Fri, 04 Jul 2008 23:51:17 BST CiteULike: Tag judgment http://www.citeulike.org/tag/judgment CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1199687 <i>(01 August 1992)</i><br /><br />Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from the philosophy of mind may be used to undermine widely-held subjectivist positions in ethics and politico-economic theory. The work is inspired by the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Davidson, but goes on to connect their arguments about interpretation with formal work in decision theory and social choice theory, and with the theory of adjudication. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity SL Hurley (01 August 1992) 2007-03-31T13:14:48-00:00 1992 Oxford University Press judgement judgment value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/2203908 <i>Accountability in Research, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2008), pp. 1-29.</i><br /><br />This article argues that the three major elements of typical university conflict-of-interest (COI) policies (i.e., disclosure, management, and elimination of conflicts via divestiture or recusal) are likely to be insufficient for screening out many worrisome influences of financial COIs. Current psychological research challenges the effectiveness of disclosure, management plans are unlikely to address the wide range of ways that financial COIs can influence scientific judgment, and it is often impractical to eliminate conflicts. Identifying the limits of these policies highlights the importance of considering alternative strategies, such as encouraging more independently funded research, in order to maintain the integrity of science. Scientific Judgment and the Limits of Conflict-of-Interest Policies Kevin Elliott doi:10.1080/08989620701783725 Accountability in Research, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2008), pp. 1-29. 2008-01-07T14:28:15-00:00 2008 Accountability in Research 15 1 1 29 Taylor & Francis bias conflict_of_interest judgement judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938199 <i>Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2000), pp. 559-579.</i><br /><br />Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results. Inductive Risk and Values in Science Heather Douglas Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2000), pp. 559-579. 2006-11-09T18:45:56-00:00 2000 Philosophy of Science 67 4 559 579 false_negative false_positivefalse_negative histopathology judgment risk risk_assessment threshold value http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/215407 <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 17, No. 1. (16 December 2003), pp. 39-57.</i><br /><br />This research tests the hypothesis of Yates et al. (1996) that people prefer judgment producers who make extreme confidence judgments. In each of three experiments, college students evaluated two fictional financial advisors who judged the likelihood that each of several stocks would increase in value. One of the advisors (the moderate advisor) was reasonably well calibrated and the other (the extreme advisor) was overconfident. In all three experiments, participants tended to prefer the extreme advisor. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the advisors' confidence influenced participants' perception of their knowledge, and Experiment 3 showed that it influenced their perception of the number of categorically correct judgments they made. Both of these variables were, in turn, related to participants' preferences. Experiment 3 also suggested that need for cognition and right-wing authoritarianism are positively related to preference for the extreme advisor. A quantitative model is presented, which captures the basic pattern of results. This model includes the assumption that people use a confidence heuristic; they assume that a more confident advisor makes more categorically correct judgments and is more knowledgeable. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Intuitive evaluation of likelihood judgment producers: evidence for a confidence heuristic Paul Price Eric Stone doi:10.1002/bdm.460 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 17, No. 1. (16 December 2003), pp. 39-57. 2005-05-31T21:52:55-00:00 2003 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 1099-0771 17 1 39 57 behavioral-economics behavioral-finance confidence decision-making heuristic judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/546157 <i>Science, Vol. 293, No. 5537. (14 September 2001), pp. 2105-2108.</i> An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment Joshua Greene Brian Sommerville Leigh Nystrom John Darley Jonathan Cohen doi:10.1126/science.1062872 Science, Vol. 293, No. 5537. (14 September 2001), pp. 2105-2108. 2006-03-10T14:37:45-00:00 2001 Science 293 5537 2105 2108 fmri judgment moral morality neuroscience http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/546152 <i>Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 6, No. 12. (1 December 2002), pp. 517-523.</i><br /><br />Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it. How (and where) does moral judgment work? Joshua Greene Jonathan Haidt Trends Cogn Sci, Vol. 6, No. 12. (1 December 2002), pp. 517-523. 2006-03-10T14:34:50-00:00 2002 Trends Cogn Sci 1364-6613 6 12 517 523 judgment moral morality http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/366737 <i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 144-154.