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	<title>CiteULike: Tag intention</title>
	<description>CiteULike: Tag intention</description>


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<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/xiajinchun/article/1042144">
    <title>Reasoning about willingness in networks of agents</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/xiajinchun/article/1042144</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(2006), pp. 91-98.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Reasoning about willingness in networks of agents</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>S Dehousse</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>S Faulkner</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>H Mouratidis</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>P Giorgini</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Kolp</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1145/1138063.1138080</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>(2006), pp. 91-98.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-01-15T09:34:04-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:startingPage>91</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>98</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:publisher>ACM Press</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>reasoning</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/ttaga/article/788459">
    <title>Predicting the intentions and behavior of exercise initiates using two forms of self-efficacy</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/ttaga/article/788459</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Journal of Behavioral Medicine, Vol. 18, No. 5. (October 1995), pp. 479-497.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Predicting the intentions and behavior of exercise initiates using two forms of self-efficacy</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Kimberley Ducharme</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Lawrence Brawley</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1007/BF01904775</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Journal of Behavioral Medicine, Vol. 18, No. 5. (October 1995), pp. 479-497.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-08-07T06:21:58-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1995</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Journal of Behavioral Medicine</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>18</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>479</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>497</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>attendance</prism:category>
    <prism:category>behavioral</prism:category>
    <prism:category>exercise</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>self-efficacy</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214193">
    <title>Conscious intention and motor cognition</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/214193</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 6. (June 2005), pp. 290-295.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.</description>
    <dc:title>Conscious intention and motor cognition</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Patrick Haggard</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.012</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 6. (June 2005), pp. 290-295.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-05-30T13:27:13-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Trends in Cognitive Sciences</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>6</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>290</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>295</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>agency</prism:category>
    <prism:category>consciousness</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/366683">
    <title>Behavioral reasoning theory: Identifying new linkages underlying intentions and behavior</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/366683</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 97-120.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study developed and tested a new theory of behavior, entitled behavioral reasoning theory. The theory proposes that reasons serve as important linkages between beliefs, global motives (e.g., attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control), intentions, and behavior. An underlying theoretical assumption in this framework states that reasons impact global motives and intentions, because they help individuals justify and defend their actions. Four studies were conducted to test theoretical propositions. Using confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation modeling, Study 1 demonstrated that reasons (for and against the behavior) were differentiated from global motives and independently predicted intentions and behavior. Through orthogonal manipulation, Study 2 showed that global motives and reasons influenced intentions. Study 3 found that reasons contributed to the prediction of intentions beyond traditional belief concepts and that belief concepts predicted reasons. Finally, Study 4 experimentally demonstrated that traditional belief concepts (including interaction terms) and reasons influenced global motives and intentions. In all, while traditional concepts explained significant amounts of variance, the overall results suggest that reason concepts explain meaningful amounts of additional variance and, thus, also need to be considered.</description>
    <dc:title>Behavioral reasoning theory: Identifying new linkages underlying intentions and behavior</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>James Westaby</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.07.003</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 97-120.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-10-27T12:11:14-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>98</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>97</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>120</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>action</prism:category>
    <prism:category>attitude</prism:category>
    <prism:category>behavior</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/346967">
    <title>Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/346967</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Science, Vol. 310, No. 5745. (07 October 2005), pp. 116-119.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the face of error, and adapt to changing circumstances. Is this always the case? We investigated the relation between intention, choice, and introspection. Participants made choices between presented face pairs on the basis of attractiveness, while we covertly manipulated the relationship between choice and outcome that they experienced. Participants failed to notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they were presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. We call this effect choice blindness.</description>
    <dc:title>Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Petter Johansson</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Lars Hall</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Sverker Sikstrom</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Andreas Olsson</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1126/science.1111709</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Science, Vol. 310, No. 5745. (07 October 2005), pp. 116-119.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-10-10T15:51:20-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Science</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>310</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5745</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>116</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>119</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>introspection</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/529628">
    <title>Biased memory for prior decision making: Evidence from a longitudinal field study</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/529628</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 99, No. 1. (January 2006), pp. 34-48.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This research reveals systematic effects of outcome and behavior knowledge on memory for prior decision making in a three-wave longitudinal study of retrospective predictions and intentions involving the 1999-2000-millennium change. We demonstrate a pervasive consistency bias in memory for prior decision making, such that not only are remembered predictions more consistent with experienced outcomes than actual predictions, but also that remembered intentions are more consistent with behavior than actual intentions. These new findings reveal how outcome and behavior knowledge jointly influence memory reconstruction, reflecting multiple cue usage, and they identify the contribution of reconstruction processes in memory for prior decision making. Implications for research and theories on memory and decision making are discussed.</description>
    <dc:title>Biased memory for prior decision making: Evidence from a longitudinal field study</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Rik Pieters</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Hans Baumgartner</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Richard Bagozzi</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.05.004</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 99, No. 1. (January 2006), pp. 34-48.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-03-03T16:36:34-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>99</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>34</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>48</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>behavior</prism:category>
    <prism:category>decision-making</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>longitudinal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>memory</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/175489">
    <title>NEUROSCIENCE: Understanding Intentions: Through the Looking Glass</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/175489</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Science, Vol. 308, No. 5722. (29 April 2005), pp. 644-645.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>NEUROSCIENCE: Understanding Intentions: Through the Looking Glass</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Kiyoshi Nakahara</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Yasushi Miyashita</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1126/science.1112174</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Science, Vol. 308, No. 5722. (29 April 2005), pp. 644-645.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-05-01T05:56:28-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Science</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>308</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5722</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>644</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>645</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>theory-of-mind</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/2437921">
    <title>Neural substrates for action understanding at different description levels in the human brain.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/2437921</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 20, No. 2. (February 2008), pp. 324-341.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Understanding complex movements and abstract action goals is an important skill for our social interactions. Successful social interactions entail understanding of actions at different levels of action description, ranging from detailed movement trajectories that support learning of complex motor skills through imitation to distinct features of actions that allow us to discriminate between action goals and different action styles. Previous studies have implicated premotor, parietal, and superior temporal areas in action understanding. However, the role of these different cortical areas in action understanding at different levels of action description remains largely unknown. We addressed this question using advanced animation and stimulus generation techniques in combination with sensitive functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation or repetition suppression methods. We tested the neural sensitivity of fronto-parietal and visual areas to differences in the kinematics and goals of actions using kinematic morphs of arm movements. Our findings provide novel evidence for differential involvement of ventral premotor, parietal, and temporal regions in action understanding. We show that the ventral premotor cortex encodes the physical similarity between movement trajectories and action goals that are important for exact copying of actions and the acquisition of complex motor skills. In contrast, whereas parietal regions and the superior temporal sulcus process the perceptual similarity between movements and may support the perception and imitation of abstract action goals and movement styles. Thus, our findings propose that fronto-parietal and visual areas involved in action understanding mediate a cascade of visual-motor processes at different levels of action description from exact movement copies to abstract action goals achieved with different movement styles.</description>
    <dc:title>Neural substrates for action understanding at different description levels in the human brain.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>V Lestou</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>FE Pollick</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Z Kourtzi</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.20021</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 20, No. 2. (February 2008), pp. 324-341.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-02-27T18:25:08-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2008</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Cogn Neurosci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0898-929X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>20</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>324</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>341</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>action</prism:category>
    <prism:category>brian</prism:category>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>nichola</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>premotor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>shiva</prism:category>
    <prism:category>ventral</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/1180145">
