Sat, 26 Jul 2008 04:29:31 BST CiteULike: Tag value http://www.citeulike.org/tag/value CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/wynsculley/article/2616688 <i>Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1. (1 March 2008), pp. 97-120.</i><br /><br />I give an account of Max Weber's views concerning the basis of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. In this connection, I offer a critical discussion of his distinction between different "value spheres," each with its own "intrinsic logic." I then consider parallels between Weber's "value spheres" and central elements of Bourdieu's field theory and Luhmann's systems theory, and try to show to what extent Bourdieu's and Luhmann's problems, and the solutions they suggest, can be seen as similar to Weber's. I conclude by a general consideration of Weber's, Bourdieu's, and Luhmann's approach to the problem of objectivity. 10.1177/0048393107311144 Objectivity, Value Spheres, and "Inherent Laws": On some Suggestive Isomorphisms between Weber, Bourdieu, and Luhmann Hans Bruun doi:10.1177/0048393107311144 Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1. (1 March 2008), pp. 97-120. 2008-03-31T15:54:35-00:00 2008 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 1 97 120 bourdieu differentiation field inherent logic luhmann max niklas objectivity pierre social spheres systems theory value weber http://www.citeulike.org/user/wigelius/article/1302114 <i>(2005), pp. 1292-1295.</i> A development framework for value-centred design Gilbert Cockton doi:10.1145/1056808.1056899 (2005), pp. 1292-1295. 2007-05-17T12:58:28-00:00 2005 1292 1295 ACM Press framework value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wigelius/article/832176 <i>(2004), pp. 1287-1290.</i> From quality in use to value in the world Gilbert Cockton doi:10.1145/985921.986045 (2004), pp. 1287-1290. 2006-09-06T10:12:22-00:00 2004 1287 1290 ACM Press quality value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wigelius/article/315629 <i>(2004), pp. 149-160.</i> Value-centred HCI Gilbert Cockton doi:10.1145/1028014.1028038 (2004), pp. 149-160. 2005-09-11T06:03:23-00:00 2004 149 160 ACM Press hci value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wigelius/article/1415341 <i>Mobile Business, 2006. ICMB '06. International Conference on (2006), pp. 7-7.</i><br /><br />The industrial products and service industry is a product oriented industry, where traditional business models based on value chain optimization have been refined over many years. However, in order to increase business value, innovative industrial product companies are increasingly looking for new m- Business services related to their core business. With the emergence of such virtual markets (services, information, knowledge, life-style support, security) we need a new paradigm for understanding and predicting business performance. The concept "value constellation" replaces the value chain. A m-Business model is not sustainable if it lacks a sound economic value proposition to the end-user. In order to analyze and validate value creation in m- Business systems we suggest using a conceptual modeling methodology with proper value ontology. We will demonstrate how such a methodology will allow us to de-compose value offerings with the aim of identifying new stakeholders and new value constellations. Using Conceptual Modeling and Value Analysis to Identify Sustainable m>Business Models in Industrial Services Jesper Thestrup Trine Sorensen Mauro De Bona Mobile Business, 2006. ICMB '06. International Conference on (2006), pp. 7-7. 2007-06-27T09:00:31-00:00 2006 Mobile Business, 2006. ICMB '06. International Conference on 7 7 business mobile model value http://www.citeulike.org/user/waxd01/article/282020 <i>American Ethnologist, Vol. 23, No. 1. (1996), pp. 4-24.</i><br /><br />Why have so many societies adopted beads or other objects of adornment as currencies of trade? The question opens up a series of other questions about the nature of exchange, visibility and invisibility, and the relation of exchange both to conceptions of the human person and ways of exercising power over others. [money, exchange theory, theories of magic, fetishism, the person, gender, agency and royal power, Madagascar] Beads and Money: Notes toward a Theory of Wealth and Power David Graeber American Ethnologist, Vol. 23, No. 1. (1996), pp. 4-24. 2005-08-15T07:18:41-00:00 1996 American Ethnologist 23 1 4 24 anarchism anthropology savageminds value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938271 <i>Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 11, No. 2. (1986), pp. 40-50.</i> The Interplay of Science and Values in Assessing and Regulating Environmental Risks Frances Lynn Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 11, No. 2. (1986), pp. 40-50. 2006-11-09T20:03:48-00:00 1986 Science, Technology, & Human Values 11 2 40 50 bias risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938266 <i>Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 10, No. 4. (1985), pp. 55-68.