Thu, 24 Jul 2008 23:12:03 BST CiteULike: Tag truth http://www.citeulike.org/tag/truth CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/wujastyk/article/2821167 <i>Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 116, No. 3. (1972), pp. 252-268.</i> Duty as Truth in Ancient India Norman Brown doi:10.2307/986119 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 116, No. 3. (1972), pp. 252-268. 2008-05-21T19:46:28-00:00 1972 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 116 3 252 268 American Philosophical Society act dharma duty truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166186 <i>The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. V36, No. 4. (1 December 2002), pp. 413-424.</i> Truth, Value, and Consolation Damian Cox doi:10.1023/A:1021993622962 The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. V36, No. 4. (1 December 2002), pp. 413-424. 2007-03-15T22:57:00-00:00 2002 The Journal of Value Inquiry V36 4 413 424 intrinsic_value truth value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1168763 <i>Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, Vol. 360, No. 1458. (29 June 2005), pp. 1259-1269.</i><br /><br />The attitudes of scientists towards the philosophy of science is mixed and includes considerable indifference and some hostility. This may be due in part to unrealistic expectation and to misunderstanding. Philosophy is unlikely directly to improve scientific practices, but scientists may find the attempt to explain how science works and what it achieves of considerable interest nevertheless. The present state of the philosophy of science is illustrated by recent work on the 'truth hypothesis', according to which, science is generating increasingly accurate representations of a mind-independent and largely unobservable world. According to Karl Popper, although truth is the aim of science, it is impossible to justify the truth hypothesis. According to Thomas Kuhn, the truth hypothesis is false, because scientists can only describe a world that is partially constituted by their own theories and hence not mind-independent. The failure of past scientific theories has been used to argue against the truth hypothesis; the success of the best current theories has been used to argue for it. Neither argument is sound. The Medawar Lecture 2004 the truth about science. P Lipton doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1660 Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, Vol. 360, No. 1458. (29 June 2005), pp. 1259-1269. 2007-03-17T13:50:55-00:00 2005 Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 0962-8436 360 1458 1259 1269 philosophy_of_science scientific_aim truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/TomQ/article/666863 <i>(15 November 1995)</i><br /><br /><div>How do we come to trust our knowledge of the world? What are the means by which we distinguish true from false accounts? Why do we credit one observational statement over another?<br><br>In <i>A Social History of Truth</i>, Shapin engages these universal questions through an elegant recreation of a crucial period in the history of early modern science: the social world of gentlemen-philosophers in seventeenth-century England. Steven Shapin paints a vivid picture of the relations between gentlemanly culture and scientific practice. He argues that problems of credibility in science were practically solved through the codes and conventions of genteel conduct: trust, civility, honor, and integrity. These codes formed, and arguably still form, an important basis for securing reliable knowledge about the natural world.<br><br>Shapin uses detailed historical narrative to argue about the establishment of factual knowledge both in science and in everyday practice. Accounts of the mores and manners of gentlemen-philosophers are used to illustrate Shapin's broad claim that trust is imperative for constituting every kind of knowledge. Knowledge-making is always a collective enterprise: people have to know whom to trust in order to know something about the natural world.<br><br></div> A Social History of Truth : Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Steven Shapin (15 November 1995) 2006-05-23T23:10:49-00:00 1995 University Of Chicago Press science social trust truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/terumiyake/article/616915 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 7. (1979), pp. 361-382.</i> Truth and Confirmation Michael Friedman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 7. (1979), pp. 361-382. 2006-05-07T21:28:51-00:00 1979 The Journal of Philosophy 76 7 361 382 confirmation friedman truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/488160 <i>Science, Vol. 306, No. 5695. (15 October 2004), pp. 462-466.