Sat, 26 Jul 2008 06:18:13 BST CiteULike: deadman's library [38 articles] http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547779 <i></i> Learning to Legislate: The Senate Education of Arlen Specter Richard Fenno 2008-03-17T21:36:51-00:00 Cq Pr no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547775 <i>(01 August 1999)</i><br /><br /><i>Legislative Learning</i> breaks new theoretical and descriptive ground in examining the political perceptions, policy principles and power plays of the influential 104th Republican freshmen in the U.S. House. This even-handed book builds on the work of leading congressional scholars, and provides a detailed evaluation of coalition politics, freshmen style. Barnett shows how political environments can produce legislators who place a premium on their policy-making goals through a nuanced exploration of factors undergirding member perceptions, policy ambitions, class cohesion, and legislative learning. Legislative Learning: The 104th Republican Freshmen in the House (Garland Reference Library of Social Science) Timothy Barnett (01 August 1999) 2008-03-17T21:36:00-00:00 1999 Routledge no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547773 <i>(15 May 1989)</i><br /><br /><div>A study of the process by which members of Congress arrive at roll call voting decisions<br></div> Congressmen's Voting Decisions John Kingdon (15 May 1989) 2008-03-17T21:33:57-00:00 1989 University of Michigan Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547769 <i>(22 June 1998)</i><br /><br /><div>Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto or to put a halt to a filibuster. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an incisive account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, <i>Pivotal Politics</i> remakes our understanding of American lawmaking.<br></div> Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking Keith Krehbiel (22 June 1998) 2008-03-17T21:33:08-00:00 1998 University Of Chicago Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547765 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2. (1985), pp. 373-399.</i><br /><br />Current methods of roll-call analysis have practical as well as theoretical shortcomings. We propose here a method based on a spatial theory of voting that overcomes these problems. We apply metric multidimensional unfolding to interest-group ratings of members of Congress in order to obtain a Euclidean spatial configuration of congressmen. Each roll-call vote is then mapped into the configuration of members in a way consistent with spatial theory. Based on 190,000 ratings issued from 1959 to 1980, our empirical analysis demonstrates that a single liberal-conservative dimension accounts for more than 80% of the variance in the ratings. A second dimension, associated with party unity, accounts for 7% of the variance. Approximately 86% of all roll-call voting for the 22 years of our study is consistent with a simple one-dimensional spatial model. The votes that best fit the liberal-conservative dimension are drawn from the government management, social welfare, and foreign policy areas. The votes that best fit the two-dimensional configurations are drawn from the agricultural area. Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980 Keith Poole Steven Daniels The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2. (1985), pp. 373-399. 2008-03-17T21:29:30-00:00 1985 The American Political Science Review 79 2 373 399 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547763 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4. (1995), pp. 513-529.</i><br /><br />Using AFL-CIO COPE roll-call voting scores, we show that the voting behavior of a House member who moves to the Senate is virtually indistinguishable from the voting behavior of both the mean House member and the incumbent senator from the new senator's state and party, and that the representative's voting behavior exhibits little systematic change after moving from the House. Moreover, what change there is cannot generally be interpreted as a move in the direction of the state's median voter. However, the directionality of our results is consistent with the Glazer and Robins (1985a) finding that when their constituencies change, Democrats are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preferences unless it involves a shift to the left, while Republicans are likely to be unresponsive to a change in constituency policy preference unless it involves a shift to the right. House Members Who Become Senators: Learning from a 'Natural Experiment' in Representation Bernard Grofman Robert Griffin Gregory Berry Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4. (1995), pp. 513-529. 2008-03-17T21:28:55-00:00 1995 Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 4 513 529 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547762 <i>American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 3. (1996), pp. 768-786.