</i> Increasing Public Participation in Controversies Involving Hazards: The Value of Metastatistical Rules Deborah Mayo Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 10, No. 4. (1985), pp. 55-68. 2006-11-09T19:57:50-00:00 1985 Science, Technology, & Human Values 10 4 55 68 risk_assessment statistics value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938264 <i>Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 2. (1993), pp. 123-129.</i> Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis1,2 Sheila Jasanoff doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1993.tb01057.x Risk Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 2. (1993), pp. 123-129. 2006-11-09T19:56:49-00:00 1993 Risk Analysis 13 2 123 129 risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938263 <i>Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. V9, No. 1. (7 March 1996), pp. 42-60.</i> Science and values in risk assessment: The case of deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms Soemini Kasanmoentalib doi:10.1007/BF01965669 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. V9, No. 1. (7 March 1996), pp. 42-60. 2006-11-09T19:55:24-00:00 1996 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics V9 1 42 60 gmo longino risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1418647 <i>Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 3. (1995), pp. 441-461.</i><br /><br />This essay delineates the contributions of feminist critiques of science to contemporary reconstructions of empiricism. I argue that three central tenets arise from feminist attention to the dynamics of gender and oppression in the theories and methods of science: 1) a rejection of the science/politics dichotomy; 2) an acknowledgement of the epistemic import of subjective components of knowledge; and 3) a reconfiguration of the subject of knowledge. These three tenets are illustrated and supported through examples from the history of science. The values of science: Empiricism from a feminist perspective Nancy Tuana doi:10.1007/BF01064509 Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 3. (1995), pp. 441-461. 2007-06-28T09:09:15-00:00 1995 Synthese 104 3 441 461 empiricism feminism science value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938240 <i>Theory and Decision, Vol. V1, No. 2. (1 December 1970), pp. 121-137.</i> Science, reason and value Andrew Mclaughlin doi:10.1007/BF00154002 Theory and Decision, Vol. V1, No. 2. (1 December 1970), pp. 121-137. 2006-11-09T19:29:20-00:00 1970 Theory and Decision V1 2 121 137 philosophy_of_science value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938238 <i>Synthese, Vol. V12, No. 4. (1 December 1960), pp. 439-469.</i> Inductive inconsistencies Carl Hempel doi:10.1007/BF00485428 Synthese, Vol. V12, No. 4. (1 December 1960), pp. 439-469. 2006-11-09T19:27:21-00:00 1960 Synthese V12 4 439 469 epistemic_normativity value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938233 <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3. (1993), pp. 527-551.</i> Epistemic Desiderata William Alston Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3. (1993), pp. 527-551. 2006-11-09T19:21:32-00:00 1993 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 3 527 551 epistemic_normativity value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938232 <i>Synthese, Vol. V94, No. 3. (1 March 1993), pp. 357-376.</i> Epistemic normativity Hilary Kornblith doi:10.1007/BF01064485 Synthese, Vol. V94, No. 3. (1 March 1993), pp. 357-376. 2006-11-09T19:20:21-00:00 1993 Synthese V94 3 357 376 epistemic_normativity value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938219 <i></i><br /><br />This paper argues that the appraisal of theory is in important respects closer in structure to value-judgement than it is to the rule-governed inference that the classical tradition in philosophy of science took for granted. Values in Science Ernan Mcmullin 2006-11-09T19:19:16-00:00 philosophy_of_science value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938216 <i></i><br /><br />The debate about the rational and the social in science has sometimes been developed in the context of a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Paying particular attention to two important discussion in the last decade, by Longino and by McMullin, I argue that a fuller understanding of values in science ultimately requires abandoning the distinction itself. This is argued directly in terms of an analysis of the lack of clarity concerning what epistemic values are. I also argue that the philosophical import of much of the feminist work in philosophy of science is restricted by any kind of strict adherence to the distinction. On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful? Phyllis Rooney 2006-11-09T19:18:15-00:00 philosophy_of_science value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938201 <i>Science & Education, Vol. V11, No. 2. (1 March 2002), pp. 191-202.</i> Science, Values and Objectivity Peter Davson-Galle doi:10.1023/A:1014412500803 Science & Education, Vol. V11, No. 2. (1 March 2002), pp. 191-202. 