    <title>Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/1180145</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Current Biology, Vol. 17, No. 4. (20 February 2007), pp. 323-328.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Summary When humans are engaged in goal-related processing, activity in prefrontal cortex is increased and . However, it has remained unclear whether this prefrontal activity encodes a subject's current intention . Instead, increased levels of activity could reflect preparation of motor responses and , holding in mind a set of potential choices , tracking the memory of previous responses , or general processes related to establishing a new task set. Here we study subjects who freely decided which of two tasks to perform and covertly held onto an intention during a variable delay. Only after this delay did they perform the chosen task and indicate which task they had prepared. We demonstrate that during the delay, it is possible to decode from activity in medial and lateral regions of prefrontal cortex which of two tasks the subjects were covertly intending to perform. This suggests that covert goals can be represented by distributed patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex, thereby providing a potential neural substrate for prospective memory , and . During task execution, most information could be decoded from a more posterior region of prefrontal cortex, suggesting that different brain regions encode goals during task preparation and task execution. Decoding of intentions was most robust from the medial prefrontal cortex, which is consistent with a specific role of this region when subjects reflect on their own mental states.</description>
    <dc:title>Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>John-Dylan Haynes</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Katsuyuki Sakai</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Geraint Rees</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Sam Gilbert</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Chris Frith</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Richard Passingham</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.cub.2006.11.072</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Current Biology, Vol. 17, No. 4. (20 February 2007), pp. 323-328.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-03-21T22:27:32-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2007</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Current Biology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>323</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>328</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>goal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>prefrontal-cortex</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/2320147">
    <title>Attention, intention and domain-specific processing</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/2320147</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 2. (February 2008), pp. 59-64.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Many researchers use subliminal priming to investigate domain-specific processing mechanisms, which have classically been defined in terms of their autonomy from other cognitive systems. Surprisingly, recent research has demonstrated that nonconsciously elicited cognitive processes are not independent of attention. By extension, these findings have been used to call into question the autonomy of domain-specific processing mechanisms. By contrast, we argue that the demonstrated modulation of nonconscious cognitive processes by attention occurs at a predomain-specific stage of processing. Thus, although we agree that attention might be a prerequisite of nonconscious processes, we suggest that there is no reason to think that higher-level cognitive systems directly modulate domain-specific processes.</description>
    <dc:title>Attention, intention and domain-specific processing</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Matthew Finkbeiner</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Kenneth Forster</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.11.003</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 2. (February 2008), pp. 59-64.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-02-01T17:36:32-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2008</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Trends in Cognitive Sciences</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>59</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>64</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>attention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>domain-specificity</prism:category>
    <prism:category>general</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/1065522">
    <title>Manipulating the experienced onset of intention after action execution.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/sekulerlab/article/1065522</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 19, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 81-90.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we have tested the time needed for the perceived onset of spontaneous motor intention to be fully determined. We found that TMS applied over the presupplementary motor area after the execution of a simple spontaneous action shifted the perceived onset of the motor intention backward in time, and shifted the perceived time of action execution forward in time. The size of the effect was similar regardless of whether TMS was applied immediately after the action or 200 msec after. The results of three control studies suggest that this effect is time-limited, specific to modality, and also specific to the anatomical site of stimulation. We conclude that the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action. A model, which is based on the mechanism of cue integration under the presence of noise, is offered to explain the results. The implications for the conscious control of spontaneous actions are discussed.</description>
    <dc:title>Manipulating the experienced onset of intention after action execution.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>HC Lau</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RD Rogers</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RE Passingham</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.81</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 19, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 81-90.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-01-24T16:35:48-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2007</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Cogn Neurosci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0898-929X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>19</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>81</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>90</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motor_planning</prism:category>
    <prism:category>tms</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/sarahmccrum/article/2836581">
    <title>Science and spiritual healing: a critical review of spiritual healing, &#34;energy&#34; medicine, and intentionality.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/sarahmccrum/article/2836581</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Alternative therapies in health and medicine, Vol. 9, No. 2. (r 2003), pp. 56-61.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Science and spiritual healing: a critical review of spiritual healing, &#34;energy&#34; medicine, and intentionality.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>WB Jonas</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>CC Crawford</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Alternative therapies in health and medicine, Vol. 9, No. 2. (r 2003), pp. 56-61.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-05-27T05:58:41-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2003</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Alternative therapies in health and medicine</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1078-6791</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>56</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>61</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>energy</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spiritual</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/2308073">
    <title>Primary Motor Cortex Tuning to Intended Movement Kinematics in Humans with Tetraplegia</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/2308073</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J. Neurosci., Vol. 28, No. 5. (30 January 2008), pp. 1163-1178.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The relationship between spiking activities in motor cortex and movement kinematics has been well studied in neurologically intact nonhuman primates. We examined the relationship between spiking activities in primary motor cortex (M1) and intended movement kinematics (position and velocity) using 96-microelectrode arrays chronically implanted in two humans with tetraplegia. Study participants were asked to perform two different tasks: imagined pursuit tracking of a cursor moving on a computer screen and a &#34;neural cursor center-out&#34; task in which cursor position was controlled by the participant's neural activity. In the pursuit tracking task, the majority of neurons were significantly tuned: 90% were tuned to velocity and 86% were tuned to position in one participant; 95% and 84%, respectively, in the other. Additionally, velocity and position of the tracked cursor could be decoded from the ensemble of neurons. In the neural cursor center-out task, tuning to direction of the intended target was well captured by a log-linear cosine function. Neural spiking soon after target appearance could be used to classify the intended target with an accuracy of 95% in one participant, and 80% in the other. It was also possible to extract information about the direction of the difference vector between the target position and the instantaneous neural cursor position. Our results indicate that correlations between spiking activity and intended movement velocity and position are present in human M1 after the loss of descending motor pathways, and that M1 spiking activities share many kinematic tuning features whether movement is imagined by humans with tetraplegia, or is performed as shown previously in able-bodied nonhuman primates. 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4415-07.2008</description>
    <dc:title>Primary Motor Cortex Tuning to Intended Movement Kinematics in Humans with Tetraplegia</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Wilson Truccolo</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Gerhard Friehs</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>John Donoghue</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Leigh Hochberg</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4415-07.2008</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J. Neurosci., Vol. 28, No. 5. (30 January 2008), pp. 1163-1178.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-01-30T17:41:21-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2008</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J. Neurosci.</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1163</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1178</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>m1</prism:category>
    <prism:category>movement</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/972075">
    <title>Intention in motor learning through observation.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/972075</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Q J Exp Psychol (Colchester), Vol. 59, No. 2. (February 2006), pp. 377-386.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The purpose of this experiment was to assess whether learning an action through observation is enhanced by the intention to reproduce the observed behaviour. Two groups of participants observed a model practise a timing task and performed a 24-hour delayed retention test. Participants in the first group of observers were explicitly instructed that they would be required to execute the timing task that they had observed as accurately as possible during the delayed retention test. Observers in the second group were instructed that they would be required to describe as accurately as possible the behaviour that they had observed. A control group of participants, who did not observe the model, was also administered the delayed retention test. The results of the retention test indicated that absolute timing (parameterization) was learned by the observers to the same extent with or without intention to reproduce the task. Indeed, on the retention test absolute timing for the two groups of observers was as effective as that for the models. However, observing with an intention to reproduce the task was beneficial for learning the movement's relative timing structure. Results are discussed with respect to a potential mechanism by which intention enhances observation.</description>
    <dc:title>Intention in motor learning through observation.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>A Badets</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Y Blandin</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>CH Shea</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1080/02724980443000773</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Q J Exp Psychol (Colchester), Vol. 59, No. 2. (February 2006), pp. 377-386.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-12-03T02:34:07-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Q J Exp Psychol (Colchester)</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1747-0218</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>59</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>377</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>386</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>imitation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>observation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>simulation</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/345957">
    <title>Frontoparietal control of spatial attention and motor intention in human EEG.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/345957</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 94, No. 1. (July 2005), pp. 764-774.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Relations between spatial attention and motor intention were investigated by means of an EEG potential elicited by shifting attention to a location in space as well as by the selection of a hand for responding. High-density recordings traced this potential to a common frontoparietal network activated by attentional orienting and by response selection. Within this network, parietal and frontal cortex were activated sequentially, followed by an anterior-to-posterior migration of activity culminating in the lateral occipital cortex. Based on temporal and polarity information provided by EEG, we hypothesize that the frontoparietal activation, evoked by directional information, updates a task-defined preparatory state by deselecting or inhibiting the behavioral option competing with the cued response side or the cued direction of attention. These results from human EEG demonstrate a direct EEG manifestation of the frontoparietal attention network previously identified in functional imaging. EEG reveals the time-course of activation within this network and elucidates the generation and function of associated directing-attention EEG potentials. The results emphasize transient activation and a decision-related function of the frontoparietal attention network, contrasting with the sustained preparatory activation that is commonly inferred from neuroimaging.</description>