</i><br /><br />Compared to judgment, choice is argued to elicit more self-referent processing and thereby produce greater subsequent recall of evaluated information. This response mode effect is shown to be dependent upon sufficient visualization to overcome the use of heuristic processing during choice. When visualizing prior to the task, choice leads to increased thinking about personal consumption occasions relative to judgment, leading to enhanced recall of vivid (vs. non-vivid) attributes. This proposed interaction of task and visualization was found in two experiments that assessed incidental recall following a choice or judgment task. In experiment 1, participants recalled more vivid product attribute information after choosing between options than after rating each option separately, but only when instructed to visualize during evaluation. To eliminate a comparison-based explanation of this effect, a second experiment was conducted that presented only one option in each category. Participants who evaluated their intention to purchase the option (a judgment equivalent of choice) demonstrated greater recall of vivid product attribute information than did participants who rated their liking for the option, and this recall difference was again moderated by instructions to visualize. On self-referencing differences in judgment and choice Sanjay Sood Mark Forehand doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.05.005 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 144-154. 2005-10-27T13:53:16-00:00 2005 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 2 144 154 choice judgment memory recall self http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/79014 <i>Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 9. (September 2004), 1846.</i><br /><br />Most decision-making models rely on affect-free variables to understand the decisions that people make. We tested an affectively-loaded variable—worry—as a predictor of decision making in an affectively laden context: willingness to fly after 9/11. College students rated their willingness to fly to New York City or Washington, DC, in a study conducted 34 days after 9/11. They also recorded their beliefs about the likelihood that more terrorist attacks would occur, the severity of such attacks if they were to occur, and how much they worried about flying. Finally, they made these estimates for similar others. Results showed that worry was the most powerful predictor of one's own and similar others' willingness to fly. These findings suggest that models of how people make decisions may sometimes need to take feelings into account. Perceived Risk and Worry: The Effects of 9/11 on Willingness to Fly Rochelle Bergstrom Kevin Mccaul Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 9. (September 2004), 1846. 2005-01-16T00:26:31-00:00 2004 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 0021-9029 34 9 1846 Bellwether Publishing decision-making flying judgment risk http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/366728 <i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 133-143.</i><br /><br />Judgmental anchoring--the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard--is an exceptionally ubiquitous effect that influences human judgment in a variety of domains and paradigms. Three studies examined whether anchoring effects even occur, if anchor values are presented subliminally, outside of judges' awareness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate such subliminal anchoring effects: judges assimilated target estimates towards the subliminally presented anchor values. Study 3 further demonstrates that subliminal anchors produced a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent target knowledge. The implications of these findings for the ubiquity of judgmental anchoring, its different underlying mechanisms, and comparative information processing are discussed. Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences and underlying mechanisms Thomas Mussweiler Birte Englich doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.12.002 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 98, No. 2. (November 2005), pp. 133-143. 2005-10-27T13:08:10-00:00 2005 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 98 2 133 143 anchoring judgment subliminal http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/271455 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof</i><br /><br />Previous research demonstrated that if attention is paid to a supraliminally presented number, a subsequent quantitative estimate assimilates towards this number (the anchor effect). One explanation states that this effect is merely caused by the heightened accessibility level of the anchor value itself. Based on this numeric priming account and generalizing from subliminal priming studies, we expected a short-lived subliminal anchor effect. We presented participants subliminally with a low or high anchor value (10 or 90) and next they had to estimate the probability of an epidemic. Half of them were pressed to do this quickly. Only under time pressure, a significant anchor effect emerged. Subliminal anchoring: The effects of subliminally presented numbers on probability estimates Reitsma-Van Daamen doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.05.001 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof 2005-08-02T09:06:19-00:00 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology In Press, Corrected Proof anchoring judgment probablity subliminal http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/34894 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 1. (January 2004), pp. 91-98.</i><br /><br />The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making. The effort heuristic J Kruger D Wirtz L Van Boven TW Altermatt doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00065-9 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 1. (January 2004), pp. 91-98. 2004-12-28T16:58:08-00:00 2004 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 0022-1031 40 1 91 98 Elsevier Science effort heuristic judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/105546 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 2. (March 2005), pp. 129-140.