</i><br /><br />Subjective judgments, an essential information source for science and policy, are problematic because there are no public criteria for assessing judgmental truthfulness. I present a scoring method for eliciting truthful subjective data in situations where objective truth is unknowable. The method assigns high scores not to the most common answers but to the answers that are more common than collectively predicted, with predictions drawn from the same population. This simple adjustment in the scoring criterion removes all bias in favor of consensus: Truthful answers maximize expected score even for respondents who believe that their answer represents a minority view. A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data. D Prelec doi:10.1126/science.1102081 Science, Vol. 306, No. 5695. (15 October 2004), pp. 462-466. 2006-01-31T23:56:29-00:00 2004 Science 1095-9203 306 5695 462 466 baysian belief judgment method modelling truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/stefanherzog/article/337048 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof</i><br /><br />Four experiments demonstrate a fundamental 'statement bias': questions are more often misremembered as statements than vice versa. The bias increases with increasing item comprehensibility (Experiment 1) and is related to depth of processing at encoding (Experiment 2). When sentences are simply comprehended, the bias is not affected by the truth of the statement underlying the sentence (Experiment 3). The statement bias generalizes to contexts in which people have to express consent with the content of the sentence (Experiment 4) but is somewhat reduced when they are not sure what the correct answer is. Our findings are consistent with the idea that during processing of a sentence the content of the sentence is represented similar to a statement. Is this a question? Not for long. The statement bias Mario Pandelaere Siegfried Dewitte doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.08.004 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof 2005-09-30T15:04:21-00:00 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology In Press, Corrected Proof bias social-cognition truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/rzach/article/102125 <i>Synthese, Vol. 142, No. 3. (February 2005), pp. 317-352.</i> TRUTH AND DISQUOTATION Richard Heck doi:10.1007/s11229-005-3719-6 Synthese, Vol. 142, No. 3. (February 2005), pp. 317-352. 2005-02-23T21:37:12-00:00 2005 Synthese 0039-7857 142 3 317 352 Kluwer Academic Publishers disquotation tarski truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/rzach/article/61896 <i>British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 4., 705.</i> Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey Pierre Le Morvan doi:10.1080/0960878042000279332 British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 4., 705. 2004-12-28T18:18:54-00:00 British Journal for the History of Philosophy 0960-8788 12 4 705 Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group ramsey truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/RobertoOoz/article/1896297 <i>(31 October 2006)</i><br /><br />Having outlined a theory of bullshit and falsehood, Harry G. Frankfurt turns to what lies beyond them: the truth, a concept not as obvious as some might expect.<br><br>Our culture's devotion to bullshit may seem much stronger than our apparently halfhearted attachment to truth. Some people (professional thinkers) won't even acknowledge "true" and "false" as meaningful categories, and even those who claim to love truth cause the rest of us to wonder whether they, too, aren't simply full of it. Practically speaking, many of us deploy the truth only when absolutely necessary, often finding alternatives to be more saleable, and yet somehow civilization seems to be muddling along. But where are we headed? Is our fast and easy way with the facts actually crippling us? Or is it "all good"? Really, what's the use of truth, anyway?<br><br>With the same leavening wit and commonsense wisdom that animates his pathbreaking work <i>On Bullshit</i>, Frankfurt encourages us to take another look at the truth: there may be something there that is perhaps too plain to notice but for which we have a mostly unacknowledged yet deep-seated passion. His book will have sentient beings across America asking, "The truth—why didn't I think of that?" On Truth Harry Frankfurt (31 October 2006) 2007-11-10T21:59:45-00:00 2006 Knopf bullshit truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/recordmymind/article/94294 <i>(1997)</i><br /><br />We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The... A theory of truth that prefers falsehood - Fitting (1997) 2005-02-14T03:28:30-00:00 1997 fitting of theory truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/recordmymind/article/94293 <i></i><br /><br />. We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences - as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes. x1. On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and The Next Stable Set. P Welch 2005-02-14T03:26:28-00:00 belnap gupta of revision theory truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/oori/article/1138987 <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 112-118.