    <dc:title>Frontoparietal control of spatial attention and motor intention in human EEG.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>P Praamstra</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>L Boutsen</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>GW Humphreys</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1152/jn.01052.2004</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 94, No. 1. (July 2005), pp. 764-774.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-10-08T22:03:17-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>94</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>764</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>774</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>attention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>eeg</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/526109">
    <title>The selection of intended actions and the observation of others' actions: A time-resolved fMRI study.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/rsekuler/article/526109</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neuroimage, Vol. 29, No. 4. (15 February 2006), pp. 1294-1302.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Whenever we plan, imagine, or observe an action, the motor systems that would be involved in preparing and executing that action are similarly engaged. The way in which such common motor activation is formed, however, is likely to differ depending on whether it arises from our own intentional selection of action or from the observation of another's action. In this study, we use time-resolved event-related functional MRI to tease apart neural processes specifically related to the processing of observed actions, the selection of our own intended actions, the preparation for movement, and motor response execution. Participants observed a finger gesture movement or a cue indicating they should select their own finger gesture to perform, followed by a 5-s delay period; participants then performed the observed or self-selected action. During the preparation and readiness for action, prior to initiation, we found activation in a common network of higher motor areas, including dorsal and ventral premotor areas and the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA); the more caudal SMA showed greater activation during movement execution. Importantly, the route to this common motor activation differed depending on whether participants freely selected the actions to perform or whether they observed the actions performed by another person. Observation of action specifically involved activation of inferior and superior parietal regions, reflecting involvement of the dorsal visual pathway in visuomotor processing required for planning the action. In contrast, the selection of action specifically involved the dorsal lateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex, reflecting the role of these prefrontal areas in attentional selection and guiding the selection of responses.</description>
    <dc:title>The selection of intended actions and the observation of others' actions: A time-resolved fMRI study.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>R Cunnington</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>C Windischberger</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>S Robinson</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>E Moser</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.09.028</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neuroimage, Vol. 29, No. 4. (15 February 2006), pp. 1294-1302.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-03-01T23:39:14-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neuroimage</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1053-8119</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>29</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1294</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1302</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>attention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>imitation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/recsp2003/article/310619">
    <title>Intention-related activity in the posterior parietal cortex: a review.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/recsp2003/article/310619</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Vision Res, Vol. 40, No. 10-12. (2000), pp. 1433-1441.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Over the last few years it is becoming increasingly apparent that an important role of the posterior parietal cortex is to process sensory information for the purpose of planning actions. We review studies showing that a large component of neural activity in area LIP is related to planning saccades and activity in a nearby parietal reach region (PRR) to reaches. This intention related activity dominates the delay period in delayed movement tasks, and also comprises a substantial component of the transient response. These findings, along with additional anatomical and physiological evidence, lends support to the idea that different cortical areas within the PPC represent plans for different actions. We also found strong modulation of activity when movement plans were changed without changes in the locus of attention. This result suggests that PPC, which has been postulated to play a role in shifting attention, may also play a role in changing movement intentions. Sensory related activity was also present in these tasks and may be related to the stimulus or to attention. These experiments show that there are intention and sensory related activities in the PPC consistent with its proposed role in sensory-motor transformations. These studies also show that care must be taken to measure intention-related signals and not assume that all task dependent modulation in the PPC reflects attention.</description>
    <dc:title>Intention-related activity in the posterior parietal cortex: a review.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>LH Snyder</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>AP Batista</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Vision Res, Vol. 40, No. 10-12. (2000), pp. 1433-1441.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-09-01T20:04:04-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2000</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Vision Res</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0042-6989</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>40</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>10-12</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1433</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1441</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal_cortex</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/paultr/article/742068">
    <title>On Measuring the Perceived Onsets of Spontaneous Actions</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/paultr/article/742068</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J. Neurosci., Vol. 26, No. 27. (5 July 2006), pp. 7265-7271.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the timing procedure that was devised by Libet et al. (1983) to measure the onset of conscious motor intentions in spontaneous actions. We previously showed that, when participants were required to estimate the onset of their intentions using this procedure, the activity in the presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) was enhanced. Here, we show that when participants were required to estimate the onset of their motor executions (instead of their intentions), the activity in the cingulate motor area was enhanced. Across participants, the degree of this neural enhancement was correlated with the degree of perceptual bias: the higher the degree of enhancement, the earlier the perception. Analysis of data from a previous experiment suggests that the same principle holds true for the relationship between the perceived onset of intentions and the activity in the pre-SMA. We therefore argue that the timing method of Libet et al. (1983) is problematic, because the measuring process affects the neural representations of action and thus also the perceived onsets that the method is designed to measure. 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1138-06.2006</description>
    <dc:title>On Measuring the Perceived Onsets of Spontaneous Actions</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Hakwan Lau</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Robert Rogers</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Richard Passingham</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1138</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J. Neurosci., Vol. 26, No. 27. (5 July 2006), pp. 7265-7271.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-07-06T13:41:27-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J. Neurosci.</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>26</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>27</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>7265</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>7271</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>brain</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>libet</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>perception</prism:category>
    <prism:category>time</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/paulclinger/article/2521941">
    <title>A unified view of plans as recipes</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/paulclinger/article/2521941</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(1997)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Plans as recipes or abstract structures, as well as plans as mental attitudes that guide an agent in its planning process has been enthusiastically embraced by both philosophers and AI practitioners. They play a central role in a class of rational agents, called Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents. This dual view of plans can not only be used for efficient planning, but can also be used for recognizing the plans of other agents, coordinating one's actions and achieving joint intentions with...</description>
    <dc:title>A unified view of plans as recipes</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>A Rao</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>(1997)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-03-12T17:26:00-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1997</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:category>agent-rational</prism:category>
    <prism:category>architecture-bdi</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>planning</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/paulclinger/article/596755">
    <title>BDI-agents: from theory to practice</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/paulclinger/article/596755</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;(1995)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The study of computational agents capable of rational behaviour has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Theoretical formalizations of such agents and their implementations have proceeded in parallel with little or no connection between them. This paper explores a particular type of rational agent, a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agent. The primary aim of this paper is to integrate (a) the theoretical foundations of BDI agents from both a quantitative decision-theoretic...</description>
    <dc:title>BDI-agents: from theory to practice</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>AS Rao</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>MP Georgeff</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>(1995)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-04-24T08:31:33-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1995</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:category>architecture-bdi</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1224342">
    <title>Social cognition: an early impairment in dementia of the Alzheimer type.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1224342</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Alzheimer Dis Assoc Disord, Vol. 21, No. 1. (r 2007), pp. 25-30.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;OBJECTIVE: A core component of social functioning is the capacity to attribute mental states to others and to understand intention as psychologic cause. The hypothesis of this study was that dementia of the Alzheimer type (DAT) patients show an impaired understanding of psychologic cause although they remain able to understand physical causality. METHODS: To test this hypothesis, 20 elderly adults with DAT, 20 healthy age-matched controls, and 20 healthy young adults were presented a cartoon task requiring them to process physical or psychologic cause of events. RESULTS: Patients with DAT at onset scored significantly lower than controls when they had to reason about psychologic causation, while they did not differ for reasoning about physical causation. Consistent with these results, patients with DAT showed significantly lower scores in psychologic reasoning as compared with their scores for physical causality. Instead young and elderly healthy adults scored similarly for the 2 types of causality and the 2 groups did not differ in their scores. These results suggest that impaired understanding of intention in others may be considered as an early socio-cognitive index of onset of DAT. A post hoc division of the group of patients with DAT into 2 subgroups according to Mini Mental State (MMS) scores showed that the group with the more severe MMS scores not only had lower scores for psychologic causality but also showed impairment in reasoning about physical causality involving persons. Physical causality involving objects remained relatively preserved. CONCLUSIONS: The remarkable deficit in attribution of intention in our patients with DAT at onset and the following deterioration of their performance in reasoning about physical causality with persons may reflect progressive dysfunction of the superior temporal sulcus in Alzheimer disease.</description>
