction of an organism with an environment and as a result of sensory-motor activity. The continual coupling of cognition to the world through the body both adapts cognition to the idiosyncrasies of the here and now, makes it relevant, and provides the mechanism for developmental change. Cognition as a dynamic system: Principles from embodiment Linda Smith doi:10.1016/j.dr.2005.11.001 Developmental Review, Vol. 25, No. 3-4. ( 2005), pp. 278-298. 2007-03-03T00:42:59-00:00 2005 Developmental Review 25 3-4 278 298 dynamicalsystems embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/892543 <i>Artificial Intelligence Review, Vol. V1, No. 4. (1 December 1987), pp. 231-244.</i> Being there: why implementation matters to cognitive science Andy Clark doi:10.1007/BF00142924 Artificial Intelligence Review, Vol. V1, No. 4. (1 December 1987), pp. 231-244. 2006-10-11T09:52:54-00:00 1987 Artificial Intelligence Review V1 4 231 244 ai compsci embodied mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1137421 <i>Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 3, No. 3. (September 2002), pp. 339-348.</i><br /><br />For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as mere situatedness in complex environments. The paper focuses on the definition of embodiment, especially whether physical embodiment is necessary and/or sufficient for cognitive systems. Cognition is characterized as a continuous complex process rather than ahistorical logical capability. Furthermore, the paper investigates the relationship between cognitive embodiment and the issues of understanding, representation and task specification. When is a cognitive system embodied? Alexander Riegler doi:10.1016/S1389-0417(02)00046-3 Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 3, No. 3. (September 2002), pp. 339-348. 2007-03-03T00:35:57-00:00 2002 Cognitive Systems Research 3 3 339 348 complexity compsci embodied mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1137420 <i>Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 3, No. 3. (September 2002), pp. 275-288.</i><br /><br />The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view, however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning. Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition Fred Keijzer doi:10.1016/S1389-0417(02)00043-8 Cognitive Systems Research, Vol. 3, No. 3. (September 2002), pp. 275-288. 2007-03-03T00:35:44-00:00 2002 Cognitive Systems Research 3 3 275 288 5 compsci embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1649974 <i>(01 November 2006)</i><br /><br />How could the body influence our thinking when it seems obvious that the brain controls the body? In <i>How the Body Shapes the Way We Think</i>, Rolf Pfeifer and Josh Bongard demonstrate that thought is not independent of the body but is tightly constrained, and at the same time enabled, by it. They argue that the kinds of thoughts we are capable of have their foundation in our embodiment--in our morphology and the material properties of our bodies.<br /> <br /> This crucial notion of embodiment underlies fundamental changes in the field of artificial intelligence over the past two decades, and Pfeifer and Bongard use the basic methodology of artificial intelligence--"understanding by building"--to describe their insights. If we understand how to design and build intelligent systems, they reason, we will better understand intelligence in general. In accessible, nontechnical language, and using many examples, they introduce the basic concepts by building on recent developments in robotics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology to outline a possible theory of intelligence. They illustrate applications of such a theory in ubiquitous computing, business and management, and the psychology of human memory. Embodied intelligence, as described by Pfeifer and Bongard, has important implications for our understanding of both natural and artificial intelligence. How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence (Bradford Books) Rolf Pfeifer Josh Bongard (01 November 2006) 2007-09-13T00:04:17-00:00 2006 The MIT Press embodied mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/891050 <i>International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. (1996), pp. 185-213.</i><br /><br />Advances in graphical technology have now made it possible for us to interact with information in innovative ways, most notably by exploring multimedia environments and by manipulating three-dimensional virtual worlds. Many benefits have been claimed for this new kind of interactivity, a general assumption being that learning and cognitive processing are facilitated. We point out, however, that little is known about the cognitive value of any graphical representations, be they good... External cognition: How do graphical representations work Mike Scaife Yvonne Rogers International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. (1996), pp. 185-213. 