</i><br /><br />The social psychological literature on automatic social inferences has focused on one construct that helps explaining human behavior--traits (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984). The dispositional roots of behavior, however, go beyond relatively stable constructs such as traits to include more transient causes such as one's intentions and goals. Evidence from young infants and adult chimpanzees, knowledge acquired in the text-comprehension literature and hypotheses derived from the Automatic Causal Inferences framework (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002), seems to converge: they all suggest that perceivers may automatically infer goals from behaviors. This paper reports four studies that examine this hypothesis. The first two use surprise cued-recall, and look at goal inferences when the road to goal achievement seems straightforward and when it seems blocked. Studies 3 and 4 use on-line methodologies--probe recognition task and lexical decision--to examine whether these inferences are made at encoding. Automatic goal inferences Ran Hassin Henk Aarts Melissa Ferguson doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.06.008 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 2. (March 2005), pp. 129-140. 2005-02-27T00:41:21-00:00 2005 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 2 129 140 automaticism goal inference judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/488160 <i>Science, Vol. 306, No. 5695. (15 October 2004), pp. 462-466.</i><br /><br />Subjective judgments, an essential information source for science and policy, are problematic because there are no public criteria for assessing judgmental truthfulness. I present a scoring method for eliciting truthful subjective data in situations where objective truth is unknowable. The method assigns high scores not to the most common answers but to the answers that are more common than collectively predicted, with predictions drawn from the same population. This simple adjustment in the scoring criterion removes all bias in favor of consensus: Truthful answers maximize expected score even for respondents who believe that their answer represents a minority view. A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data. D Prelec doi:10.1126/science.1102081 Science, Vol. 306, No. 5695. (15 October 2004), pp. 462-466. 2006-01-31T23:56:29-00:00 2004 Science 1095-9203 306 5695 462 466 baysian belief judgment method modelling truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/507926 <i>Science, Vol. 311, No. 5763. (17 February 2006), pp. 1005-1007.</i><br /><br />Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not always advantageous to engage in thorough conscious deliberation before choosing. On the basis of recent insights into the characteristics of conscious and unconscious thought, we tested the hypothesis that simple choices (such as between different towels or different sets of oven mitts) indeed produce better results after conscious thought, but that choices in complex matters (such as between different houses or different cars) should be left to unconscious thought. Named the "deliberation-without-attention" hypothesis, it was confirmed in four studies on consumer choice, both in the laboratory as well as among actual shoppers, that purchases of complex products were viewed more favorably when decisions had been made in the absence of attentive deliberation. On Making the Right Choice: The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect Ap Dijksterhuis Maarten Bos Loran Nordgren Rick van Baaren doi:10.1126/science.1121629 Science, Vol. 311, No. 5763. (17 February 2006), pp. 1005-1007. 2006-02-17T17:51:40-00:00 2006 Science 311 5763 1005 1007 choice deliberation dijksterhuis judgment utt http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1370366 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof</i><br /><br />This article investigates differences in the ways that groups and individuals apply information-processing strategies and fall prey to biases in their judgments. Judgments were made on probabilistic inference problems that involved base-rate and case-specific information. Consistent with hypotheses, when individuals neglect base-rate information in their probability judgments, groups accentuate this tendency. Moreover, when the source of case-specific information is inaccurate, individuals neglect the case-specific information, and groups accentuate this tendency with the base-rate information dominating their probability judgments. In addition, groups accentuate the strategies used by individuals to integrate the base-rate and case-specific information. These results provide strong support for a group accentuation tendency for the application of information-processing biases and the strategies used to integrate information. Discussion reflects upon the relationship of the results of this experiment with other research on base-rate neglect and group judgment. Underlying mechanisms and potential moderators of the group accentuation pattern are also discussed. Accentuation of information processes and biases in group judgments integrating base-rate and case-specific information Verlin Hinsz Scott Dennis Nagao Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof 2007-06-07T13:12:19-00:00 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology In Press, Corrected Proof bias groups judgment psychology social http://www.citeulike.org/user/rlai/article/1370403 <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 90, No. 2. (February 2006), pp. 197-209.