    <dc:title>Social cognition: an early impairment in dementia of the Alzheimer type.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>CM Verdon</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>P Fossati</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Verny</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>B Dieudonné</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>L Teillet</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>J Nadel</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1097/WAD.0b013e318032487a</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Alzheimer Dis Assoc Disord, Vol. 21, No. 1. (r 2007), pp. 25-30.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-04-13T16:08:36-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2007</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Alzheimer Dis Assoc Disord</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0893-0341</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>21</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>25</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>30</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>alzheimers_disease</prism:category>
    <prism:category>causality</prism:category>
    <prism:category>dat</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1224444">
    <title>Grasping the intentions of others: the perceived intentionality of an action influences activity in the superior temporal sulcus during social perception.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/oamg/article/1224444</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 16, No. 10. (December 2004), pp. 1706-1716.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;An explication of the neural substrates for social perception is an important component in the emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience and is relevant to the field of cognitive neuroscience as a whole. Prior studies from our laboratory have demonstrated that passive viewing of biological motion (Pelphrey, Mitchell, et al., 2003; Puce et al., 1998) activates the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS ) region. Furthermore, recent evidence has shown that the perceived context of observed gaze shifts (Pelphrey, Singerman, et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2004) modulates STS activity. Here, using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging at 4 T, we investigated brain activity in response to passive viewing of goal- and nongoal-directed reaching-to-grasp movements. Participants viewed an animated character making reaching-to-grasp movements either toward (correct) or away (incorrect) from a blinking dial. Both conditions evoked significant posterior STS activity that was strongly right lateralized. By examining the time course of the blood oxygenation level-dependent response from areas of activation, we observed a functional dissociation. Incorrect trials evoked significantly greater activity in the STS than did correct trials, while an area posterior and inferior to the STS (likely corresponding to the MT/ V5 complex) responded equally to correct and incorrect movements. Parietal cortical regions, including the superior parietal lobule and the anterior intraparietal sulcus, also responded equally to correct and incorrect movements, but showed evidence for differential responding based on the hand and arm (left or right) of the animated character used to make the reaching-to-grasp movement. The results of this study further suggest that a region of the right posterior STS is involved in analyzing the intentions of other people's actions and that activity in this region is sensitive to the context of observed biological motions.</description>
    <dc:title>Grasping the intentions of others: the perceived intentionality of an action influences activity in the superior temporal sulcus during social perception.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>KA Pelphrey</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JP Morris</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>G McCarthy</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1162/0898929042947900</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J Cogn Neurosci, Vol. 16, No. 10. (December 2004), pp. 1706-1716.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-04-13T17:43:18-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2004</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Cogn Neurosci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0898-929X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>10</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1706</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1716</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>biological_motion</prism:category>
    <prism:category>cause_and_effect</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>social_perception</prism:category>
    <prism:category>superior_temporal_sulcus</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/nomurami/article/670445">
    <title>Goals and means in action observation: A computational approach</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/nomurami/article/670445</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neural Networks, Vol. 19, No. 3. (April 2006), pp. 311-322.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Many of our daily activities are supported by behavioural goals that guide the selection of actions, which allow us to reach these goals effectively. Goals are considered to be important for action observation since they allow the observer to copy the goal of the action without the need to use the exact same means. The importance of being able to use different action means becomes evident when the observer and observed actor have different bodies (robots and humans) or bodily measurements (parents and children), or when the environments of actor and observer differ substantially (when an obstacle is present or absent in either environment). A selective focus on the action goals instead of the action means furthermore circumvents the need to consider the vantage point of the actor, which is consistent with recent findings that people prefer to represent the actions of others from their own individual perspective. In this paper, we use a computational approach to investigate how knowledge about action goals and means are used in action observation. We hypothesise that in action observation human agents are primarily interested in identifying the goals of the observed actor's behaviour. Behavioural cues (e.g. the way an object is grasped) may help to disambiguate the goal of the actor (e.g. whether a cup is grasped for drinking or handing it over). Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience are cited in support of the model's architecture.</description>
    <dc:title>Goals and means in action observation: A computational approach</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Raymond Cuijpers</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Hein Schie</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Mathieu Koppen</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Wolfram Erlhagen</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Harold Bekkering</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.02.004</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neural Networks, Vol. 19, No. 3. (April 2006), pp. 311-322.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-05-25T19:32:04-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neural Networks</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>19</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>311</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>322</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/mortimer/article/228585">
    <title>Attention, Intentions, and the Structure of Discourse</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/mortimer/article/228585</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Computational Linguistics, Vol. 12, No. 3. (1986), pp. 175-204.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;this paper we explore a new theory of discourse structure that stresses the role of purpose and processing in discourse. In this theory, discourse structure is composed of three separate but interrelated components: the structure of the sequence of utterances (called the linguistic structure), a struclure of purposes (called the intentional structure), and the state of focus of attention (called the attentional state). The linguistic structure consists of segments of the discourse into which...</description>
    <dc:title>Attention, Intentions, and the Structure of Discourse</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Barbara Grosz</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Candace Sidner</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Computational Linguistics, Vol. 12, No. 3. (1986), pp. 175-204.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-06-15T17:39:43-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1986</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Computational Linguistics</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>12</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>175</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>204</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>dialogue</prism:category>
    <prism:category>discourse</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>phd-bibtex-import</prism:category>
    <prism:category>structure</prism:category>
    <prism:category>task-oriented</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/momo54/article/2847372">
    <title>A Multi-Versioning Scheme for Intention Preservation in Collaborative Editing Systems*</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/momo54/article/2847372</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Abstract&#160;&#160;Although the multi-version approach to consistency maintenance has been widely discussed and implemented in database systems, version control systems, and asynchronous groupware systems, its potential in real-time groupware systems is largely unexplored. Intention preservation is an important aspect of consistency maintenance in real-time collaborative editing systems, where multiple users cooperate with each other by concurrently editing the same document. The multi-version approach is supposed to be able to preserve individual users’ concurrent conflicting intentions. In this article, we propose a new multi-versioning scheme that can preserve not only concurrent conflicting intentions but also contextual intentions while achieving convergence of the document under editing. By extending an existing multi-versioning scheme to a general one that specifies the conditions for convergence, we decouple the discussion of convergence from that of intention preservation. By constraining the general scheme, we arrive at the novel scheme that guarantees to preserve users’ intentions. The correctness of the scheme has been formally verified. The design of an algorithm for consistent version composition and identification has been discussed in detail.</description>
    <dc:title>A Multi-Versioning Scheme for Intention Preservation in Collaborative Editing Systems*</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Liyin Xue</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Mehmet Orgun</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Kang Zhang</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1007/s10606-008-9076-5</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-05-30T14:03:17-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationName>Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:category>cscw</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>ot</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/miwismith/article/2919245">
    <title>Conceptualisation of Terrorism in Modelling Tools: Critical Reflexive Approach</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/miwismith/article/2919245</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Prometheus, Vol. 24, No. 4. (2006), pp. 441-447.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This paper outlines a critical reflexive approach to an assessment of modelling/simulation tools. The concepts of terrorism and terrorism threat in modelling literature are analysed and compared with the contesting definitions of terrorism in political science and counter-terrorism discourse. Possible social implications of using particular concepts of terrorism and terrorism threat are identified. This study discusses how modellers provide better support to counter-terrorism analysis and decision making, by taking the above-mentioned approach.</description>
    <dc:title>Conceptualisation of Terrorism in Modelling Tools: Critical Reflexive Approach</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Lucy Resnyansky</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1080/08109020601030035</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Prometheus, Vol. 24, No. 4. (2006), pp. 441-447.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-06-23T16:25:25-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Prometheus</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>24</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>441</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>447</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:publisher>Routledge</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>decision-support</prism:category>
    <prism:category>factions</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/metropol/article/514122">
    <title>Insights into the dialogue processing of VERBMOBIL</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/metropol/article/514122</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;No. 191. (1997)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We present the dialogue module of the speech-to-speech translation system VERBMOBIL.</description>
    <dc:title>Insights into the dialogue processing of VERBMOBIL</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Jan Alexandersson</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Norbert Reithinger</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Elisabeth Maier</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>No. 191. (1997)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-02-21T06:35:54-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1997</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:number>191</prism:number>
    <prism:category>context</prism:category>
    <prism:category>corpus</prism:category>
    <prism:category>dialogue</prism:category>
    <prism:category>inference</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>knowledge</prism:category>
    <prism:category>learning</prism:category>
    <prism:category>plan</prism:category>
    <prism:category>statistical</prism:category>
    <prism:category>verbmobil</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/217374">