2006-11-09T18:49:05-00:00 2002 Science & Education V11 2 191 202 bias objectivity philosophy_of_science value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938200 <i>Critical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2. (1998), pp. 29-43.</i> How values are in science Peter Machamer Heather Douglas doi:10.1111/1467-8705.00153 Critical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2. (1998), pp. 29-43. 2006-11-09T18:47:50-00:00 1998 Critical Quarterly 40 2 29 43 philosophy philosophy_of_science value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938199 <i>Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2000), pp. 559-579.</i><br /><br />Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results. Inductive Risk and Values in Science Heather Douglas Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, No. 4. (2000), pp. 559-579. 2006-11-09T18:45:56-00:00 2000 Philosophy of Science 67 4 559 579 false_negative false_positivefalse_negative histopathology judgment risk risk_assessment threshold value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938197 <i>Science & Education, Vol. V8, No. 1. (1 January 1999), pp. 89-103.</i> On Cognitive and Social Values: A Reply to My Critics Hugh Lacey doi:10.1023/A:1008660400494 Science & Education, Vol. V8, No. 1. (1 January 1999), pp. 89-103. 2006-11-09T18:42:51-00:00 1999 Science & Education V8 1 89 103 value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1419477 <i></i> How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? Nicholas Rescher 2007-06-28T12:32:19-00:00 fact value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166230 <i>(01 December 2001)</i><br /><br /><p>Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive.</p><p>Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced.</p><p> Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book <i>Science as Social Knowledge</i>, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty.</p> The Fate of Knowledge. Helen Longino (01 December 2001) 2007-03-15T23:15:31-00:00 2001 Princeton University Press epistemic_values epistemology value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1419473 <i>The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1. (1 March 2001), pp. 5-12.</i> Is Reasoning about Values Viciously Circular? Nicholas Rescher doi:10.1023/A:1010301913273 The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 35, No. 1. (1 March 2001), pp. 5-12. 2007-06-28T12:31:10-00:00 2001 The Journal of Value Inquiry 35 1 5 12 value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166222 <i>(16 January 2004)</i><br /><br />Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science. Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Lane Studies in Regional Government) Larry Laudan (16 January 2004) 2007-03-15T23:13:30-00:00 2004 University of California Press scientific_aim scientific_controversy value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1419464 <i>Mind & Society, Vol. 4, No. 1. (1 June 2005), pp. 115-127.</i><br /><br />The article urges a negative answer to the question if values merely lie ‘‘in the eyes of the beholder’’. It argues the objectivity of values via their status as tertiary properties that are neither on dispositionally inherent in their objects nor yet affective (dispositionally evoked in the interaction between objects and sense–observers), but rather reflective in being dispositionally evoked in suitably competent minds considering the matters involved. On the import and rationale of value attribution Nicholas Rescher doi:10.1007/s11299-005-0007-6 Mind & Society, Vol. 4, No. 1. (1 June 2005), pp. 115-127. 2007-06-28T12:23:59-00:00 2005 Mind & Society 4 1 115 127 value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166186 <i>The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. V36, No. 4. (1 December 2002), pp. 413-424.</i> Truth, Value, and Consolation Damian Cox doi:10.1023/A:1021993622962 The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. V36, No. 4. (1 December 2002), pp. 413-424. 2007-03-15T22:57:00-00:00 2002 The Journal of Value Inquiry V36 4 413 424 intrinsic_value truth value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166182 <i>(01 January 1991)</i><br /><br />Selected by Choice as one of the outstanding publications for 1991. Value Assumptions in Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the Alachlor Controversy Lawrence Haworth Conrad Brunk Brenda Lee (01 January 1991) 2007-03-15T22:54:15-00:00 1991 Wilfrid Laurier University Press controversy risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166178 <i>Philosophical Studies, Vol. V107, No. 1. (1 January 2002), pp. 23-44.</i> Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Ben Bradley doi:10.1023/A:1013165112545 Philosophical Studies, Vol. V107, No. 1. (1 January 2002), pp. 23-44. 2007-03-15T22:51:47-00:00 2002 Philosophical Studies V107 1 23 44 intrinsic_value value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1166177 <i>Philosophical Studies, Vol. V102, No. 3. (1 February 2001), pp. 329-343.