</i><br /><br />Research in impression formation and persuasion has considered use of tag questions as part of a powerless speech style. However, little research has examined how contextual factors, such as characteristics of the communicator, moderates whether tag questions act "powerless". The present study manipulated source credibility, tag question use, and argument quality. When the source was low in credibility, tag question use decreased persuasion and biased message processing relative to a control message. However, when the source was credible, tag questions increased message processing in a relatively objective manner. Therefore, it appears that tag questions can have different effects on information processing, depending on who uses the tag questions. Language and persuasion: Tag questions as powerless speech or as interpreted in context Kevin Blankenship Traci Craig doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.12.012 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 43, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 112-118. 2007-03-04T00:34:04-00:00 2007 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 1 112 118 belief negation suggestion truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/NeighborhoodNetworks/article/1230028 <i>Social Studies of Science, Vol. 36, No. 1. (1 February 2006), pp. 5-38.</i><br /><br />How does place' contribute to the credibility of scientific claims? The Chicago School of urban studies (1918-32) had close ties to the city for which it was named: its social scientists lived in Chicago, were affiliated with the University of Chicago, and made Chicago the object of almost all of their empirical research. In order for this city to become a legitimate source of claims about urban form and process, Chicago is textually made to oscillate between two available authorizing spaces. As a field-site, the city of Chicago becomes a found and uncorrupted reality, the singularly ideal place to do urban research, and requiring the analyst to get up-close and personal. As a laboratory, Chicago becomes a controlled environment where artificial specimens yield generalities true anywhere, requiring of the analyst distance and objectivity. The distinctive epistemic virtues of both field and laboratory are preserved as complementary sources of credibility, and Chicago becomes the right place for the job. 10.1177/0306312705054526 City as Truth-Spot: Laboratories and Field-Sites in Urban Studies Thomas Gieryn doi:10.1177/0306312705054526 Social Studies of Science, Vol. 36, No. 1. (1 February 2006), pp. 5-38. 2007-04-16T14:53:03-00:00 2006 Social Studies of Science 36 1 5 38 chicagoschool city truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/namescornelius/article/1154977 <i>Nous, Vol. 34, No. 2. (2000), pp. 291-301.</i> Theism and Epistemic Truth-Equivalences Michael Rea doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00212 Nous, Vol. 34, No. 2. (2000), pp. 291-301. 2007-03-12T06:37:26-00:00 2000 Nous 34 2 291 301 epistemology truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/MikolkaMikolka/article/2933065 <i>Erkenntnis, Vol. 68, No. 1. (28 January 2008), pp. 103-112.</i><br /><br />Abstract  It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the different theses in Quine’s philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry. Quine and Logical Truth T Parent doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9080-z Erkenntnis, Vol. 68, No. 1. (28 January 2008), pp. 103-112. 2008-06-27T08:24:01-00:00 2008 Erkenntnis 68 1 103 112 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/linga/article/163426 <i></i><br /><br />On the semantic web, assertions may be aggregated from many sources, those aggregations filtered, reasoned over, aggregated with other aggregators, displayed, scraped, extracted, recombined, and otherwise processed without significant human oversight. To preserve the connection between assertions and their source, various provenance schemes for semantic web data have been explored. However, the primary focus has been on authenticating the author of a particular statement, e.g., using... Trusting Claims from Trusted Sources:Trust Network Based Filtering of Aggregated Claims Jennifer Golbeck Bijan Parsia 2005-04-18T05:12:22-00:00 aggregators blogs decentralized facts forresearch information recommendations semantic social software trust truth web wikis http://www.citeulike.org/user/Lemyyri/article/1716454 <i>(02 August 2002)</i><br /><br /><P><i>Truth without Objectivity</i> provides a critique of the mainstream view of "meaning". Kölbel examines the standard solutions to the conflict implicit in this view, demonstrating their inadequacy and developing instead his own relativist theory of truth. <br><br>The mainstream view of meaning assumes that understanding a sentence's meaning implies knowledge of the conditions required for it to be true. This view is challenged by taste judgements, which have meaning, but seem to be neither true nor false.