</i><br /><br />Seven studies exploring people's tendency to make observer-like attributions about their past and future selves are presented. Studies 1 and 2 showed temporal differences in trait assessments that paralleled the classic actor-observer difference. Study 3 provided evidence against a motivational account of these differences. Studies 4-7 explored underlying mechanisms involving differences in the focus of attention of the sort linked to the classic actor-observer difference. In Study 4, people perceived past and future selves from a more observer-like perspective than present selves. In Studies 5 and 6, manipulating attention to internal states (vs. observable behavior) of past and future selves led people to ascribe fewer traits to those selves. Study 7 showed an inverse relationship for past and present selves between observer-like visual focus and salience of internal information. Temporal Differences in Trait Self-Ascription: When the Self Is Seen as an Other Emily Pronin Lee Ross Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 90, No. 2. (February 2006), pp. 197-209. 2007-06-07T13:35:57-00:00 2006 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90 2 197 209 bias groups judgment psychology social http://www.citeulike.org/user/nikko/article/1160430 <i>Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1. (February 2007), pp. 59-69.</i><br /><br />Public perception of nanotechnology may influence the realization of technological advances. Laypeople's (N = 375) and experts' (N = 46) perception of 20 different nanotechnology applications and three nonnanotechnology applications were examined. The psychometric paradigm was utilized and applications were described in short scenarios. Results showed that laypeople and experts assessed asbestos as much more risky than nanotechnology applications. Analyses of aggregated data suggested that perceived dreadfulness of applications and trust in governmental agencies are important factors in determining perceived risks. Similar results were observed for experts and laypeople, but the latter perceived greater risks than the former. Analyses of individual data showed that trust, perceived benefits, and general attitudes toward technology influenced the perceived risk of laypeople. In the expert sample, confidence in governmental agencies was an important predictor of risks associated with nanotechnology applications. Results suggest that public concerns about nanotechnology would diminish if measures were taken to enhance laypeople's trust in governmental agencies. Laypeople's and experts' perception of nanotechnology hazards Michael Siegrist Carmen Keller Hans Kastenholz Silvia Frey Arnim Wiek doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00859.x Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1. (February 2007), pp. 59-69. 2007-03-14T15:31:36-00:00 2007 Risk Analysis 0272-4332 27 1 59 69 Blackwell Publishing acceptance attitude benefit emerging europe gender judgment lay nanotechnology paradigm perception psychometric public risk technologies trust us http://www.citeulike.org/user/gruger/article/1678984 <i></i><br /><br />In this target article, we present evidence for a new model of individual differences in judgments and reactions. The model holds that people's implicit theories about human attributes structure the way they understand and react to human actions and outcomes. We review research showing that when people believe that attributes (such as intelligence or moral character) are fixed, trait-like entities (an entity theory), they tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of these fixed traits ("I failed the test because I am dumb" or "He stole the bread because he is dishonest"). In contrast, when people believe that attributes are more dynamic, malleable, and developable (an incremental theory), they tend to focus less on broad traits and, instead, tend to understand outcomes and actions in terms of more specific behavioral or psychological mediators ("I failed the test because of my effort or strategy" or "He stole the bread because he was desperate"). The two frameworks also appear to foster different reactions: helpless versus mastery-oriented responses to personal setbacks and an emphasis on retribution versus education or rehabilitation for transgressions. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for personality, motivation, and social perception. Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions: A World from Two Perspectives Carol Dweck Chi-Yue Chiu Ying-Yi Hong 2007-09-20T13:06:40-00:00 biases heuristics judgment laytheory review socialpsychology theory http://www.citeulike.org/group/4917/article/2776572 <i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 70, No. 1. (April 1997), pp. 41-64.</i><br /><br />A sampling model was proposed in which the weight given to a piece of information corresponds to the amount of sampling of that information in either a continuous, discrete or strategic manner. These three sampling processes were related to process tracing measures of initial and additional time per acquisition and frequency of acquisition. The applicability of the sampling model was tested in three experiments in which students uncovered information corresponding to verbal and math aptitude scores of hypothetical applicants and either judged the likelihood of success in a designated major or chose which of a pair of applicants was more likely to succeed in the major. Task focus was manipulated by altering the designated major. In Experiment 1, analysis of judgment data demonstrated large effects of task focus on the weighting of verbal and math scores and corresponding increases in number of acquisitions and time per acquisition on the information receiving more weight. In Experiments 2 and 3, analyses of choice proportions revealed effects of task focus on weight and bias parameters. Looking data in choice provided strong support for two of the stages of processing described by Russo and Leclerc (1994). Initial looks reflected orientation and screening functions and additional looks reflected more evaluative processes. Experiment 3 also explored similarities and differences among groups of participants who were classified as following different identifiable choice strategies. Looking and Weighting in Judgment and Choice, Douglas Wedell Stuart Senter doi:10.1006/obhd.1997.2692 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 70, No. 1. (April 1997), pp. 41-64. 