CiteULike: Tag iowa-gambling-task

Failure to respond autonomically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal cortex

A Bechara — 2005-11-30T19:11:23-00:00

Cereb. Cortex, Vol. 6, No. 2. (1 March 1996), pp. 215-225.

Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex.

A Bechara — 2005-11-30T19:10:42-00:00

Cognition, Vol. 50, No. 1-3. (n 1994), pp. 7-15.

Following damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, humans develop a defect in real-life decision-making, which contrasts with otherwise normal intellectual functions. Currently, there is no neuropsychological probe to detect in the laboratory, and the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible for this defect have resisted explanation. Here, using a novel task which simulates real-life decision-making in the way it factors uncertainty of premises and outcomes, as well as reward and punishment, we find that prefrontal patients, unlike controls, are oblivious to the future consequences of their actions, and seem to be guided by immediate prospects only. This finding offers, for the first time, the possibility of detecting these patients' elusive impairment in the laboratory, measuring it, and investigating its possible causes.

Some decks are better than others: The effect of reinforcer type and task instructions on learning in the Iowa Gambling Task

Gordon Fernie — 2006-03-03T13:13:59-00:00

Brain and Cognition, Vol. 60, No. 1. (February 2006), pp. 94-102.

The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) has become widely used as a laboratory test of "real-life" decision-making. However, aspects of its administration that have been varied by researchers may differentially affect performance and the conclusions researchers can draw. Some researchers have used facsimile money reinforcers while others have used real money reinforcers. More importantly, the instructions participants receive have also been varied. While no differences have been reported in performance dependent on reinforcer type, no previous comparison of participants' instructions has been conducted. This is despite one set of instructions giving participants a clear hint about the nature of the task. Additionally, in previous research one set of instructions have not been used exclusively with one reinforcer type making any differential or cumulative effects of these factors difficult to interpret. The present study compared the effects of instruction and reinforcer type on IGT performance. When participants received instructions without a hint performance was affected by reinforcer type. This was not the case when the instructions included a hint. In a second IGT session performance was improved in participants who had received the hint instructions compared with those who had not.

Instructional cues modify performance on the Iowa Gambling Task

Iris Balodis — 2006-03-08T14:54:02-00:00

Brain and Cognition, Vol. 60, No. 2. (March 2006), pp. 109-117.

The current study investigated whether acute alcohol intoxication produces impaired decision-making on tasks assessing ventromedial prefrontal (VMF) cortex functioning and impulsive responding. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a decision-making test targeting the VMF, and the Newman Perseveration Task (NT), a measure of impulsivity. Personality measures of impulsivity were assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). To encourage natural responding on both tasks, participants were falsely informed that the study was examining the effects of alcohol on memory; the impulsivity tasks were presented as 'distractor' tasks. Advantageous performance on the IGT was related to specific instructional cues as well as to knowledge about the experimental purpose. Performance of intoxicated and sober participants did not differ. A subsequent study in which the true purpose of the experiment was revealed confirmed that alcohol does not affect IGT performance. Most importantly, the instruction-sensitivity of the IGT emphasizes the importance of salient cues for decision-making.

Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy.

A Bechara — 2005-11-22T10:50:25-00:00

Science, Vol. 275, No. 5304. (28 February 1997), pp. 1293-1295.

Deciding advantageously in a complex situation is thought to require overt reasoning on declarative knowledge, namely, on facts pertaining to premises, options for action, and outcomes of actions that embody the pertinent previous experience. An alternative possibility was investigated: that overt reasoning is preceded by a nonconscious biasing step that uses neural systems other than those that support declarative knowledge. Normal participants and patients with prefrontal damage and decision-making defects performed a gambling task in which behavioral, psychophysiological, and self-account measures were obtained in parallel. Normals began to choose advantageously before they realized which strategy worked best, whereas prefrontal patients continued to choose disadvantageously even after they knew the correct strategy. Moreover, normals began to generate anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) whenever they pondered a choice that turned out to be risky, before they knew explicitly that it was a risky choice, whereas patients never developed anticipatory SCRs, although some eventually realized which choices were risky. The results suggest that, in normal individuals, nonconscious biases guide behavior before conscious knowledge does. Without the help of such biases, overt knowledge may be insufficient to ensure advantageous behavior.