</P> Truth Without Objectivity (International Library of Philosophy) Max Kölbel (02 August 2002) 2007-10-01T17:52:56-00:00 2002 Routledge disagreement relativism truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/ketangli/article/199606 <i>Philosophical Studies, Vol. 123, No. 1-2. (March 2005), pp. 47-70.</i> True, Truer, Truest Brian Weatherson doi:10.1007/s11098-004-5218-x Philosophical Studies, Vol. 123, No. 1-2. (March 2005), pp. 47-70. 2005-05-14T16:30:33-00:00 2005 Philosophical Studies 0031-8116 123 1-2 47 70 Kluwer Academic Publishers language logic philosophy semantics truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/jpbenda/article/940650 <i>Ethics, Vol. 67, No. 2. (1957), pp. 89-99.</i> Communication, Truth, and Society Richard Mckeon Ethics, Vol. 67, No. 2. (1957), pp. 89-99. 2006-11-12T09:11:00-00:00 1957 Ethics 67 2 89 99 communication society truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/incognito/article/1789560 <i>(01 April 2002)</i><br /><br /><div>This textbook/software package covers first-order language in a method appropriate for first and second courses in logic. The unique on-line grading services instantly grades solutions to hundred of computer exercises. It is specially devised to be used by philosophy instructors in a way that is useful to undergraduates of philosophy, computer science, mathematics, and linguistics. <br><br>The book is a completely rewritten and much improved version of The Language of First-order Logic. Introductory material is presented in a more systematic and accessible fashion. Advanced chapters include proofs of soundness and completeness for propositional and predicate logic, as well as an accessible sketch of Godel's first incompleteness theorem. The book is appropriate for a wide range of courses, from first logic courses for undergraduates (philosophy, mathematics, and computer science) to a first graduate logic course. <br><br>The package includes four pieces of software: <br><br>Tarski's World 5.0, a new version of the popular program that teaches the basic first-order language and its semantics; Fitch, a natural deduction proof environment for giving and checking first-order proofs;<br><br>Boole, a program that facilitates the construction and checking of truth tables and related notions (tautology, tautological consequence, etc.);<br><br>Submit, a program that allows students to submit exercises done with the above programs to the Grade Grinder, the automatic grading service.<br><br>Grade reports are returned to the student and, if requested, to the student's instructor, eliminating the need for tedious checking of homework. All programs will be available on both Windows and Macintosh OS. Instructors do not need to use the programs themselves in order to be able to take advantage of their pedagogical value.<br><br>The price of a new text/software package includes one Registration ID, which must be used each time work is submitted to the grading service. Once activated, the Registration ID is not transferable.<br><br></div> Language, Proof and Logic Jon Barwise John Etchemendy (01 April 2002) 2007-10-19T14:42:48-00:00 2002 Center for the Study of Language and Inf basic concepts language lib-musil logic proof truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/hamish/article/166260 <i>(01 June 1970)</i> The Divine Proportion HE Huntley (01 June 1970) 2005-04-21T15:23:44-00:00 1970 Dover Publications maths truth http://www.citeulike.org/group/48/article/92782 <i></i> The Emotive Theory of Truth Barnett Savery 2005-02-10T19:53:53-00:00 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/greg_restall/article/256229 <i>(13 Jul 2005)</i><br /><br />Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics (QM) subtends a quantum concept of truth, formalized by quantum logic (QL) and radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth. We show in this paper that QL can be obtained as a pragmatic structure of pragmatically decidable assertive formulas which formalizes the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification in QM. The formulas in this structure can be seen indeed as assertions about properties of physical systems which are empirically justified or unjustified, since they can be empirically proved or disproved. This new interpretation of QL allows us to place properly QL within a general integrationist perspective, according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained. A Pragmatic Interpretation of Quantum Logic Claudio Garola (13 Jul 2005) 2005-07-14T19:13:08-00:00 2005 logic physics pluralism quantum truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/greg_restall/article/403020 <i></i> Logic and Meaning: The Philosophical Significance of the Sequent Calculus Michael Kremer 2005-11-21T13:51:43-00:00 calculus logic pnc prooftheory sequent truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/greg_restall/article/75905 <i>Mind, Vol. 114, No. 453., 75.</i> Deflationism and the Godel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant Jeffrey Ketland doi:10.1093/mind/fzi075 Mind, Vol. 114, No. 453., 75. 