2008-05-09T20:25:05-00:00 1997 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70 1 41 64 decision-making judgment multi-attribute http://www.citeulike.org/group/214/article/479008 <i>(30 April 1982)</i><br /><br />The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Individual chapters discuss the representativeness and availability heuristics, problems in judging covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage inference, social perception, medical diagnosis, risk perception, and methods for correcting and improving judgments under uncertainty. About half of the chapters are edited versions of classic articles; the remaining chapters are newly written for this book. Most review multiple studies or entire subareas of research and application rather than describing single experimental studies. This book will be useful to a wide range of students and researchers, as well as to decision makers seeking to gain insight into their judgments and to improve them. Judgment under Uncertainty : Heuristics and Biases Daniel Kahneman Paul Slovic Amos Tversky (30 April 1982) 2006-01-24T21:39:04-00:00 1982 Cambridge University Press bias decision_making heuristics judgment modeling probability psychology uncertainty http://www.citeulike.org/group/1208/article/1092734 <i>PNAS, Vol. 103, No. 24. (13 June 2006), pp. 9369-9372.</i><br /><br />Three studies investigated the impact of the psychological principle of fluency (that people tend to prefer easily processed information) on short-term share price movements. In both a laboratory study and two analyses of naturalistic real-world stock market data, fluently named stocks robustly outperformed stocks with disfluent names in the short term. For example, in one study, an initial investment of $1,000 yielded a profit of $112 more after 1 day of trading for a basket of fluently named shares than for a basket of disfluently named shares. These results imply that simple, cognitive approaches to modeling human behavior sometimes outperform more typical, complex alternatives. 10.1073/pnas.0601071103 Predicting short-term stock fluctuations by using processing fluency Adam Alter Daniel Oppenheimer PNAS, Vol. 103, No. 24. (13 June 2006), pp. 9369-9372. 2007-02-07T15:27:25-00:00 2006 PNAS 103 24 9369 9372 fluency heuristics judgment http://www.citeulike.org/group/1208/article/1092720 <i>Pers Soc Psychol Rev, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2004), pp. 364-382.</i><br /><br />We propose that aesthetic pleasure is a function of the perceiver's processing dynamics: The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aesthetic response. We review variables known to influence aesthetic judgments, such as figural goodness, figure-ground contrast, stimulus repetition, symmetry, and prototypicality, and trace their effects to changes in processing fluency. Other variables that influence processing fluency, like visual or semantic priming, similarly increase judgments of aesthetic pleasure. Our proposal provides an integrative framework for the study of aesthetic pleasure and sheds light on the interplay between early preferences versus cultural influences on taste, preferences for both prototypical and abstracted forms, and the relation between beauty and truth. In contrast to theories that trace aesthetic pleasure to objective stimulus features per se, we propose that beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of the perceiver, which are in part a function of stimulus properties. Processing fluency and aesthetic pleasure: is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? R Reber N Schwarz P Winkielman doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_3 Pers Soc Psychol Rev, Vol. 8, No. 4. (2004), pp. 364-382. 2007-02-07T15:18:04-00:00 2004 Pers Soc Psychol Rev 1088-8683 8 4 364 382 fluency judgment perception http://www.citeulike.org/group/1208/article/1092715 <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 6. (December 2001), pp. 989-1000.</i><br /><br />The affect system, in its position to monitor organismic-environmental transactions, may be sensitive to the internal dynamics of information processing. Hence, the authors predicted that facilitation of stimulus processing should elicit a brief, mild, positive affective response. In 2 studies, participants watched a series of neutral pictures while the processing ease was unobtrusively manipulated. Affective reactions were assessed with facial electromyography (EMG). In both studies, easy-to-process pictures elicited higher activity over the region of zygomaticus major, indicating positive affect. The EMG data were paralleled by self-reports of positive responses to the facilitated stimuli. The findings suggest a close link between processing dynamics and affect and may help understand several preference phenomena, including the mere-exposure effect. The findings also highlight a potential source of affective biases in social judgments. Mind at Ease Puts a Smile on the Face: Psychophysiological Evidence That Processing Facilitation Elicits Positive Affect, Piotr Winkielman John Cacioppo Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 6. (December 2001), pp. 989-1000. 