Do somatic markers mediate decisions on the gambling task?

I Tomb — 2007-09-17T22:09:48-00:00

Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 5, No. 11. (November 2002), pp. 1103-1104.

The differential relationship between cocaine use and marijuana use on decision-making performance over repeat testing with the Iowa Gambling Task

A Verdejo-Garcia — 2007-06-22T23:16:06-00:00

Drug and Alcohol Dependence, Vol. 90, No. 1. (6 September 2007), pp. 2-11.

Decision-making deficits are a robust cognitive correlate of substance abuse, but few studies have addressed the long-term differential associations of cocaine use and marijuana (MJ) use on decision-making. This study utilized the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a widely used measure of decision-making, to investigate the relationship between cocaine and MJ use and IGT learning. We analyzed between and within group differences across two consecutive testing sessions in abstinent users of either MJ or cocaine. We assessed long-term correlates of the use of these drugs by evaluating users after 25 days of enforced abstinence. Results showed that both cocaine users and MJ users performed worse than controls on the total IGT net score. All groups showed learning between Session 1 and Session 2, but the cocaine users showed the smallest increase in performance. The pattern of learning from the beginning to the end (block x block) of the IGT (Session 2) was different for the drug groups, with the cocaine group showing more learning than the MJ group. Dose-related measures of cocaine use (g/week) and MJ use (joints/week) predicted IGT performance (the heavier the drug use the lower the performance). Differential correlates of cocaine use and MJ use on decision-making learning may have important implications for the development of novel treatment interventions.

Is deck C an advantageous deck in the Iowa Gambling Task?

YC Chiu — 2007-08-07T16:26:29-00:00

Behavioral and Brain Functions, Vol. 3 (06 August 2007), 37.

The somatic marker hypothesis: still many questions but no answers: Response to Bechara et al.

Tiago Maia — 2007-06-26T23:44:35-00:00

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 4. (April 2005), pp. 162-164.

Is deck B a disadvantageous deck in the Iowa Gambling Task?

Ching-Hung Lin — 2007-03-16T05:41:12-00:00

Behavioral and Brain Functions, Vol. 3 (15 March 2007), 16.

Is knowing always feeling?

Alan Sanfey — 2007-08-29T16:05:19-00:00

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Vol. 101, No. 48. (30 November 2004), pp. 16709-16710.

10.1073/pnas.0407200101

Impaired decision making in suicide attempters

J Jollant — 2007-06-25T20:53:35-00:00

American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 162, No. 2. (February 2005), pp. 304-310.

OBJECTIVE: The understanding of suicidal behavior is incomplete. The stress-diathesis model suggests that a deficit in serotonergic projections to the orbitofrontal cortex is involved in susceptibility to suicidal behavior. The orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in decision making, a cognitive function dealing with complex choices that may be under serotonergic modulation. In this preliminary study, the authors assessed decision making in suicide attempters. METHOD: The authors used the Iowa Gambling Task to investigate patients with a history of violent (N=32) or nonviolent (N=37) suicidal behavior, patients suffering from affective disorders with no history of suicidal behavior (N=25), and healthy comparison subjects (N=82). Patients were assessed when they were not suffering from a current axis I disorder. The authors also assessed the correlation of Iowa Gambling Task performance with psychometric measures of impulsivity, hostility, anger, aggression, and emotional instability. RESULTS: Both groups of suicide attempters scored significantly lower than healthy comparison subjects, and violent suicide attempters performed significantly worse than affective comparison subjects. No significant differences were observed between the groups of suicide attempters or between the two comparison groups. The differences in performance could not be accounted for by age, intellectual ability, educational level, number of suicide attempts, age at first suicide attempt, history of axis I disorder, or medication use. Iowa Gambling Task performances were correlated positively with affective lability and with anger expression but not with impulsivity. CONCLUSIONS: Impaired decision making, possibly due to emotional dysfunction, may be a neuropsychological risk factor for suicidal behavior.

A reexamination of the evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis: what participants really know in the Iowa gambling task.

TV Maia — 2005-11-22T11:32:30-00:00

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Vol. 101, No. 45. (9 November 2004), pp. 16075-16080.

