Thu, 21 Aug 2008 07:09:23 BST CiteULike: guererk's Walker http://www.citeulike.org/user/guererk/author/Walker CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/guererk/article/1188290 <i>Public Choice, Vol. 106, No. 1. (1 January 2001), pp. 137-155.</i> Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play TK Ahn Elinor Ostrom David Schmidt Robert Shupp James Walker doi:10.1023/A:1005219123532 Public Choice, Vol. 106, No. 1. (1 January 2001), pp. 137-155. 2007-03-26T16:41:27-00:00 2001 Public Choice 106 1 137 155 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/guererk/article/1077227 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (1992), pp. 404-417.</i><br /><br />Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other). Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible Elinor Ostrom James Walker Roy Gardner The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (1992), pp. 404-417. 2007-01-30T19:43:46-00:00 1992 The American Political Science Review 86 2 404 417 no-tag