</i><br /><br />A divergent platform spatial model is used to explain whether United States House members shift their legislative voting record toward a state party position as they approach a bid for the United States Senate. Any position shifting by candidates should be toward the state position and should begin well before the Senate race. There should be more movement toward the state position by winning candidates than by losing candidates and noncandidates. The average adjusted ADA score of United States Senators in the state and party is used to establish an estimate of a "winning" position for each party. The extent of position shifting is estimated through pooled time-series cross-section regressions for candidates and through individual regressions for each candidate, winning candidate, and noncandidate. House members who run for the Senate begin to shift toward the state position 13 years prior to running. Contrary to conventional wisdom, members are as likely, if not more so, to shift from the center to the left or right as they are from the extremes toward the center. Moderate Democrats move to the left. Moderate Republicans move to the right. Candidates were more likely to shift than noncandidates, and winners more than losers. Position Shifting in Pursuit of Higher Office Wayne Francis Lawrence Kenny American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 3. (1996), pp. 768-786. 2008-03-17T21:28:29-00:00 1996 American Journal of Political Science 40 3 768 786 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547761 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1. (1988), pp. 237-245.</i><br /><br />Do U.S. senators adjust their policy positions or voting behavior--engage in @'strategic moderation@'--in their quest for reelection? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Gerald Wright and Michael Berkman sought to demonstrate that Senate incumbents moderate their ideological positions as elections near. This endeavor was part of their larger effort to show the importance of policy issues in the selection of members of Congress. Robert Bernstein takes the view that the claims about strategic moderation rest on methodological flaws. But Wright and Berkman argue that most investigators agree on the general direction of senatorial candidate behavior. The controversy turns on conception and interpretation of analytical results. Do U.S. Senators Moderate Strategically? Robert Bernstein Gerald Wright Michael Berkman The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1. (1988), pp. 237-245. 2008-03-17T21:27:53-00:00 1988 The American Political Science Review 82 1 237 245 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547620 <i></i> The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics John Aldrich David Rohde 2008-03-17T19:53:42-00:00 conditional http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547596 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2. (1981), pp. 411-425.</i><br /><br />This article deals with the transition in House leadership from Cannon to Rayburn. The transition involved moving from a hierarchical pattern of leadership to a bargaining pattern. In accounting for this transition, we argue that it is the institutional context of the House that determines leadership power and style. Moreover, we argue that there is no straightforward relationship between leadership style and effectiveness; rather, style and effectiveness are contingent or situational. We conclude that the impact of institutional context on leadership behavior is itself primarily determined by party strength. When party strength is high, power is concentrated and leaders are task- or goal-oriented, whereas when party strength is low, power is dispersed and leaders will be oriented to bargaining and maintaining relationships. Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn Joseph Cooper David Brady The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2. (1981), pp. 411-425. 2008-03-17T19:43:33-00:00 1981 The American Political Science Review 75 2 411 425 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2547455 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 3. (2000), pp. 665-676.</i><br /><br />The proposed model predicts that voting behavior of legislators is more variable early in their career and that junior members are more likely to vote with their party than senior members. The results from the analysis of voting patterns in the House of Representatives and the Senate are consistent with the hypotheses: Party line voting and variability of voting decisions decline with increasing seniority. Changes in voting behavior are also induced by redistricting. The empirical results show that legislators subject to redistricting change their voting behavior to accord better with altered constituency preferences. Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints Thomas Stratmann The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 3. (2000), pp. 665-676. 2008-03-17T18:32:16-00:00 2000 The American Political Science Review 94 3 665 676 freshmen http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2542543 <i>The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1. (1993), pp. 239-242.</i> [Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. (David W. Rohde)] Lawrence Evans The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1. (1993), pp. 239-242. 2008-03-16T21:04:26-00:00 1993 The Journal of Politics 55 1 239 242 review rohde http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2542538 <i></i> [Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (David W. Rhode)] William Connelly 2008-03-16T21:02:51-00:00 review rohde http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2364029 <i>The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2. (1998), pp. 541-543.</i> [Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (Keith T. Poole; Howard Rosenthal)] Janet Martin The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2. (1998), pp. 541-543. 