Thu, 21 Aug 2008 15:32:24 BST CiteULike: benoitstpierre's artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/tag/artificial-cognition CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2771691 <i>(27 May 1987)</i><br /><br />Law and legal reasoning are a natural target for artificial intelligence systems. Like medical diagnosis and other tasks for expert systems, legal analysis is a matter of interpreting data in terms of higher-level concepts. But in law the data are more like those for a system aimed at understanding natural language: they tell a story about human events that may lead to a lawsuit. Statements of the law, too, are written in natural language and legal arguments are often arguments about what that language means or ought to mean.<br /> <br /> This study is one of the few research efforts in this fertile area. It is unique in developing a computational model for analyzing legal problems in a way that brings these strands of AI research together and makes sense from a jurisprudential perspective as well.<br /> <br /> Gardner first analyzes several positions in Anglo-American jurisprudence and their relevance for work in artificial intelligence. She identifies aspects of legal reasoning that any truly expert system in law must make a place for and suggests a way of decomposing the process of legal analysis that takes these aspects into account. She compares the resulting framework with those used by other legal analysis programs. A solid exposition of current AI techniques follows in chapters covering the author's system (written in Maclisp) for offer and acceptance problems, taken from law examinations, involved in contract law.<br /> <br /> Anne von der Lieth Gardner has a law degree and a Ph.D. in computer science, both from Stanford University. <i>An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning</i> inaugurates the series Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Processes and Models of Legal Reasoning, edited by L. Thorne McCarty and Edwina L. Rissland. A Bradford Book. An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning (Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning) Anne (27 May 1987) 2008-05-08T13:42:31-00:00 1987 The MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2452085 <i>Psychologie Francaise, Vol. 52, No. 3. (September 2007), pp. 279-297.</i><br /><br />Resume Les sciences cognitives sont a la fois un champ scientifique, un enjeu epistemologique et un lieu de confrontation institutionnelle entre plusieurs disciplines academiques. Dans ce contexte, la psychologie cognitive occupe une position historique et theorique centrale. Il est donc essentiel de situer precisement sa contribution a l'origine et au developpement des sciences cognitives. Cependant, pour certains, la psychologie cognitive pourrait se fondre dans la neuroscience cognitive dont les techniques d'imagerie cerebrale permettraient, a terme, de depasser l'obsedant probleme du dualisme cerveau-esprit. Pour d'autres, un tel pari epistemique ne peut etre tenu qu'en reduisant la cognition a ses etats et processus les plus elementaires. Le probleme de la reprensentation mentale (du sens et de la conscience) est alors invoque pour exclure une conception etroitement reductionniste de l'esprit au cerveau. Les sciences cognitives ne seront-elles donc qu'une simple etape de l'integration de la psychologie cognitive aux neurosciences cognitives ? Ou, au contraire, les autres disciplines constitutives des sciences cognitives seront-elles conduites a placer la psychologie cognitive au centre de leur programme de recherche et a en reconnaitre la specificite ? Le debat est en cours mais l'issue scientifique et institutionnelle incertaine. The cognitive sciences are all at once a scientific field with far-reaching epistemological implications and the locus of institutional confrontation between several academic disciplines. In this context, cognitive psychology occupies a key historical and theoretical position. It is therefore essential to clearly situate its contribution to the origin and the development of the cognitive sciences. For some, cognitive psychology may end up being dissolved by cognitive neuroscience, with its brain imaging techniques, which in the long run, should solve the age-old problem of brain-mind dualism. For others, this epistemic wager can only be won by reducing cognition to its most elementary states and processes. Here, the problem of mental representation (of meaning and consciousness) is brought to bear to rule out a view that strictly reduces the mind to the brain. Will the cognitive sciences, then, be nothing more than a mere stage in the integration of cognitive psychology into the cognitive neurosciences? Or on the contrary, will the other disciplines in the cognitive sciences be led to recognize the specificity of cognitive psychology and put it at the centre of their research program? The debate is underway, but the scientific and institutional outcome is uncertain. Entre neurosciences et neurophilosophie : la psychologie cognitive et les sciences cognitives G Tiberghien doi:10.1016/j.psfr.2007.05.001 Psychologie Francaise, Vol. 52, No. 3. (September 2007), pp. 279-297. 