</i> Intrinsic Value M Bernstein doi:10.1023/A:1010384106310 Philosophical Studies, Vol. V102, No. 3. (1 February 2001), pp. 329-343. 2007-03-15T22:50:26-00:00 2001 Philosophical Studies V102 3 329 343 intrinsic_value value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/237183 <i>Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 11, No. 3. (June 2005), pp. 477-482.</i> Consequences, Ethical Obligations, IRIS, NAS Reviews and Perchlorate in Drinking Water David Brown doi:10.1080/10807030590968932 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 11, No. 3. (June 2005), pp. 477-482. 2005-06-25T10:30:49-00:00 2005 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 1080-7039 11 3 477 482 Taylor and Francis Ltd exposure iris value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1180593 <i>Toxicol Lett, Vol. 152, No. 3. (25 September 2004), pp. 265-272.</i><br /><br />It is a widely accepted claim that scientific practice contains value judgments, i.e. decisions made on the basis of values. This paper clarifies the concepts involved in this claim and explains its implications for risk assessment. It is explained why values are necessarily a part of science and of risk assessment. A certain type of values that contribute to the aim of science, so-called epistemic values, are identified as rationally justified as basis for judgment in science. It is argued that the aims of pure science and risk assessment differ in some aspects and that consequently pure science's epistemic values are not sufficient for risk assessment. I suggest how the epistemic values may be supplemented in order to align better with the aim of risk assessment. It is concluded that since risk assessment is no less value-laden than pure science, it is important (a) that risk assessors become aware of what values they are (often implicitly) relying on, (b) that the values are justifiable, and (c) that transparency is ensured, i.e. that the values and value-based assumptions applied in particular risk assessments are explicitly acknowledged. Values in science and risk assessment. B Wandall doi:10.1016/j.toxlet.2004.05.010 Toxicol Lett, Vol. 152, No. 3. (25 September 2004), pp. 265-272. 2007-03-22T12:47:21-00:00 2004 Toxicol Lett 0378-4274 152 3 265 272 value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1180545 <i>Science & Education, Vol. 8, No. 1. (1 January 1999), pp. 45-54.</i> Cognitive and Social Values Peter Machamer Heather Douglas doi:10.1023/A:1008664519150 Science & Education, Vol. 8, No. 1. (1 January 1999), pp. 45-54. 2007-03-22T11:30:02-00:00 1999 Science & Education 8 1 45 54 epistemic_values goal social_value value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1108219 <i></i><br /><br />Government agencies and private risk assessors use (quasi) scientific risk assessment procedures to try to estimate or predict risk to human health or the environment that might result from exposure to toxic substances in order to take steps to prevent such risks from arising or to eliminate the risks if they already exist. In this paper I discuss several ways in which the "science" of carcinogen risk assessment differs from ordinary scientific enterprises. I also consider several ways in which normative policy considerations infect this regulatory science. Scientists, philosophers of science, moral philosophers and policy makers should address these issues forthrightly in order to serve better the aims of science and regulation. Some Public Policy Problems with the Science of Carcinogen Risk Assessment Carl Cranor 2007-02-15T09:36:51-00:00 carcinogen epidemiology false_positivefalse_negative policy risk_assessment risk_management statistics value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/988650 <i>Br J Psychiatry, Vol. 178, No. 1. (1 January 2001), pp. 84-85.</i><br /><br />10.1192/bjp.178.1.84 Violence risk prediction in practice G Szmukler Br J Psychiatry, Vol. 178, No. 1. (1 January 2001), pp. 84-85. 2006-12-11T14:31:29-00:00 2001 Br J Psychiatry 178 1 84 85 false_positivefalse_negative risk_assessment uncertainty value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/988646 <i>Psychiatr Bull, Vol. 27, No. 6. (1 June 2003), pp. 205-207.</i><br /><br />10.1192/pb.27.6.205 Risk assessment: 'numbers' and 'values' George Szmukler Psychiatr Bull, Vol. 27, No. 6. (1 June 2003), pp. 205-207. 2006-12-11T14:26:46-00:00 2003 Psychiatr Bull 27 6 205 207 false_positivefalse_negative risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1029738 <i>Metaphilosophy, Vol. 38, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 71-87.</i> PURE VERSUS PRACTICAL EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION James Montmarquet doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00468.x Metaphilosophy, Vol. 38, No. 1. (January 2007), pp. 71-87. 2007-01-08T06:26:34-00:00 2007 Metaphilosophy 0026-1068 38 1 71 87 Blackwell Publishing epistemic_values justification value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/937916 <i>Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1. (1953), pp. 1-6.</i> The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments Richard Rudner Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1. (1953), pp. 1-6. 