2005-01-12T07:27:28-00:00 Mind 0026-4423 114 453 75 Oxford University Press deflationism godel truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/greg_restall/article/87403 <i>Mind & Language, Vol. 20, No. 1. (February 2005), 68.</i> Context-Sensitive Truth-Theoretic Accounts of Semantic Competence Steven Gross doi:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00278.x Mind & Language, Vol. 20, No. 1. (February 2005), 68. 2005-02-05T13:49:20-00:00 2005 Mind & Language 0268-1064 20 1 68 Blackwell Publishing context semantics truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/Fin/article/1279763 <i>(07 April 2005)</i><br /><br />Alain Badiou is already regarded as one of the most original and powerful voices in contemporary European thought. Almost alone among his peers, his work promises a radical renewal of philosophy. <P>Influenced by Plato, Lucretius, Heidegger, Lacan and Deleuze, Badiou is a critic of both the analytical and the postmodern schools of thought. His work spans the range of philosophy, from ethics, to mathematics to science, psychoanalysis, politics and art. His writing is rigorous and startling and takes no prisoners. <P>Infinite Thought brings together a representative selection of the range of Alain Badiou's work, illustrating the power and diversity of his thought. The pieces, including the final interview, are chosen for their accessibility to readers new to the work of a philosopher who is doing no less than changing the way we think about the world. Infinite Thought: Truth And The Return To Philosophy (Continuum Impacts) Alain Badiou (07 April 2005) 2007-05-05T17:12:37-00:00 2005 Continuum International Publishing Group badiou infinite_thought truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2453514 <i>The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 97. (1974), pp. 365-368.</i> Truth and Evidence Robert Almeder The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 97. (1974), pp. 365-368. 2008-03-01T19:17:49-00:00 1974 The Philosophical Quarterly 24 97 365 368 epistemology evidence gettier_problem infallibilism truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2489031 <i>Philosophical Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3. (1 November 1984), pp. 279-295.</i> Justification and truth Stewart Cohen doi:10.1007/BF00372907 Philosophical Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3. (1 November 1984), pp. 279-295. 2008-03-08T10:13:24-00:00 1984 Philosophical Studies 46 3 279 295 epistemology justification truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2498905 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 3. (1992), pp. 657-669.</i> The Truth Connection Earl Conee Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 3. (1992), pp. 657-669. 2008-03-10T04:52:04-00:00 1992 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 3 657 669 evidence evidentialism fallibilism justification truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2453637 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 56, No. 1. (1996), pp. 183-192.</i> Does Warrant Entail Truth? Sharon Ryan Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 56, No. 1. (1996), pp. 183-192. 2008-03-01T20:05:53-00:00 1996 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 1 183 192 epistemology infallibilism truth warrant http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2453634 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 55, No. 4. (1995), pp. 841-855.</i> Warrant Entails Truth Trenton Merricks Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 55, No. 4. (1995), pp. 841-855. 2008-03-01T20:04:34-00:00 1995 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 4 841 855 epistemology infallibilism truth warrant http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2453629 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 57, No. 3. (1997), pp. 627-631.</i><br /><br />Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In "Warrant Entails Truth" (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" (PPR, March 1996). In "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth" I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original "Warrant Entails Truth." This paper responds to Ryan's objections, but it is not merely a reply to Ryan's article. It is, rather, a free-standing defense of warrant's entailing truth that is the product of discussion and argument for over two years with many philosophers, including Ryan, over the arguments contained in my original paper. More On Warrant's Entailing Truth Trenton Merricks Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 57, No. 3. (1997), pp. 627-631. 2008-03-01T20:03:18-00:00 1997 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 3 627 631 epistemology infallibilism truth warrant http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2496770 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 4. (1992), pp. 167-180.