    <title>Action plans used in action observation.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/217374</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Nature, Vol. 424, No. 6950. (14 August 2003), pp. 769-771.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;How do we understand the actions of others? According to the direct matching hypothesis, action understanding results from a mechanism that maps an observed action onto motor representations of that action. Although supported by neurophysiological and brain-imaging studies, direct evidence for this hypothesis is sparse. In visually guided actions, task-specific proactive eye movements are crucial for planning and control. Because the eyes are free to move when observing such actions, the direct matching hypothesis predicts that subjects should produce eye movements similar to those produced when they perform the tasks. If an observer analyses action through purely visual means, however, eye movements will be linked reactively to the observed action. Here we show that when subjects observe a block stacking task, the coordination between their gaze and the actor's hand is predictive, rather than reactive, and is highly similar to the gaze-hand coordination when they perform the task themselves. These results indicate that during action observation subjects implement eye motor programs directed by motor representations of manual actions and thus provide strong evidence for the direct matching hypothesis.</description>
    <dc:title>Action plans used in action observation.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>JR Flanagan</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RS Johansson</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1038/nature01861</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Nature, Vol. 424, No. 6950. (14 August 2003), pp. 769-771.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-06-02T22:52:13-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2003</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Nature</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1476-4687</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>424</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>6950</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>769</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>771</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>imitation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444840">
    <title>Interruption of motor cortical discharge subserving aimed arm movements.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444840</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Exp Brain Res, Vol. 49, No. 3. (1983), pp. 327-340.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Can evolving motor commands be interrupted by changes in sensory signals that triggered them? We investigated this problem by observing the changes in single cell activity in the motor cortex of monkeys, changes that preceded movement of the hand toward a visual target. We found that this activity was interrupted following a shift of the target during the reaction or movement time and replaced by the pattern activity related to the movement towards the new target. This suggests that motor cortical commands subserving aimed arm movements are processes that can be interrupted in the course of their formation and/or execution by changes in afferent controlling inputs.</description>
    <dc:title>Interruption of motor cortical discharge subserving aimed arm movements.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>AP Georgopoulos</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JF Kalaska</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>R Caminiti</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JT Massey</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Exp Brain Res, Vol. 49, No. 3. (1983), pp. 327-340.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-12-19T21:57:46-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1983</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Exp Brain Res</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0014-4819</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>49</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>327</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>340</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcortex</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/90440">
    <title>Motor intention activity in the macaque's lateral intraparietal area. I. Dissociation of motor plan from sensory memory.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/90440</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 76, No. 3. (September 1996), pp. 1439-1456.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. The lateral intraparietal area (area LIP) of the monkey's posterior parietal cortex (PPC) contains neurons that are active during saccadic eye movements. These neurons' activity includes visual and saccade-related components. These responses are spatially tuned and the location of a neuron's visual receptive field (RF) relative to the fovea generally overlaps its preferred saccade amplitude and direction (i.e., its motor field, MF). When a delay is imposed between the presentation of a visual stimulus and a saccade made to its location (memory saccade task), many LIP neurons maintain elevated activity during the delay (memory activity, M), which appears to encode the metrics of the next intended saccadic eye movements. Recent studies have alternatively suggested that LIP neurons encode the locations of visual stimuli regardless of where the animal intends to look. We examined whether the M activity of LIP neurons specifically encodes movement intention or the locations of recent visual stimuli, or a combination of both. In the accompanying study, we investigated whether the intended-movement activity reflects changes in motor plan. 2. We trained monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to memorize the locations of two visual stimuli and plan a sequence of two saccades, one to each remembered target, as we recorded the activity of single LIP neurons. Two targets were flashed briefly while the monkey maintained fixation; after a delay the fixation point was extinguished, and the monkey made two saccades in sequence to each target's remembered location, in the order in which the targets were presented. This &#34;delayed double saccade&#34; (DDS) paradigm allowed us to dissociate the location of visual stimulation from the direction of the planned saccade and thus distinguish neuronal activity related to the target's location from activity related to the saccade plan. By imposing a delay, we eliminated the confounding effect of any phasic responses coincident with the appearance of the stimulus and with the saccade. 3. We arranged the two visual stimuli so that in one set of conditions at least the first one was in the neuron's visual RF, and thus the first saccade was in the neuron's motor field (MF). M activity should be high in these conditions according to both the sensory memory and motor plan hypotheses. In another set of conditions, the second stimulus appeared in the RF but the first one was presented outside the RF, instructing the monkey to plan the first saccade away from the neuron's MF. If the M activity encodes the motor plan, it should be low in these conditions, reflecting the plan for the first saccade (away from the MF). If it is a sensory trace of the stimulus' location, it should be high, reflecting stimulation of the RF by the second target. 4. We tested 49 LIP neurons (in 3 hemispheres of 2 monkeys) with M activity on the DDS task. Of these, 38 (77%) had M activity related to the next intended saccade. They were active in the delay period, as expected, if the first saccade was in their preferred direction. They were less active or silent if the next saccade was not in their preferred direction, even when the second stimulus appeared in their RF. 5. The M activity of 8 (16%) of the remaining neurons specifically encoded the location of the most recent visual stimulus. Their firing rate during the delay reflected stimulation of the RF independently of the saccade being planned. The remaining 3 neurons had M activity that did not consistently encode either the next saccade or the stimulus' location. 6. We also recorded the activity of a subset of neurons (n = 38) in a condition in which no stimulus appeared in a neuron's RF, but the second saccade was in the neuron's MF. In this case the majority of neurons tested (23/38, 60%) became active in the period between the first and second saccade, even if neither stimulus had appeared in their RF. Moreover, this activity appeared only after the first saccade had started in all but two of</description>
    <dc:title>Motor intention activity in the macaque's lateral intraparietal area. I. Dissociation of motor plan from sensory memory.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>P Mazzoni</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RM Bracewell</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>S Barash</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 76, No. 3. (September 1996), pp. 1439-1456.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-08T21:14:12-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1996</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>76</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1439</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1456</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>ips</prism:category>
    <prism:category>monkey</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spatial</prism:category>
    <prism:category>wm</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/963361">
    <title>Stabilizing the visual world</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/963361</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 12., pp. 1467-1468.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Stabilizing the visual world</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Douglas Munoz</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1038/nn1206-1467</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 12., pp. 1467-1468.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-11-27T14:33:24-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationName>Nature Neuroscience</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1097-6256</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>12</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1467</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1468</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:publisher>Nature Publishing Group</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>forwardmodel</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>remap</prism:category>
    <prism:category>saccade</prism:category>
    <prism:category>supcol</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/566962">
    <title>Voluntary action expands perceived duration of its sensory consequence.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/566962</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Exp Brain Res, Vol. 149, No. 4. (April 2003), pp. 527-529.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When we look at a clock with a hand showing seconds, the hand sometimes appears to stay longer at its first-seen position than at the following positions, evoking an illusion of chronostasis. This illusory extension of perceived duration has been shown to be coupled to saccadic eye movement and it has been suggested to serve as a mechanism of maintaining spatial stability across the saccade. Here, we examined the effects of three kinds of voluntary movements on the illusion of chronostasis: key press, voice command, and saccadic eye movement. We found that the illusion can occur with all three kinds of voluntary movements if such movements start the clock immediately. When a delay is introduced between the voluntary movement and the start of the clock, the delay itself is overestimated. These results indicate that the illusion of chronostasis is not specific to saccadic eye movement, and may therefore involve a more general mechanism of how voluntary action influences time perception.</description>
    <dc:title>Voluntary action expands perceived duration of its sensory consequence.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>J Park</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Schlag-Rey</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>J Schlag</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1007/s00221-003-1376-x</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Exp Brain Res, Vol. 149, No. 4. (April 2003), pp. 527-529.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-03-28T19:44:42-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2003</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Exp Brain Res</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0014-4819</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>149</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>527</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>529</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>saccade</prism:category>
    <prism:category>striatum</prism:category>
    <prism:category>timing</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444905">
    <title>An evolving view of duplex vision: separate but interacting cortical pathways for perception and action.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444905</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Curr Opin Neurobiol, Vol. 14, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 203-211.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 1992, Goodale and Milner proposed a division of labour in the visual pathways of the primate cerebral cortex between a dorsal stream specialised for the visual control of action and a ventral stream dedicated to the perception of the visual world. In the years since this original proposal, support for the perception-action hypothesis has come from neuroimaging experiments, human neuropsychology, monkey neurophysiology, and human psychophysical experiments. Indeed, some of the strongest support for this hypothesis has come from behavioural experiments showing that visually guided actions are largely refractory to perceptual illusions. Although controversial, the findings from this literature both support the original hypothesis and suggest important modifications. The ongoing challenge for neurobiologists is to map these behavioural findings onto their corresponding neural substrates.</description>
    <dc:title>An evolving view of duplex vision: separate but interacting cortical pathways for perception and action.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>MA Goodale</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>DA Westwood</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.03.002</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Curr Opin Neurobiol, Vol. 14, No. 2. (April 2004), pp. 203-211.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-12-19T22:54:12-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2004</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Curr Opin Neurobiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0959-4388</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>14</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>203</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>211</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>dorsalventral</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444904">