Bechara, Damasio, and coworkers [Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (1997) Science 275, 1293-1295] have reported that normal participants decide advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy in a simple card game designed to mimic real-life decision-making. Bechara et al. have used this result to support their view that nonconscious somatic markers can guide advantageous behavior. By using more sensitive methods, we show that participants have much more knowledge about the game than previously thought. In fact, participants report knowledge of the advantageous strategy more reliably than they behave advantageously. Furthermore, when they behave advantageously, their verbal reports nearly always reveal evidence of quantitative knowledge about the outcomes of the decks that would be sufficient to guide such advantageous behavior. In addition, there is evidence that participants also have access to more qualitative reportable knowledge. These results are compatible with the view that, in this task, both overt behavior and verbal reports reflect sampling from consciously accessible knowledge; there is no need to appeal to nonconscious somatic markers. We also discuss the findings of other studies that similarly suggest alternative interpretations of other evidence previously used to support a role for somatic markers in decision-making.

The Iowa Gambling Task and the somatic marker hypothesis: some questions and answers

A Bechara — 2005-11-21T05:36:41-00:00

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 4. (April 2005), pp. 159-162.

A recent study by Maia and McClelland on participants' knowledge in the Iowa Gambling Task suggests a different interpretation for an experiment we reported in 1997. The authors use their results to question the evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis. Here we consider whether the authors' conclusions are justified.

Functional activity related to risk anticipation during performance of the Iowa gambling task

Hiroki Fukui — 2007-08-29T15:48:22-00:00

NeuroImage, Vol. 24, No. 1. (1 January 2005), pp. 253-259.

Risk anticipation is an important cognitive/emotional component of decision making. The Iowa Gambling Task [Bechara, A., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H., Anderson, S.W., 1994. Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition 50, 7-15], which is the most widely used "risk-anticipation task" in clinical studies, has been demonstrated to be sensitive to lesions involving the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or amygdala. However, the critical neural circuitry involved in this complex task has not yet been fully clarified even in healthy subjects. Using a 3-T scanner, we performed an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study in 14 healthy subjects performing the task. The statistical parametric mapping showed that the risk anticipation component (risky decisions minus safe decisions) exclusively activated the medial frontal gyrus. Furthermore, we found a significant interindividual correlation between the task performance and the magnitude of brain activity during risky decisions. These results indicate that the Iowa Gambling Task does recruit the neural circuitry that is critical in decision making under uncertainty, particularly when subjects perceive the risk of their decision.

Direct versus indirect emotional consequences on the Iowa Gambling Task

Oliver Turnbull — 2007-08-29T15:45:48-00:00

Brain and Cognition, Vol. 53, No. 2. (November 2003), pp. 389-392.

The Iowa Gambling Task has been widely used in the assessment of neurological patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions. The Iowa Group has claimed that the Gambling Task is too complex for participants to follow using cognition alone, so that participants must rely on emotion-based learning systems (somatic markers). The present study investigates whether similar tasks can be performed without direct somatic markers. In a `Firefighter' task closely matched to the classic Gambling Task, participants evaluate the performance of others--so that they experience reward and punishment indirectly. In contrast to the gradual improvement in performance seen on the classic Iowa Gambling Task, participants on the Firefighter Task showed no learning effect, mirroring the performance of patients with ventro-mesial frontal lesions, and suggesting that the task is very difficult to perform without direct somatic marker information. The use of this task as empirical measure of `empathy' are discussed.

Neural substrates of faulty decision-making in abstinent marijuana users.

KI Bolla — 2007-08-29T16:15:00-00:00

Neuroimage, Vol. 26, No. 2. (June 2005), pp. 480-492.