2007-02-07T15:12:33-00:00 2001 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 6 989 1000 fluency judgment http://www.citeulike.org/group/1208/article/850161 <i>Psychological Science, Vol. 17, No. 9. (September 2006), pp. 799-806.</i> Prototypes Are Attractive Because They Are Easy on the Mind Winkielman Piotr Halberstadt Jamin Fazendeiro Tedra Catty Steve doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01785.x Psychological Science, Vol. 17, No. 9. (September 2006), pp. 799-806. 2006-09-19T21:44:53-00:00 2006 Psychological Science 0956-7976 17 9 799 806 Blackwell Publishing fluency judgment perception prototypes http://www.citeulike.org/user/acslab/article/2624424 <i>Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, Vol. 33, No. 6. (1 November 2007), pp. 999-1019.</i><br /><br />Observers were presented with pairs of objects varying along binary-valued attributes and learned to predict which member of each pair had a greater value on a continuously varying criterion variable. The predictions from exemplar models of categorization were contrasted with classic alternative models, including generalized versions of a “take-the-best” model and a weighted-additive model, by testing structures in which interactions between attributes predicted the magnitude of the criterion variable. Under typical training conditions, observers showed little sensitivity to the attribute interactions, thereby challenging the predictions from the exemplar models. In a condition involving highly extended training, observers eventually learned the relations between the attribute interactions and the criterion variable. However, an analysis of the observers' response times for making their paired-comparison decisions also challenged the exemplar model predictions. Instead, it appeared that most observers recoded the interacting attributes into emergent configural cues. They then applied a set of hierarchically organized rules based on the priority of the cues to make their decisions. Limitations of Exemplar Models of Multi-Attribute Probabilistic Inference Robert Nosofsky Bryan Bergert doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.6.999 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, Vol. 33, No. 6. (1 November 2007), pp. 999-1019. 2008-04-02T20:47:05-00:00 2007 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 33 6 999 1019 exemplar-model judgment multi-attribute http://www.citeulike.org/user/acslab/article/2630592 <i>Psychological Review, Vol. 93, No. 3. (1 July 1986), pp. 258-268.</i><br /><br />Five alternative information processing models that relate memory for evidence to judgments based on the evidence are identified in the current social cognition literature: independent processing, availability, biased retrieval, biased encoding, and incongruity-biased encoding. A distinction between two types of judgment tasks, memory-based versus on-line, is introduced and is related to the five process models. In memory-based tasks where the availability model describes subjects' thinking, direct correlations between memory and judgment measures are obtained. In on-line tasks where any of the remaining four process models may apply, prediction of the memory-judgment relationship is equivocal but usually follows the independence model prediction of zero correlation. The Relationship Between Memory and Judgment Depends on Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-Based or On-Line Reid Hastie Bernadette Park doi:10.1037/0033-295X.93.3.258 Psychological Review, Vol. 93, No. 3. (1 July 1986), pp. 258-268. 2008-04-04T21:11:47-00:00 1986 Psychological Review 93 3 258 268 interactive judgment memory http://www.citeulike.org/user/acslab/article/2703143 <i>Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition, Vol. 28, No. 1. (January 2002), pp. 3-11.</i><br /><br />Categorization research typically assumes that the cognitive system has access to a (more or less noisy) representation of the absolute magnitudes of the properties of stimuli and that this information is used in reaching a categorization decision. However, research on identification of simple perceptual stimuli suggests that people have very poor representations of absolute magnitude information and that judgments about absolute magnitude are strongly influenced by preceding material. The experiments presented here investigate such sequence effects in categorization tasks. Strong sequence effects were found. Classification of a borderline stimulus was more accurate when preceded by a distant member of the opposite category than by a distant member of the same category. It is argued that this category contrast effect cannot be accounted for by extant exemplar or decision-bound models of categorization. The effect suggests the use of relative magnitude information in categorization. A memory and contrast model illustrates how relative magnitude information may be used in categorization. Sequence effects in categorization of simple perceptual stimuli. N Stewart GD Brown N Chater Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition, Vol. 28, No. 1. (January 2002), pp. 3-11. 2008-04-22T21:35:39-00:00 2002 Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition 0278-7393 28 1 3 11 categorization judgment perceptual-separability sequence-effect http://www.citeulike.org/user/acslab/article/2703123 <i></i><br /><br />this article should be addressed to W. Todd Maddox, Department of Psychology, Mezes Hall 330 Mail Code B3800, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 78712. E-mail: maddox@psy.utexas.edu Learning and Attention in Multidimensional Identification, and Categorization: Separating Low-Level Perceptual Processes and High Level Decisional Processes Todd Maddox 2008-04-22T21:23:42-00:00 judgment multidimensional-judgment perceptual-separability