</i> Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief Crispin Sartwell The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 4. (1992), pp. 167-180. 2008-03-09T18:14:29-00:00 1992 The Journal of Philosophy 89 4 167 180 analysis belief epistemology justification knowledge truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/1407386 <i>Analysis, Vol. 67, No. 295. (July 2007), pp. 219-222.</i> In praise of folly: a reply to Blome-Tillmann Kearns Stephen doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00677.x Analysis, Vol. 67, No. 295. (July 2007), pp. 219-222. 2007-06-23T20:51:06-00:00 2007 Analysis 0003-2638 67 295 219 222 Blackwell Publishing analysis epistemology infallibilism truth warrant http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2453594 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 66, No. 2. (2003), pp. 304-327.</i><br /><br />Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief: (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy Daniel Howard-Snyder Frances Howard-Snyder Neil Feit doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00263.x Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 66, No. 2. (2003), pp. 304-327. 2008-03-01T19:39:55-00:00 2003 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 2 304 327 epistemology gettier_problem infallibilism truth warrant http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2871268 <i>(06 March 2008)</i><br /><br />Saving Truth from Paradox is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Godel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches. Part One examines Tarski's, Kripke's, and Lukasiewicz's theories of truth, and discusses validity and soundness, and vagueness. Part Two considers a wide range of attempts to resolve the paradoxes within classical logic. In Part Three Field turns to non-classical theories of truth that that restrict excluded middle. He shows that there are theories of this sort in which the conditionals obey many of the classical laws, and that all the semantic paradoxes (not just the simplest ones) can be handled consistently with the naive theory of truth. In Part Four, these theories are extended to the property-theoretic paradoxes and to various other paradoxes, and some issues about the understanding of the notion of validity are addressed. Extended paradoxes, involving the notion of determinate truth, are treated very thoroughly, and a number of different arguments that the theories lead to "revenge problems" are addressed. Finally, Part Five deals with dialetheic approaches to the paradoxes: approaches which, instead of restricting excluded middle, accept certain contradictions but alter classical logic so as to keep them confined to a relatively remote part of the language. Advocates of dialetheic theories have argued them to be better than theories that restrict excluded middle, for instance over issues related to the incompleteness theorems and in avoiding revenge problems. Field argues that dialetheists' claims on behalf of their theories are quite unfounded, and indeed that on some of these issues all current versions of dialetheism do substantially worse than the best theories that restrict excluded middle. Saving Truth from Paradox Hartry Field (06 March 2008) 2008-06-07T14:03:23-00:00 2008 Oxford University Press liar paradox truth vagueness validity http://www.citeulike.org/user/dutant/article/2492208 <i>Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 5. (1965), pp. 168-175.</i> Knowledge, Truth and Evidence Keith Lehrer Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 5. (1965), pp. 168-175. 2008-03-09T03:11:23-00:00 1965 Analysis 25 5 168 175 analysis defeasability epistemology evidence knowledge truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/davsans/article/257364 <i>Mind, Vol. 114, No. 455. (July 2005), pp. 671-688.</i> The Justificationist's Response to a Realist Michael Dummett doi:10.1093/mind/fzi671 Mind, Vol. 114, No. 455. (July 2005), pp. 671-688. 2005-07-15T20:30:03-00:00 2005 Mind 0026-4423 114 455 671 688 Oxford University Press past philosophy realism time truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/cirdan/article/1475819 <i>The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 0, No. 0. (0000), pp. ???-???.</i><br /><br />Abstract I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments. TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST REALISM Timothy Bays doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.505.x The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 0, No. 0. (0000), pp. ???-???. 2007-07-23T19:32:07-00:00 0000 The Philosophical Quarterly 0 0 ??? ??? putnam realism reference truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/borrega/article/1843470 <i>Acta Analytica, Vol. 18, No. 1. (December 2003), pp. 143-160.