    <title>Posterior parietal association cortex of the monkey: command functions for operations within extrapersonal space.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/444904</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 38, No. 4. (July 1975), pp. 871-908.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Experiments were made on the posterior parietal association cortical areas 5 and in 17 hemispheres of 11 monkeys, 6 M. mulatta and 5 M. arctoides. The electrical signs of the activity of single cortical cells were recorded with microelectrodes in waking animals as they carried out certain behavioral acts in response to a series of sensory cues. The behavioral paradigms were one for detection alone, and a second for detection plus projection of the arm to contact a stationary or moving target placed at arm's length. Of the 125 microelectrode penetrations made, 1,451 neurons were identified in terms of the correlation of their activity with the behavioral acts and their sensitivity or lack of it to sensory stimuli delivered passively; 180 were studied quantitatively. The locations of cortical neurons were identified in serial sections; 94 penetrations and 1,058 neurons were located with certainty. About two-thirds of the neurons of area 5 were activated by passive rotation of the limbs at their joints; of these, 82% were related to single, contralateral joints, 10% to two or more contralateral joints, 6% to ipsilateral, and 2% to joints on both sides of the body. A few of the latter were active during complex bodily postures. A large proportion of area 5 neurons were relatively insensitive to passive joint rotations, as compared with similar neurons of the postcentral gyrus, but were driven to high rates of discharge when the same joint was rotated during an active movement of the animal...</description>
    <dc:title>Posterior parietal association cortex of the monkey: command functions for operations within extrapersonal space.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>VB Mountcastle</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JC Lynch</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>A Georgopoulos</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>H Sakata</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>C Acuna</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 38, No. 4. (July 1975), pp. 871-908.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-12-19T22:53:06-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1975</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>38</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>871</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>908</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/615607">
    <title>A neural network model of flexible spatial updating.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/615607</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 91, No. 4. (April 2004), pp. 1608-1619.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Neurons in many cortical areas involved in visuospatial processing represent remembered spatial information in retinotopic coordinates. During a gaze shift, the retinotopic representation of a target location that is fixed in the world (world-fixed reference frame) must be updated, whereas the representation of a target fixed relative to the center of gaze (gaze-fixed) must remain constant. To investigate how such computations might be performed, we trained a 3-layer recurrent neural network to store and update a spatial location based on a gaze perturbation signal, and to do so flexibly based on a contextual cue. The network produced an accurate readout of target position when cued to either reference frame, but was less precise when updating was performed. This output mimics the pattern of behavior seen in animals performing a similar task. We tested whether updating would preferentially use gaze position or gaze velocity signals, and found that the network strongly preferred velocity for updating world-fixed targets. Furthermore, we found that gaze position gain fields were not present when velocity signals were available for updating. These results have implications for how updating is performed in the brain.</description>
    <dc:title>A neural network model of flexible spatial updating.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>RL White</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>LH Snyder</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1152/jn.00277.2003</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 91, No. 4. (April 2004), pp. 1608-1619.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-05-05T23:07:25-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2004</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>91</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>4</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1608</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1619</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>ips</prism:category>
    <prism:category>remap</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spatial</prism:category>
    <prism:category>updating</prism:category>
    <prism:category>wm</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/692677">
    <title>Encoding of intention and spatial location in the posterior parietal cortex.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/692677</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Cereb Cortex, Vol. 5, No. 5. (t 1995), pp. 457-469.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The posterior parietal cortex is functionally situated between sensory cortex and motor cortex. The responses of cells in this area are difficult to classify as strictly sensory or motor, since many have both sensory- and movement-related activities, as well as activities related to higher cognitive functions such as attention and intention. In this review we will provide evidence that the posterior parietal cortex is an interface between sensory and motor structures and performs various functions important for sensory-motor integration. The review will focus on two specific sensory-motor tasks--the formation of motor plans and the abstract representation of space. Cells in the lateral intraparietal area, a subdivision of the parietal cortex, have activity related to eye movements the animal intends to make. This finding represents the lowest stage in the sensory-motor cortical pathway in which activity related to intention has been found and may represent the cortical stage in which sensory signals go &#34;over the hump&#34; to become intentions and plans to make movements. The second part of the review will discuss the representation of space in the posterior parietal cortex. Encoding spatial locations is an essential step in sensory-motor transformations. Since movements are made to locations in space, these locations should be coded invariant of eye and head position or the sensory modality signaling the target for a movement. Data will be reviewed demonstrating that there exists in the posterior parietal cortex an abstract representation of space that is constructed from the integration of visual, auditory, vestibular, eye position, and proprioceptive head position signals. This representation is in the form of a population code and the above signals are not combined in a haphazard fashion. Rather, they are brought together using a specific operation to form &#34;planar gain fields&#34; that are the common foundation of the population code for the neural construct of space.</description>
    <dc:title>Encoding of intention and spatial location in the posterior parietal cortex.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Cereb Cortex, Vol. 5, No. 5. (t 1995), pp. 457-469.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-06-11T23:47:58-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1995</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Cereb Cortex</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1047-3211</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>5</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>457</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>469</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>attention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>forward</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spatial</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/500600">
    <title>The posterior parietal cortex: Sensorimotor interface for the planning and online control of visually guided movements.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/500600</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neuropsychologia (18 November 2005)&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We present a view of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) as a sensorimotor interface for visually guided movements. Special attention is given to the role of the PPC in arm movement planning, where representations of target position and current hand position in an eye-centered frame of reference appear to be mapped directly to a representation of motor error in a hand-centered frame of reference. This mapping is direct in the sense that it does not require target position to be transformed into intermediate reference frames in order to derive a motor error signal in hand-centered coordinates. Despite being direct, this transformation appears to manifest in the PPC as a gradual change in the functional properties of cells along the ventro-dorsal axis of the superior parietal lobule (SPL), i.e. from deep in the sulcus to the cortical surface. Possible roles for the PPC in context dependent coordinate transformations, formation of intrinsic movement representations, and in online control of visually guided arm movements are also discussed. Overall these studies point to the emerging view that, for arm movements, the PPC plays a role not only in the inverse transformations required to convert sensory information into motor commands but also in 'forward' transformations as well, i.e. in integrating sensory input with previous and ongoing motor commands to maintain a continuous estimate of arm state that can be used to update present and future movement plans. Critically, this state estimate appears to be encoded in an eye-centered frame of reference.</description>
    <dc:title>The posterior parietal cortex: Sensorimotor interface for the planning and online control of visually guided movements.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Christopher A Buneo</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Richard A Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.10.011</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neuropsychologia (18 November 2005)</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-02-10T15:16:45-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neuropsychologia</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0028-3932</prism:issn>
    <prism:category>eyehand</prism:category>
    <prism:category>forward</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>reachgrasp</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spatial</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1142175">
    <title>Visuomotor functions of the posterior parietal cortex.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1142175</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2589-2593.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this special issue of Neuropsychologia leading experts in the field discuss controversies and advances in the role of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in visuomotor control. The papers are wide-ranging in their scope, covering monkey physiology and anatomy, functional imaging in humans and monkeys as well as transcranial magnetic stimulation and lesion studies in humans. The collection provides an important overview of the current state-of the-art in this area of research, including discussions on homologies between monkey and human parietal regions, the role of co-ordinate transformations and intermediate representations from vision to action, and reviews of controversial hot topics in this field.</description>
    <dc:title>Visuomotor functions of the posterior parietal cortex.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>SR Jackson</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Husain</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.08.002</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2589-2593.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-03-05T19:31:08-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neuropsychologia</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0028-3932</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>44</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>13</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>2589</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>2593</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>sensorimotor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>tms</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/714224">
    <title>Optimal decision making and the anterior cingulate cortex</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/714224</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 7. (18 June 2006), pp. 940-947.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Optimal decision making and the anterior cingulate cortex</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Steven Kennerley</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Mark Walton</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Timothy Behrens</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Mark Buckley</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Matthew Rushworth</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1038/nn1724</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 7. (18 June 2006), pp. 940-947.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-06-28T17:36:05-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Nature Neuroscience</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>1097-6256</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>7</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>940</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>947</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:publisher>Nature Publishing Group</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>acc</prism:category>
    <prism:category>cingulate</prism:category>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>reachgrasp</prism:category>
    <prism:category>representation</prism:category>
    <prism:category>response</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1217418">