Persistent dose-related cognitive decrements have been reported in 28-day abstinent heavy marijuana (MJ) users. However, the neural substrates of these decrements in cognitive performance are not known. This study aimed to determine if 25-day abstinent MJ users show persistent dose-related alterations in performance and brain activity using PET H(2)(15)O during the Iowa Gambling Task-IGT (a decision-making task). Eleven heavy MJ users and 11 non-drug users participated. The MJ group resided in an inpatient research unit at the NIH/NIDA-IRP for 25 days prior to testing to ensure abstinence. A dose-related association was found between increased MJ use and lower IGT performance and alterations in brain activity. The MJ group showed greater activation in the left cerebellum and less activation in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) than the Control group. When the MJ group was divided into Moderate (8-35 joints/week) and Heavy users (53-84 joints/week), the Heavy MJ group showed less activation in the left medial OFC and greater activation in the left cerebellum than the Moderate group. However, brain activity and task performance were similar between the Moderate MJ users and the Control group, suggesting a "threshold effect". These preliminary findings indicate that very heavy users of MJ have persistent decision-making deficits and alterations in brain activity. Specifically, the Heavy MJ users may focus on only the immediate reinforcing aspects of a situation (i.e., getting high) while ignoring the negative consequences. Thus, faulty decision-making could make an individual more prone to addictive behavior and more resistant to treatment. Finally, it is unclear if these neurologic findings will become progressively worse with continued heavy MJ use or if they will resolve with abstinence from MJ use.

Contributions of the prefrontal cortex to the neural basis of human decision making

DC Krawczyk — 2008-01-01T18:58:47-00:00

Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Vol. 26, No. 6. (October 2002), pp. 631-664.

The neural basis of decision making has been an elusive concept largely due to the many subprocesses associated with it. Recent efforts involving neuroimaging, neuropsychological studies, and animal work indicate that the prefrontal cortex plays a central role in several of these subprocesses. The frontal lobes are involved in tasks ranging from making binary choices to making multi-attribute decisions that require explicit deliberation and integration of diverse sources of information. In categorizing different aspects of decision making, a division of the prefrontal cortex into three primary regions is proposed. (1) The orbitofrontal and ventromedial areas are most relevant to deciding based on reward values and contribute affective information regarding decision attributes and options. (2) Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is critical in making decisions that call for the consideration of multiple sources of information, and may recruit separable areas when making well defined versus poorly defined decisions. (3) The anterior and ventral cingulate cortex appear especially relevant in sorting among conflicting options, as well as signaling outcome-relevant information. This topic is broadly relevant to cognitive neuroscience as a discipline, as it generally comprises several aspects of cognition and may involve numerous brain regions depending on the situation. The review concludes with a summary of how these regions may interact in deciding and possible future research directions for the field.

Emotion-based learning on a simplified card game: The Iowa and Bangor Gambling Tasks

Caroline Bowman — 2007-08-29T15:42:30-00:00

Brain and Cognition, Vol. 55, No. 2. (July 2004), pp. 277-282.

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been widely used in the assessment of neurological patients with frontal lesions. Emphasis has been placed on the complexity of the task (i.e., four decks of varying contingency pattern) with the suggestion that the participant must use emotion-based learning to deal with a complex decision-making process. The present study used a single deck card game (the Bangor Gambling Task, BGT), matched in many respects with the Iowa Gambling Task, in which the contingencies varied over time (gradually becoming worse for the participant) rather than across deck (as in the IGT). Forty participants performed both tasks. Performance on the tasks showed many similarities, with participants showing a comparable pattern of incremental learning on both tasks, reaching an analogous final level of performance. More importantly, there was a high correlation (r2=.93) in performance between the two tasks, the most salient feature of which was that virtually every participant who fell below categorisation of impaired IGT performance, also did very poorly on the BGT. These findings bear on the question of whether arguments about the `complexity' of the Iowa Gambling Task necessarily explain why it appears to require emotion-based learning. The Bangor Gambling Task might also be a useful tool for clinical neuropsychologists, in the assessment of patients with executive dysfunction--given that the task is easier and quicker to administer than the Iowa Gambling Task, but appears to share the same performance features.

Characterization of the decision-making deficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions

A Bechara — 2005-11-22T11:45:55-00:00

Brain, Vol. 123, No. 11. (1 November 2000), pp. 2189-2202.