</i><br /><br />Abstract  The publication of Davidson 2001, anthologizing articles from the 1980s and 1990s, encourages reconsidering arguments contained in them. One such argument is Davidson’s omniscient-interpreter argument (‘OIA’) in Davidson 1983. The OIA allegedly establishes that it is necessary that most beliefs are true. Thus the omniscient interpreter, revived in 2001 and now 20 years old, was born to answer the skeptic. In Part I of this paper, I consider charges that the OIA establishes only that it is possible that most beliefs are true; if correct, then it is also possibly the case that most beliefs are false—the skeptic’s very position. Next, I consider two responses on Davidson’s behalf, showing that each fails. In Part II, I show that the OIA establishes neither that it is necessarily merely possibly but actually the case that most beliefs are true. I then conclude that this is enough to answer the skeptic. Possibly v. actually the case: Davidson’s omniscient interpreter at twenty Nathaniel Goldberg doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1018-8 Acta Analytica, Vol. 18, No. 1. (December 2003), pp. 143-160. 2007-10-30T20:46:17-00:00 2003 Acta Analytica 18 1 143 160 competitivespeakers datesexport1 davidson fotocopiado0 interpreter leido0 lenguage reality tesis-1 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/borrega/article/1843457 <i>Language & Communication, Vol. 25, No. 4. (October 2005), pp. 335-349.</i><br /><br />Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have argued that semantic holism is incompatible with the in-principle possibility of languages that consist of a single meaningful expression. Should the traditional Quinean/Davidsonian holist be worried by this apparently weird possibility? In this paper, I offer some reasons for why he should be. My argument focuses upon Davidson's account of how a hypothetical interpreter might come to understand an unfamiliar human language. Davidson's discussion of the methodology of so-called "radical interpretation" appears to rule out the possibility of semantically atomic languages upon purely a priori grounds. But this appearance turns out to be deceiving. Semantic holism vs. semantic atomism Mark Silcox doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2005.06.001 Language & Communication, Vol. 25, No. 4. (October 2005), pp. 335-349. 2007-10-30T20:41:04-00:00 2005 Language & Communication 25 4 335 349 competitivespeakers datesexport1 davidson fotocopiado0 holism leido0 lenguage quine truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/borrega/article/1843293 <i>Journal of Pragmatics, Vol. 39, No. 5. (May 2007), pp. 1039-1046.</i> Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality: Ernest Lepore, Kirk Ludwig, Oxford: OUP, 2005, 446 pp Alessandro Capone doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2006.12.002 Journal of Pragmatics, Vol. 39, No. 5. (May 2007), pp. 1039-1046. 2007-10-30T19:35:06-00:00 2007 Journal of Pragmatics 39 5 1039 1046 datesexport0 davidson fotocopiado0 leido0 lenguage reality tesis-1 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2049468 <i>(10 October 1996)</i><br /><br /><P>Russell examines the foundations of knowledge through a discussion of language and investigates the way a knowledge of the structure of language helps our understanding of the structure of the world.</P> Inquiry into Meaning and Truth Bertrand Russell (10 October 1996) 2007-12-03T12:22:34-00:00 1996 Routledge loci-classici similarity truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2141202 <i>New Literary History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (1985), pp. 61-79.</i> A Comparison of Something with Something Else Hilary Putnam New Literary History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (1985), pp. 61-79. 2007-12-18T14:51:20-00:00 1985 New Literary History 17 1 61 79 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2143989 <i>Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 197. (1976), pp. 323-336.</i> Is It True What They Say about Tarski? Susan Haack Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 197. (1976), pp. 323-336. 2007-12-19T04:10:45-00:00 1976 Philosophy 51 197 323 336 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2143985 <i>The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27, No. 3. (1976), pp. 231-249.</i> The Pragmatist Theory of Truth Susan Haack The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 27, No. 3. (1976), pp. 231-249. 2007-12-19T04:09:48-00:00 1976 The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 3 231 249 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1755734 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 13. (1972), pp. 347-375.</i> Tarski's Theory of Truth Hartry Field The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 13. (1972), pp. 347-375. 2007-10-11T14:40:47-00:00 1972 The Journal of Philosophy 69 13 347 375 truth http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1751146 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 21. (1969), pp. 748-764.</i> True to the Facts Donald Davidson The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 21. (1969), pp. 748-764. 2007-10-10T15:50:25-00:00 1969 The Journal of Philosophy 66 21 748 764 truth