2008-03-01T15:29:43-00:00 2007 Psychologie Francaise 52 3 279 297 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2400610 <i></i><br /><br />this paper), let's dive in and play an infinite game --- a game we call, in deference to some recent investigations carried out by Robert McNaughton, "McNaught" (McNaughton, 1993). McNaught isn't a game like chess, mind you: chess, as we've noted, is after all a finite game, one handled quite well by ordinary computation, as even Dreyfus must now admit. We're talking about an infinite game; here's how it works. You will need a place-marker (a dime will do nicely), and the graph shown in Figure... Chess Isn't Tough Enough: Better Games for Mind-Machine Competition Selmer Bringsjord Adam Lally 2008-02-19T23:58:22-00:00 artificial-cognition chess turing-test http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2400608 <i>JETAI: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 10 (1998)</i><br /><br />In this paper I place Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of `zombie'), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. One, persons process information at a "super"-Turing level; two, people enjoy certain properties (e.g.,... Computationalism is Dead; Now What? Response to Fetzer's `Minds Are Not Computers: (Most) Thought Processes Are Not Computational Procedures' Bringsjord JETAI: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 10 (1998) 2008-02-19T23:57:32-00:00 1998 JETAI: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/2141232 <i>The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 21. (1964), pp. 668-691.</i> Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life? Hilary Putman Hilary Putnam The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 21. (1964), pp. 668-691. 2007-12-18T15:00:30-00:00 1964 The Journal of Philosophy 61 21 668 691 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1454411 <i>(28 August 1991)</i><br /><br />Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.<br /> <br /> Hilary Putnam is Walter Beverly Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard University. Representation and Reality (Representation and Mind) Hilary Putnam (28 August 1991) 2007-07-13T14:29:00-00:00 1991 The MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926889 <i>(1992), pp. 255-270.</i> Why Functionalism didn't Work Hilary Putnam (1992), pp. 255-270. 2007-11-16T16:10:42-00:00 1992 255 270 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926877 <i>(1988), pp. 241-268.</i> Artificial intelligence and psychoanalysis: a new alliance Sherry Turkle (1988), pp. 241-268. 2007-11-16T16:05:24-00:00 1988 241 268 MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926874 <i>(1988), pp. 45-64.</i> Natural and artificial intelligence Robert Sokolowski (1988), pp. 45-64. 2007-11-16T16:05:07-00:00 1988 45 64 MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926872 <i>(1988), pp. 283-295.</i> When philosophers encounter artificial intelligence Daniel Dennett (1988), pp. 283-295. 2007-11-16T16:04:50-00:00 1988 283 295 MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926870 <i>(1988), pp. 1-14.</i> One AI or many? Seymour Papert (1988), pp. 1-14. 2007-11-16T16:04:13-00:00 1988 1 14 MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926743 <i></i> Webb, B (2001) Can robots make good models of biological behaviour? 2007-11-16T15:31:42-00:00 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926673 <i>(1988), pp. 269-281.</i> Much ado about not very much Hilary Putnam (1988), pp. 269-281. 2007-11-16T15:04:05-00:00 1988 269 281 MIT Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926682 <i></i> Intelligence and the brain GJC Lokhorst 2007-11-16T15:06:42-00:00 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1926659 <i>(1991)</i> Analog Automata and the Foundation of Cognitive Science Gert-Jan Lokhorst (1991) 2007-11-16T14:58:32-00:00 1991 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1813038 <i>Commun. ACM, Vol. 19, No. 3. (March 1976), pp. 113-126.</i> Computer science as empirical inquiry: symbols and search Allen Newell Herbert Simon doi:10.1145/360018.360022 Commun. ACM, Vol. 19, No. 3. (March 1976), pp. 113-126. 2007-10-23T22:20:40-00:00 1976 Commun. ACM 0001-0782 19 3 113 126 ACM Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1656106 <i>(1976)</i> Fairytales Allan Newell (1976) 2007-09-14T13:29:03-00:00 1976 artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1586304 <i>(1994)</i> The Logical Foundations of Cognition (1994) 2007-08-23T15:54:50-00:00 1994 Oxford University Press artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1586291 <i>(2001), pp. 17-24.</i> Natural-born Cyborg? Andy Clark (2001), pp. 17-24. 2007-08-23T15:54:49-00:00 2001 17 24 Springer-Verlag artificial-cognition http://www.citeulike.org/user/benoitstpierre/article/1573962 <i>Cognition (1995)</i> SOAR and the case for unified theories of cognition Richard Cooper Tim Challice Cognition (1995) 2007-08-18T13:10:52-00:00 1995 Cognition artificial-cognition