2006-11-09T15:17:02-00:00 1953 Philosophy of Science 20 1 1 6 philosophy value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1199687 <i>(01 August 1992)</i><br /><br />Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from the philosophy of mind may be used to undermine widely-held subjectivist positions in ethics and politico-economic theory. The work is inspired by the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Davidson, but goes on to connect their arguments about interpretation with formal work in decision theory and social choice theory, and with the theory of adjudication. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity SL Hurley (01 August 1992) 2007-03-31T13:14:48-00:00 1992 Oxford University Press judgement judgment value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1448669 <i>Crit Rev Food Sci Nutr, Vol. 47, No. 3. (2007), pp. 267-285.</i><br /><br />In this paper, we review European legislation in the field of micronutrient food supplements and find it wanting. It is shown that the precautionary principle, embedded in European food legislation, pre-empts innovative developments in this field. In view of the scientific advances in micronutrients research, we subsequently critique the precautionary perspective and propose a novel outlook on micronutrients food supplements regulation. However, this requires a transition from the "survival" approach of the current deficiency-related RDAs to a "health-optimization" approach of a n(ew)-RDA. Genomic integrity is central in this envisioned transition. Food supplements and European regulation within a precautionary context: a critique and implications for nutritional, toxicological and regulatory consistency. JC Hanekamp A Bast doi:10.1080/10408390600737748 Crit Rev Food Sci Nutr, Vol. 47, No. 3. (2007), pp. 267-285. 2007-07-11T12:58:09-00:00 2007 Crit Rev Food Sci Nutr 1040-8398 47 3 267 285 false_positivefalse_negative precaution regulation toxicology value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1419164 <i>The Accounting Review, Vol. 45, No. 3. (1970), pp. 619-622.</i> [An Introduction to Value Theory (Nicholas Rescher)] WP Birkett The Accounting Review, Vol. 45, No. 3. (1970), pp. 619-622. 2007-06-28T11:09:03-00:00 1970 The Accounting Review 45 3 619 622 value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/2141550 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 11. (1960), pp. 345-357.</i> Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments? Isaac Levi The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 11. (1960), pp. 345-357. 2007-12-18T16:33:17-00:00 1960 The Journal of Philosophy 57 11 345 357 value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/938283 <i></i><br /><br />Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haack's argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haack's argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice. Science and Values: Are Value Judgments Always Irrelevant to the Justification of Scientific Claims? Kristen Intemann 2006-11-09T20:15:42-00:00 scientific_practice value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1112876 <i>Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof</i><br /><br />The relatively new issue of pharmaceutical contamination of the environment offers the opportunity to explore the application of values to the construction, communication and management of risk. The still-developing regulatory policies regarding environmental contamination with pharmaceuticals provide fertile ground for the introduction of values into the definition and management of risk. In this report, we summarize the current knowledge regarding pharmaceutical contamination of the environment and discuss specific attributes of pharmaceuticals that require special consideration. We then present an analysis showing that if values are incorporated into assessing, characterizing and managing risk, the results of risk assessments will more accurately reflect the needs of various stakeholders. Originating from an acknowledgement of the inherent uncertainty and value-laden nature of risk assessment, the precautionary principle (and later, the multi-criteria, integrated risk assessment), provides a direction for further research and policy development. Assessing the assessments: Pharmaceuticals in the environment OV Enick MM Moore doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2007.01.001 Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof 2007-02-19T14:56:31-00:00 Environmental Impact Assessment Review In Press, Corrected Proof risk_assessment value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1362824 <i>(09 July 2005)</i><br /><br />This volume of contributed essays, a follow-up to Noretta Koertge's successful book on the science wars, A House Built on Sand, takes an affirming, positive view of the relationship between the values embodied in science, and the nature of a civil society. It argues that recent attacks on the probity of science undermine the possibility of rational