    <title>Premotor and parietal cortex: corticocortical connectivity and combinatorial computations.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1217418</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Annu Rev Neurosci, Vol. 20 (1997), pp. 25-42.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The dorsal premotor cortex is a functionally distinct cortical field or group of fields in the primate frontal cortex. Anatomical studies have confirmed that most parietal input to the dorsal premotor cortex originates from the superior parietal lobule. However, these projections arise not only from the dorsal aspect of area 5, as has long been known, but also from newly defined areas of posterior parietal cortex, which are directly connected with the extrastriate visual cortex. Thus, the dorsal premotor cortex receives much more direct visual input than previously accepted. It appears that this fronto-parietal network functions as a visuomotor controller-one that makes computations based on proprioceptive, visual, gaze, attentional, and other information to produce an output that reflects the selection, preparation, and execution of movements.</description>
    <dc:title>Premotor and parietal cortex: corticocortical connectivity and combinatorial computations.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>SP Wise</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>D Boussaoud</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>PB Johnson</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>R Caminiti</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.20.1.25</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Annu Rev Neurosci, Vol. 20 (1997), pp. 25-42.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-04-08T21:04:17-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1997</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Annu Rev Neurosci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0147-006X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>20</prism:volume>
    <prism:startingPage>25</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>42</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>action</prism:category>
    <prism:category>anatomy</prism:category>
    <prism:category>eyehand</prism:category>
    <prism:category>fef</prism:category>
    <prism:category>frontal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>ips</prism:category>
    <prism:category>model</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>pfc</prism:category>
    <prism:category>premotor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>reachgrasp</prism:category>
    <prism:category>sequence</prism:category>
    <prism:category>spatial</prism:category>
    <prism:category>wm</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1224680">
    <title>Action control in visual neglect.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/1224680</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2717-2733.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Patients with unilateral neglect show a variety of impairments when reaching towards objects in contralesional space. The basis of these deficits could be perceptual, motor or at one of the intermediate stages linking these processes. Here, we review studies of visually guided reaching in neglect and integrate these results with findings from normal human and monkey action control. We consider evidence which shows that neglect patients can be slow to initiate or execute reaches particularly to a contralesional target. We discuss the directional and spatial deficits that may interact to contribute to such reaching abnormalities and highlight the importance of effective target selection and on-line guidance, exploring the idea that deficits in these mechanisms underlie increased susceptibility to ipsilesional visual distraction in neglect. We also examine the relationship between optic ataxia and neglect by considering two illustrative cases, one with pure optic ataxia and the other with optic ataxia plus neglect, which reveal differences in the anatomical substrates of the two syndromes. We conclude that many patients with neglect make abnormal visually guided reaches, but the pattern of reaching deficits is highly variable, most likely reflecting heterogeneity of lesion location across subjects. Rather than being specific to the neglect syndrome, abnormalities of reaching in these patients may correspond to the extent of damage to the visuomotor control system which involves critical regions in both the parietal and frontal cortex, the white matter tracts connecting them and subcortical regions. Thus, the action control deficits in neglect may be conceptualised as a range of impairments affecting multiple stages in the visuomotor control process.</description>
    <dc:title>Action control in visual neglect.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>E Coulthard</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>A Parton</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Husain</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.11.004</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2717-2733.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-04-14T00:14:14-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neuropsychologia</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0028-3932</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>44</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>13</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>2717</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>2733</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>action</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>neglect</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/911412">
    <title>Visuo-motor integration and control in the human posterior parietal cortex: Evidence from TMS and fMRI.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/911412</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2691-2699.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The posterior parietal cortex is a fundamental structure for visuo-motor integration and control. Here I discuss recent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that I interpret as suggesting four concepts. The evolutionary process has enlarged the human posterior parietal cortex while still preserving the internal structure of the posterior parietal cortex of other primates. Visuo-motor control in the posterior parietal cortex may be implemented by coding primarily action goals. The lateralization of visuo-motor functions in the posterior parietal cortex suggests that the left posterior parietal cortex is more concerned with tool use and the right posterior parietal cortex is more concerned with imitation of the actions of others. Finally, visuo-motor inter-hemispheric transfer through parietal callosal fibers occurs at the level of 'motor intention'.</description>
    <dc:title>Visuo-motor integration and control in the human posterior parietal cortex: Evidence from TMS and fMRI.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>M Iacoboni</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.04.029</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Neuropsychologia, Vol. 44, No. 13. (2006), pp. 2691-2699.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2006-10-24T18:38:24-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2006</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Neuropsychologia</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0028-3932</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>44</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>13</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>2691</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>2699</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motorcontrol</prism:category>
    <prism:category>parietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>sensorimotor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>tms</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/409465">
    <title>Artificial intelligence. Autonomous mental development by robots and animals.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/409465</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Science, Vol. 291, No. 5504. (26 January 2001), pp. 599-600.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Artificial intelligence. Autonomous mental development by robots and animals.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>J Weng</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>J Mcclelland</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>A Pentland</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>O Sporns</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>I Stockman</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Sur</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>E Thelen</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1126/science.291.5504.599</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Science, Vol. 291, No. 5504. (26 January 2001), pp. 599-600.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-11-27T04:33:05-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2001</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Science</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0036-8075</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>291</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5504</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>599</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>600</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motordev</prism:category>
    <prism:category>robot</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/101189">
    <title>Listening to Action-related Sentences Activates Fronto-parietal Motor Circuits</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/memphisphil/article/101189</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol. 17, No. 2. (February 2005), pp. 273-281.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
    <dc:title>Listening to Action-related Sentences Activates Fronto-parietal Motor Circuits</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Marco Tettamanti</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Giovanni Buccino</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Maria Saccuman</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Vittorio Gallese</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Massimo Danna</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Paola Scifo</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Ferruccio Fazio</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Giacomo Rizzolatti</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Stefano Cappa</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Daniela Perani</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1162/0898929053124965</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol. 17, No. 2. (February 2005), pp. 273-281.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-23T04:54:37-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2005</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0898-929X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>17</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>2</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>273</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>281</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:publisher>MIT Press</prism:publisher>
    <prism:category>fmri</prism:category>
    <prism:category>imagery</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>mirror</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/MattiaMarangon/article/1297771">
    <title>Reduced excitability of the cortico-spinal system during the warning period of a reaction time task.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/MattiaMarangon/article/1297771</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol, Vol. 109, No. 6. (December 1998), pp. 489-495.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Seven subjects made a wrist flexion movement as rapidly as possible in response to a cutaneous shock on the opposite hand. In some trials, an auditory warning signal was given 0.5 s beforehand. In random trials, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to elicit EMG responses (MEPs) in forearm flexor and extensor muscles 0-500 ms before the cutaneous shock. H-reflexes were elicited in flexor muscles at the same intervals. The warning stimulus reduced reaction time from about 400 ms to 200 ms. MEPs in the flexor muscles were significantly suppressed from 125 ms after the warning stimulus until the time of the cutaneous shock whilst MEPs in the extensors, and H-reflexes in the flexor were either unaffected, or reduced by a smaller amount at a later time. Responses in relaxed contralateral muscles were unchanged. If the task was changed to a choice reaction, in which the imperative stimulus (but not the warning signal) indicated whether to flex or extend the wrist, then there was no change in the MEPs or H-reflex in the warning period. A similar effect was seen if the duration of the warning period was extended from 0.5 to 2 s in a simple reaction (flexion) task. We conclude that increased excitability of the corticospinal output is not required to speed up reaction times. The time taken to discharge cortical output elements is relatively unimportant compared with the time needed to process the sensory input and link it to the motor output.</description>
    <dc:title>Reduced excitability of the cortico-spinal system during the warning period of a reaction time task.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>T Touge</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JL Taylor</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>JC Rothwell</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol, Vol. 109, No. 6. (December 1998), pp. 489-495.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-05-15T18:05:32-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1998</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0013-4694</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>109</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>6</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>489</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>495</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>before</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motor</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/MattiaMarangon/article/1297755">