2008-02-11T22:30:29-00:00 1998 The Journal of Politics 60 2 541 543 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360459 <i>(2000)</i> Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan era (2000) 2008-02-10T22:39:23-00:00 2000 CQ Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360456 <i>American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2. (2000), pp. 193-211.</i> Estimating party influence in congressional roll-call voting JM Snyder T Groseclose American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2. (2000), pp. 193-211. 2008-02-10T22:36:15-00:00 2000 American Journal of Political Science 44 2 193 211 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360453 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (200), pp. 193-215.</i> Positive theories of congressional parties SS Smith Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2. (200), pp. 193-215. 2008-02-10T22:33:40-00:00 Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 2 193 215 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360444 <i>The Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 3. (1999), pp. 815-831.</i> Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party Sarah Binder Eric Lawrence Forrest Maltzmann The Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 3. (1999), pp. 815-831. 2008-02-10T22:28:58-00:00 1999 The Journal of Politics 61 3 815 831 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360435 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3. (2005), pp. 365-389.</i> Parties as procedural coalitions in congress: An examination of differing career tracks JA Jenkins MH Crespin JL Carson Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3. (2005), pp. 365-389. 2008-02-10T22:23:47-00:00 2005 Legislative Studies Quarterly 30 3 365 389 cartel parties party theory http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360431 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1. (2006), pp. 33-69.</i> Who wins? Party effects in legislative voting ED Lawrence F Maltzman SS Smith Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1. (2006), pp. 33-69. 2008-02-10T22:19:52-00:00 2006 Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 1 33 69 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360428 <i>American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2. (2004), pp. 355-370.</i> The statistical analysis of roll call data J Clinton S Jackman D Rivers American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2. (2004), pp. 355-370. 2008-02-10T22:16:34-00:00 2004 American Political Science Review 98 2 355 370 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360424 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4. (2004), pp. 569-590.</i> Preferences, partisanship, and whip activity in the US house of representatives BC Burden TM Frisby Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4. (2004), pp. 569-590. 2008-02-10T22:12:17-00:00 2004 Legislative Studies Quarterly 29 4 569 590 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360420 <i>Public Choice, Vol. 131, No. 3-4. (2007), pp. 435-451.</i> Changing minds? Not in Congress! Keith Poole Public Choice, Vol. 131, No. 3-4. (2007), pp. 435-451. 2008-02-10T22:07:23-00:00 2007 Public Choice 131 3-4 435 451 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360414 <i>American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 3. (2007), pp. 464-481.</i> Strategic party government: Party influence in congress, 1789-2000 Matthew Lebo Adam Mcglynn Gregory Koger American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 3. (2007), pp. 464-481. 2008-02-10T21:59:43-00:00 2007 American Journal of Political Science 51 3 464 481 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360405 <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3. (2007), pp. 341-360.</i> The statistical analysis of Roll-call data: A cautionary tale Jason Roberts Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3. (2007), pp. 341-360. 2008-02-10T21:54:35-00:00 2007 Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 3 341 360 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360403 <i>LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 31, No. 1., pp. 71-104.</i> How strong should our party be? Party member preferences over party cohesion C Volden E Bergman LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 31, No. 1., pp. 71-104. 2008-02-10T21:51:31-00:00 LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY 31 1 71 104 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360398 <i>Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1. (2007), pp. 1-23.</i> Partisan roll rates in a nonpartisan legislature Keith Krehbiel Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1. (2007), pp. 1-23. 2008-02-10T21:46:09-00:00 2007 Journal of Law Economics and Organization 23 1 1 23 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/1364758 <i>LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 32, No. 1. (2007), pp. 59-77.</i> Vote switchers and party influence in the US house Garry Young Vicky Wilkins LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. 32, No. 1. (2007), pp. 59-77. 