On a gambling task that models real-life decisions, patients with bilateral lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM) opt for choices that yield high immediate gains in spite of higher future losses. In this study, we addressed three possibilities that may account for this behaviour: (i) hypersensitivity to reward; (ii) insensitivity to punishment; and (iii) insensitivity to future consequences, such that behaviour is always guided by immediate prospects. For this purpose, we designed a variant of the original gambling task in which the advantageous decks yielded high immediate punishment but even higher future reward. The disadvantageous decks yielded low immediate punishment but even lower future reward. We measured the skin conductance responses (SCRs) of subjects after they had received a reward or punishment. Patients with VM lesions opted for the disadvantageous decks in both the original and variant versions of the gambling task. The SCRs of VM lesion patients after they had received a reward or punishment were not significantly different from those of controls. In a second experiment, we investigated whether increasing the delayed punishment in the disadvantageous decks of the original task or decreasing the delayed reward in the disadvantageous decks of the variant task would shift the behaviour of VM lesion patients towards an advantageous strategy. Both manipulations failed to shift the behaviour of VM lesion patients away from the disadvantageous decks. These results suggest that patients with VM lesions are insensitive to future consequences, positive or negative, and are primarily guided by immediate prospects. This `myopia for the future' in VM lesion patients persists in the face of severe adverse consequences, i.e. rising future punishment or declining future reward.

Substance use disorders and the orbitofrontal cortex: systematic review of behavioural decision-making and neuroimaging studies.

G Dom — 2005-10-14T03:50:02-00:00

Br J Psychiatry, Vol. 187 (September 2005), pp. 209-220.

BACKGROUND: Orbitofrontal cortex dysfunctions have been frequently documented in people with substance use disorders. The exact role of this cortical region, however, remains unspecified. AIMS: To assess the functionality of the orbitofrontal cortex in people with substance use disorders. METHOD: Reports of studies using behavioural decision-making tasks and/or neuroimaging techniques to investigate orbitofrontal cortex functioning in cases of substance misuse were reviewed. Studies focusing exclusively on tobacco-smoking and gambling were excluded. RESULTS: Fifty-two research articles were evaluated. Most studies showed significant deficits in decision-making in people with substance use disorders. A consistent finding in the neuroimaging studies was hypoactivity of the orbitofrontal cortex after detoxification. The association between hyperactivity of this region and craving or cue reactivity was not consistent across studies. CONCLUSIONS: The orbitofrontal cortex has an important role in addictive behaviours. Further studies are needed to elucidate the underlying neuronal substrates of cue reactivity, craving and decision-making, and the implications for treatment and relapse prevention.

Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness

Navindra Persaud — 2007-01-27T11:53:27-00:00

Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 10, No. 2. (21 January 2007), pp. 257-261.

A contribution of cognitive decision models to clinical assessment: decomposing performance on the Bechara gambling task.

JR Busemeyer — 2005-10-17T14:58:38-00:00

Psychol Assess, Vol. 14, No. 3. (September 2002), pp. 253-262.

The Bechara simulated gambling task is a popular method of examining decision-making deficits exhibited by people with brain damage, psychopathology, antisocial personality, or drug abuse problems. However, performance on this task is confounded by complex interdependencies between cognitive, motivational, and response processes, making it difficult to sort out and identify the specific processes responsible for the observed behavioral deficits. The authors compare 3 competing cognitive decision models of the Bechara task in terms of their ability to explain the performance deficits observed in Huntington's disease patients as compared with healthy populations and people with Parkinson's disease. The parameters of the best fitting model are used to decompose the observed performance deficit of the Huntington patients into cognitive, motivational, and response sources.

Older adults as adaptive decision makers: evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task.

S Wood — 2005-10-17T14:52:00-00:00

Psychol Aging, Vol. 20, No. 2. (June 2005), pp. 220-225.

Older adults process emotional information differently than younger adults and may demonstrate less of a negativity bias on cognitive tasks. The Iowa Gambling Task designed by A. Bechara, H. Damasio, D. Tranel, and A. R. Damasio (1997) has been used to examine the integration of emotion and cognition in a risky-choice decision task and may give insight into differences in the decision-making strategies in younger and older adults. Eighty-eight younger adults (18-34 years) and 67 older adults (65-88 years) completed the Iowa Gambling Task. Using a theoretical decomposition of the task designed by J. R. Busemeyer and J. C. Stout (2002), the authors found that both groups were successful at solving the task but used very different strategies that reflected each group's strength. For younger adults, that strength was learning and memory. For older adults, that strength was an accurate representation of wins and losses (valence).