    <title>The time-course of preparatory spinal and cortico-spinal inhibition: an H-reflex and transcranial magnetic stimulation study in man.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/MattiaMarangon/article/1297755</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Exp Brain Res, Vol. 124, No. 1. (January 1999), pp. 33-41.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In a previous study where reaction-time methods were combined with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex, cortico-spinal excitability was shown to reflect time preparation. Provided that subjects can accurately estimate time, the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) diminish progressively during the interval separating the warning signal from the response signal (i.e., the foreperiod). On the other hand, several experiments have demonstrated that the amplitude of the Hoffman (H) reflex elicited in prime movers diminishes during the foreperiod of reaction-time tasks. The aim of the present study was to compare the time course of the respective decrements of H-reflex and MEP amplitude during a constant 500-ms foreperiod. The subjects (n=8) participated in two experimental sessions. In one session, H-reflexes were induced in a tonically activated, responding hand muscle, the flexor pollicis brevis, at different times during the foreperiod of a visual-choice reaction-time task. In the other session, motor potentials were evoked in the same muscle by TMS of the motor cortex delivered in the same behavioral conditions and at the same times as in the first session. The results show that both H-reflexes and MEPs diminish in amplitude during the foreperiod, which replicates and extends previous findings. Interestingly, the time constants of the two decrements differed. There was a facilitatory effect of both electrical and magnetic stimulations on the subject's performance: reaction time was shorter for the trials during which a stimulation was delivered than for the no-stimulation trials. This facilitation was maximal when the stimulations were delivered simultaneously with the warning signal and vanished progressively with stimulation time.</description>
    <dc:title>The time-course of preparatory spinal and cortico-spinal inhibition: an H-reflex and transcranial magnetic stimulation study in man.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>T Hasbroucq</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>H Kaneko</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>M Akamatsu</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>CA Possamaï</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>Exp Brain Res, Vol. 124, No. 1. (January 1999), pp. 33-41.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2007-05-15T18:01:07-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1999</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Exp Brain Res</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0014-4819</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>124</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>33</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>41</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>course</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>motor</prism:category>
    <prism:category>time</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90441">
    <title>Motor intention activity in the macaque's lateral intraparietal area. II. Changes of motor plan.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90441</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 76, No. 3. (September 1996), pp. 1457-1464.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;1. In the companion paper we reported that the predominant signal of the population of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (area LIP) of the monkey's posterior parietal cortex (PPC) encode the next intended saccadic eye movement during the delay period of a memory-saccade task. This result predicts that, should be monkey change his intention of what the next saccade will be, LIP activity should change accordingly to reflect the new plan. We tested this prediction by training monkeys to change their saccadic plan on command and recording the activity of LIP neurons across plan changes. 2. We trained rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to maintain fixation on a light spot as long as this spot remained on. During this period we briefly presented one, two, or three peripheral visual stimuli in sequence, each followed by a delay (memory period, M). After the final delay the fixation spot was extinguished, and the monkey had to quickly make a saccade to the location of the last target to have appeared. The monkey could not predict which stimuli, nor how many, would appear on each trial. He thus had to plan a saccade to each stimulus as it appeared and change his saccade plan whenever a stimulus appeared at a different location. 3. We recorded the M period activity of 81 area LIP neurons (from 3 hemispheres of 2 monkeys) in this task. We predicted that, if a neuron's activity reflected the monkey's planned saccade, its activity should be high while the monkey planned a saccade in the neuron's motor field (MF), and low while the planned saccade was in the opposite direction. The activity of most of the neurons in our sample changed in accordance with our hypothesis as the monkey's planned saccade changed. 4. In one condition the monkey was instructed by visual stimuli to change his plan from a saccade in the neuron's preferred direction to a saccade planned in the opposite direction. In this condition activity decreased significantly (P &#60; 0.05) in 65 (80%) of 81 neurons tested. These neurons' activity changed to reflect the new saccade plan even though the cue for this change was not presented in their RF. 5. As a control we randomly interleaved, among trials requiring a plan change, trials in which the monkey had to formulate two consecutive plans to make a saccade in the neuron's preferred direction. The activity remained unchanged (P &#60; 0.05) in 22 of 31 neurons tested (79%), indicating that the neurons continued to encode the same saccade plan. 6. In a variant of the task, the cue to the location of the required saccade was either a light spot or a noise burst from a loudspeaker. Of 22 neurons tested in this task, 16 (73%) showed activity changes consistent with plan changes cued by visual or auditory stimuli. 7. Alterations in the monkey's intentions, even in the absence of overt behavior, are manifested in altered LIP activity. These activity changes could be induced whether visual or auditory cues were used to indicate the required plan changes. Most LIP neurons thus do not encode only the locations of visual stimuli, but also the intention to direct gaze to specific locations, independently of whether a gaze shift actually occurs.</description>
    <dc:title>Motor intention activity in the macaque's lateral intraparietal area. II. Changes of motor plan.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>RM Bracewell</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>P Mazzoni</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>S Barash</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 76, No. 3. (September 1996), pp. 1457-1464.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-08T21:15:31-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1996</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>76</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>1457</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>1464</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>lip</prism:category>
    <prism:category>monkey</prism:category>
    <prism:category>neurophysiology</prism:category>
    <prism:category>saccade</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90439">
    <title>Coding of intention in the posterior parietal cortex.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90439</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Nature, Vol. 386, No. 6621. (13 March 1997), pp. 167-170.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To look at or reach for what we see, spatial information from the visual system must be transformed into a motor plan. The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is well placed to perform this function, because it lies between visual areas, which encode spatial information, and motor cortical areas. The PPC contains several subdivisions, which are generally conceived as high-order sensory areas. Neurons in area 7a and the lateral intraparietal area fire before and during visually guided saccades. Other neurons in areas 7a and 5 are active before and during visually guided arm movements. These areas are also active during memory tasks in which the animal remembers the location of a target for hundreds of milliseconds before making an eye or arm movement. Such activity could reflect either visual attention or the intention to make movements. This question is difficult to resolve, because even if the animal maintains fixation while directing attention to a peripheral location, the observed neuronal activity could reflect movements that are planned but not executed. To address this, we recorded from the PPC while monkeys planned either reaches or saccades to a single remembered location. We now report that, for most neurons, activity before the movement depended on the type of movement being planned. We conclude that PPC contains signals related to what the animal intends to do.</description>
    <dc:title>Coding of intention in the posterior parietal cortex.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>LH Snyder</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>AP Batista</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1038/386167a0</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Nature, Vol. 386, No. 6621. (13 March 1997), pp. 167-170.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-08T21:09:12-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1997</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Nature</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0028-0836</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>386</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>6621</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>167</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>170</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>7a</prism:category>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>lip</prism:category>
    <prism:category>monkey</prism:category>
    <prism:category>neurophysiology</prism:category>
    <prism:category>posteriorparietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>saccade</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90443">
    <title>Intentional maps in posterior parietal cortex.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90443</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Annu Rev Neurosci, Vol. 25 (2002), pp. 189-220.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The posterior parietal cortex (PPC), historically believed to be a sensory structure, is now viewed as an area important for sensory-motor integration. Among its functions is the forming of intentions, that is, high-level cognitive plans for movement. There is a map of intentions within the PPC, with different subregions dedicated to the planning of eye movements, reaching movements, and grasping movements. These areas appear to be specialized for the multisensory integration and coordinate transformations required to convert sensory input to motor output. In several subregions of the PPC, these operations are facilitated by the use of a common distributed space representation that is independent of both sensory input and motor output. Attention and learning effects are also evident in the PPC. However, these effects may be general to cortex and operate in the PPC in the context of sensory-motor transformations.</description>
    <dc:title>Intentional maps in posterior parietal cortex.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>CA Buneo</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.25.112701.142922</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Annu Rev Neurosci, Vol. 25 (2002), pp. 189-220.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-08T21:24:20-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>2002</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Annu Rev Neurosci</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0147-006X</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>25</prism:volume>
    <prism:startingPage>189</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>220</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>lip</prism:category>
    <prism:category>monkey</prism:category>
    <prism:category>neurophysiology</prism:category>
    <prism:category>posteriorparietal</prism:category>
    <prism:category>prr</prism:category>
    <prism:category>review</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90442">
    <title>Change in motor plan, without a change in the spatial locus of attention, modulates activity in posterior parietal cortex.</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/klouie/article/90442</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;J Neurophysiol, Vol. 79, No. 5. (May 1998), pp. 2814-2819.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The lateral intraparietal area (LIP) of macaque monkey, and a parietal reach region (PRR) medial and posterior to LIP, code the intention to make visually guided eye and arm movements, respectively. We studied the effect of changing the motor plan, without changing the locus of attention, on single neurons in these two areas. A central target was fixated while one or two sequential flashes occurred in the periphery. The first appeared either within the response field of the neuron being recorded or else on the opposite side of the fixation point. Animals planned a saccade (red flash) or reach (green flash) to the flash location. In some trials, a second flash 750 ms later could change the motor plan but never shifted attention: second flashes always occurred at the same location as the preceding first flash. Responses in LIP were larger when a saccade was instructed (n = 20 cells), whereas responses in PRR were larger when a reach was instructed (n = 17). This motor preference was observed for both first flashes and second flashes. In addition, the response to a second flash depended on whether it affirmed or countermanded the first flash; second flash responses were diminished only in the former case. Control experiments indicated that this differential effect was not due to stimulus novelty. These findings support a role for posterior parietal cortex in coding specific motor intention and are consistent with a possible role in the nonspatial shifting of motor intention.</description>
    <dc:title>Change in motor plan, without a change in the spatial locus of attention, modulates activity in posterior parietal cortex.</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>LH Snyder</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>AP Batista</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>RA Andersen</dc:creator>
    <dc:source>J Neurophysiol, Vol. 79, No. 5. (May 1998), pp. 2814-2819.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2005-02-08T21:19:20-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1998</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>J Neurophysiol</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:issn>0022-3077</prism:issn>
    <prism:volume>79</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>5</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>2814</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>2819</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>intention</prism:category>
    <prism:category>lip</prism:category>
    <prism:category>monkey</prism:category>
    <prism:category>neurophysiology</prism:category>
    <prism:category>prr</prism:category>
</item>



</rdf:RDF>