2007-06-04T21:53:35-00:00 2007 LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY 32 1 59 77 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360384 <i>(1974)</i> Congress : the electoral connection David Mayhew (1974) 2008-02-10T21:28:20-00:00 1974 Yale University Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360371 <i>(1995)</i> Legislators, leaders, and lawmaking : the U.S. House of Representatives in the postreform era Barbara Sinclair (1995) 2008-02-10T21:18:35-00:00 1995 Johns Hopkins University Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360368 <i>(1991)</i> Parties and leaders in the postreform house David Rohde (1991) 2008-02-10T21:15:14-00:00 1991 University of Chicago Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360364 <i>(1993)</i> Legislative leviathan : party government in the House Gary Cox Mathew Mccubbins (1993) 2008-02-10T21:11:45-00:00 1993 University of California Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360358 <i>(1997)</i> Congress : a political-economic history of roll call voting Keith Poole Howard (1997) 2008-02-10T21:05:05-00:00 1997 Oxford University Press no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360349 <i>British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (1993), pp. 235-266.</i><br /><br />Political parties are prominent in legislative politics and legislative research. Using data from the 99th Congress, this article assesses the degree to which significant party behaviour - defined and operationalized as behaviour that is independent of preferences - occurs in two key stages of legislative organization: the formation of standing committees and the appointment of conferees. Four hypotheses are developed and tested. When controlling for preferences and other hypothesized effects, positive and significant party effects are rare. A discussion addresses some criticisms of this unorthodox approach and attempts to reconcile some differences between these and previous findings. Where's the Party? Keith Krehbiel British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (1993), pp. 235-266. 2008-02-10T20:57:09-00:00 1993 British Journal of Political Science 23 2 235 266 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360340 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 673-687.</i><br /><br />We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator's ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-Groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress Nolan Mccarty Keith Poole Howard Rosenthal The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 673-687. 2008-02-10T20:51:28-00:00 2001 The American Political Science Review 95 3 673 687 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360330 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 2. (2002), pp. 367-379.</i><br /><br />American legislative studies in recent years have been occupied to a large degree with the question of the effects of political parties on the policy behavior of elected legislators, with most of the research focusing on the U.S. Congress. We undertake a comparative analysis of state legislatures for a window into the character and extent of party's effects. Specifically, we compare the impact of party on the partisan polarization and dimensionality of campaign issue stances and roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the largely comparable, though nonpartisan, Nebraska Unicameral. This comparison offers us a nice quasi-experiment to assess the impact of party by establishing a baseline condition in Nebraska for what happens when party is absent. We argue that party lends order to conflict, producing the ideological low-dimensional space that is a trademark of American politics. Where parties are not active in the legislature-Nebraska is our test case-the clear structure found in partisan politics disappears. This works to sever the connection between voters and their elected representatives and, with it, the likelihood of electoral accountability that is essential for the health of liberal democracy. The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures Gerald Wright Brian Schaffner The American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 2. (2002), pp. 367-379. 2008-02-10T20:43:01-00:00 2002 The American Political Science Review 96 2 367 379 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360311 <i>American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3. (2002), pp. 477-489.</i><br /><br />We propose a method of assessing party influence, based on a spatial model. Our method provides the first test of whether observed values of the widely-used Rice index of party dissimilarity are consistent with a "party-less" null model. It also avoids problems that beset previous estimators. Substantively, we find evidence of party influence in all but one Congress since 1877. Moreover, our indicator of party pressure is systematically higher for the sorts of roll calls that party theorists believe are more pressured-procedural, organizational, and label-defining votes. Our results refute the widespread notion that parties in the House have typically had negligible influence on roll-call voting behavior. They also document important changes in party influence associated with the packing of the Rules Committee in 1961 and the procedural reforms of 1973. On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999 Gary Cox Keith Poole American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3. (2002), pp. 477-489. 2008-02-10T20:21:49-00:00 2002 American Journal of Political Science 46 3 477 489 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/deadman/article/2360251 <i>Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1. (2002), pp. 333-367.</i> Landmarks in the Study of Congress since 1945 Nelson Polsby Eric Schickler Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1. (2002), pp. 333-367. 2008-02-10T19:39:58-00:00 2002 Annual Review of Political Science 5 1 333 367 review