2006-10-10T06:02:37-00:00 1996 International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 45 2 185 213 diagram distributed embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/889810 <i>System Dynamics Review, Vol. 20, No. 4. (2004), pp. 341-356.</i><br /><br />This paper provides some context for my paper which won the 2004 Jay Wright Forrester award. It describes the system dynamics challenges I received from a number of people and my response to them, particularly to explore the issue of mismatch in organisations between process and boundary structure. It also describes how I have been using generic archetypes in practice since publication of the original work. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Using generic system archetypes to support thinking and modelling Eric Wolstenholme doi:10.1002/sdr.302 System Dynamics Review, Vol. 20, No. 4. (2004), pp. 341-356. 2006-10-09T05:10:46-00:00 2004 System Dynamics Review 20 4 341 356 dynamicalsystems embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/887428 <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Formal Approaches to Agent-Based Systems (2000), pp. 194-206.</i> Capacity Limits in Diagrammatic Reasoning Mark Hegarty doi: Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Formal Approaches to Agent-Based Systems (2000), pp. 194-206. 2006-10-06T18:14:56-00:00 2000 Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Formal Approaches to Agent-Based Systems 194 206 diagram embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/578047 <i>(09 January 1998)</i><br /><br />Brain, body, and world are united in a complex dance of circular causation and extended computational activity. In <i>Being There</i>, Andy Clark weaves these several threads into a pleasing whole and goes on to address foundational questions concerning the new tools and techniques needed to make sense of the emerging sciences of the embodied mind. Clark brings together ideas and techniques from robotics, neuroscience, infant psychology, and artificial intelligence. He addresses a broad range of adaptive behaviors, from cockroach locomotion to the role of linguistic artifacts in higher-level thought. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again Andy Clark (09 January 1998) 2006-04-06T04:58:52-00:00 1998 The MIT Press embodied language learning mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/998866 <i>Behav Brain Sci, Vol. 21, No. 5. (October 1998)</i><br /><br />To explain social learning without invoking the cognitively complex concept of imitation, many learning mechanisms have been proposed. Borrowing an idea used routinely in cognitive psychology, we argue that most of these alternatives can be subsumed under a single process, priming, in which input increases the activation of stored internal representations. Imitation itself has generally been seen as a "special faculty." This has diverted much research towards the all-or-none question of whether an animal can imitate, with disappointingly inconclusive results. In the great apes, however, voluntary, learned behaviour is organized hierarchically. This means that imitation can occur at various levels, of which we single out two clearly distinct ones: the "action level," a rather detailed and linear specification of sequential acts, and the "program level," a broader description of subroutine structure and the hierarchical layout of a behavioural "program." Program level imitation is a high-level, constructive mechanism, adapted for the efficient learning of complex skills and thus not evident in the simple manipulations used to test for imitation in the laboratory. As examples, we describe the food-preparation techniques of wild mountain gorillas and the imitative behaviour of orangutans undergoing "rehabilitation" to the wild. Representing and manipulating relations between objects seems to be one basic building block in their hierarchical programs. There is evidence that great apes suffer from a stricter capacity limit than humans in the hierarchical depth of planning. We re-interpret some chimpanzee behaviour previously described as "emulation" and suggest that all great apes may be able to imitate at the program level. Action level imitation is seldom observed in great ape skill learning, and may have a largely social role, even in humans. Learning by imitation: a hierarchical approach. RW Byrne AE Russon Behav Brain Sci, Vol. 21, No. 5. (October 1998) 2006-12-18T00:20:09-00:00 1998 Behav Brain Sci 0140-525X 21 5 distributed embodied grammar hierarchy imitation learning modelling primate http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/999085 <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Conceptual Modeling: Current Issues and Future Directions (1999), 272.</i> What Is the Role of Cognition in Conceptual Modeling? A Report on the First Workshop on Cognition and Conceptual Modeling Venkataraman Ramesh Jeffrey Parsons Glenn Browne Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Conceptual Modeling: Current Issues and Future Directions (1999), 272. 