discourse in the political arena. While science has traditionally been viewed as incorporating intellectual virtues like honesty and precision of language, the contributors to this volume point to additional benefits, examining the idea that science can serve as a source of, and inspiration for, civic virtues--in the need to be well-informed about the way the world works, in tolerating the viewpoints of others, and in functioning as a fully global enterprise dedicated to the public good. The contributors--who include philosophers, political scientists, physicists, biologists and engineers--look at examples of scientific virtues in action and how they might be used as inspirations and practical resources for improving civic society. The volume will appeal to a similarly broad audience interested in the relationship between science and society. Scientific Values and Civic Virtues Noretta Koertge (09 July 2005) 2007-06-04T13:52:21-00:00 2005 Oxford University Press, USA scientific_method scientific_norms value http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1338508 <i>The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 92. (1973), pp. 253-257.</i> Value-Judgements, Prescriptive Language, and Imperatives Winston Nesbitt The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 92. (1973), pp. 253-257. 2007-05-28T10:55:51-00:00 1973 The Philosophical Quarterly 23 92 253 257 hare prescription value value_judgment http://www.citeulike.org/user/wandall/article/1158182 <i>Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 1. (1 March 2007), pp. 74-84.</i><br /><br />Hilary Putnam makes two related points in his recent collection of essays: (1) Values can be rational, and their inescapable intrusion into every kind of discourse is welcome. (2) Ignoring or suppressing this fact is common yet irrational. This is of course true; yet the intrusion in question can be trivial, and it can be problematic. Putnam ignores this here. The book is pleasant to read; it is infused with friendly and appreciative personal anecdotes and observations. It is almost entirely critical and almost always in a friendly way. Yet it is often unclear. In almost every discussion here, the author announces one item and discusses another almost identical with it but one much easier to discuss. 10.1177/0048393106296570 What Collapse, Exactly? Joseph Agassi doi:10.1177/0048393106296570 Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 1. (1 March 2007), pp. 74-84. 2007-03-13T10:57:58-00:00 2007 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 1 74 84 factvalue putnam value http://www.citeulike.org/user/ttaga/article/2245717 <i>Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 16, No. 3. (1 June 1992), pp. 329-348.</i><br /><br />Self-efficacy, Bandura's concept of a central cognitive mediating belief, has been widely researched and found to play an important role in the initiation, persistence, and achievement of a variety of behaviors. Self-efficacy can be viewed as one aspect of expectancy-value theory, but little research has been conducted to identify the relationship between measures of self-efficacy and outcome expectation across performance trials. This paper illustrates the importance of multiple trials in the investigation of self-efficacy, outcome expectation, outcome value, and performance. Using an item-writing task, subjects' self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and outcome value ratings were measured across a 10-week period. While self-efficacy was initially related to performance, in later trials it was past behavior that accounted for most of the explained variance in item-writing performance. It appears that investigating these variables across multiple trials is essential if a comprehensive view of the relationship between self-efficacy, outcome expectation, outcome value, and behavior is to be gained. Results and alterative explanations are discussed in light of both self-efficacy theory and cognitive information process. An investigation of the patterns of self-efficacy, outcome expectation, outcome value, and performance across trials Thomas Sexton Bruce Tuckman Kevin Crehan doi:10.1007/BF01183285 Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 16, No. 3. (1 June 1992), pp. 329-348. 2008-01-17T15:27:54-00:00 1992 Cognitive Therapy and Research 16 3 329 348 expectation multiple outcome performance self-efficacy trials value http://www.citeulike.org/user/tomchen/article/1047836 <i>Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2007), pp. 28-47.</i> A qualitative exploration of a consumer's value-based e-trust building process: A framework development Pennanen Kyasti Tiainen Tarja Luomala T Harri doi:10.1108/13522750710720387 Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1. (2007), pp. 28-47. 2007-01-17T22:47:34-00:00 2007 Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 1352-2752 10 1 28 47 Emerald Group Publishing Limited example tam value http://www.citeulike.org/user/thiede/article/2213841 <i></i> HandWerk Richard Sennett 2008-01-10T09:51:53-00:00 Berlin Verlag handcraft value