2006-12-18T04:11:54-00:00 1999 Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Conceptual Modeling: Current Issues and Future Directions 272 compsci diagram dynamicalsystems embodied mind modelling http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1158919 <i>(November 2003), pp. 45-57.</i><br /><br />I present a framework to study the evolution of traits that allow an organism to survive life-threatening but rare risks. Specifically, I am concerned with risks so rare that any one individual in a population may not experience the risk-causing event in its lifetime. A theory of rare risk management is virtually absent in evolutionary biology, although it is well developed in economics. This is surprising because of the great influence economics had on evolutionary biology, and because biology is full of examples for evolved risk management traits. They include the ability of bacteria to sporulate, of pathogens to survive antibiotic treatment, of temperate bacteriophages to enter a lytic life cycle, as well as traits that allow higher organisms to survive rare environmental disasters, such as sporadic wildfires and irregular flooding. I make predictions about the sustenance of risk management traits under two scenarios, one where the catastrophic events cause individual deaths, and another one where catastrophic events cause population extinction. A well-developed theory of risk management will not only predict the distribution of risk management traits, but may also serve other purposes, such as to reconstruct the spectrum of environments that an organism encountered in its evolutionary history from the record stored in its genome's memory. Risk management in biological evolution A Wagner (November 2003), pp. 45-57. 2007-03-14T05:31:21-00:00 2003 45 57 economics embodied evolution learning metabolism statistics uncertainty http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/1144931 <i>J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 12, No. 3. (May 2000), pp. 415-420.</i><br /><br />Far (extrapersonal) and near (peripersonal) spaces are behaviorally defined as the space outside the hand-reaching distance and the space within the hand-reaching distance. Animal and human studies have confirmed this distinction, showing that space is not homogeneously represented in the brain. In this paper we demonstrate that the coding of space as "far" and "near" is not only determined by the hand-reaching distance, but it is also dependent on how the brain represents the extension of the body space. We will show that when the cerebral representation of body space is extended to include objects or tools used by the subject, space previously mapped as far can be remapped as near. Patient P.P., after a right hemisphere stroke, showed a dissociation between near and far spaces in the manifestation of neglect. Indeed, in a line bisection task, neglect was apparent in near space, but not in far space when bisection in the far space was performed with a projection lightpen. However, when in the far space bisection was performed with a stick, used by the patient to reach the line, neglect appeared and was as severe as neglect in the near space. An artificial extension of the patient's body (the stick) caused a remapping of far space as near space. When far becomes near: remapping of space by tool use. A Berti F Frassinetti J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 12, No. 3. (May 2000), pp. 415-420. 2007-03-07T01:35:22-00:00 2000 J Cogn Neurosci 0898-929X 12 3 415 420 embodied neuron technology http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/892509 <i>Dev Psychol, Vol. 33, No. 1. (January 1997), pp. 113-119.</i><br /><br />This investigation compared the attention patterns of 40 toddlers and their mothers with or without dysphoric symptoms in a situation that allowed both common and independent foci of attention. Mother-toddler dyads with a dysphoric mother spent a smaller proportion of the session engaged in attention to an activity in common than did dyads with nondysphoric mothers. In addition, even when primarily attending elsewhere, nondysphoric mothers more extensively time-shared their attention between their child and a competing activity than did dysphoric mothers. Thus, dysphoric mothers appear to attend to an event in common with their children less frequently than do nondysphoric mothers in terms of both their primary focus of attention and their attentiveness to the child when primarily attending to a competing event. Mothers' and toddlers' coordinated joint focus of attention: variations with maternal dysphoric symptoms. DF Goldsmith B Rogoff Dev Psychol, Vol. 33, No. 1. (January 1997), pp. 113-119. 2006-10-11T09:11:06-00:00 1997 Dev Psychol 0012-1649 33 1 113 119 distributed embodied learning mind http://www.citeulike.org/user/livingthingdan/article/892510 <i></i> Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical Prerequisites Ronald Langacker 2006-10-11T09:11:49-00:00 Stanford University Press distributed embodied language learning mind