CiteULike: hardin's library [29 articles] http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2564238 <i>Nature, Vol. 452, No. 7185. (20 March 2008), pp. 348-351.</i> Winners don/'t punish Anna Dreber David Rand Drew Fudenberg Martin Nowak doi:10.1038/nature06723 Nature, Vol. 452, No. 7185. (20 March 2008), pp. 348-351. 2008-03-19T21:27:06-00:00 Nature 452 7185 348 351 Nature Publishing Group punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/898673 <i>Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Vol. 103, No. 11. (14 March 2006), pp. 3994-3998.</i><br /><br />Maintaining the Earth's climate within habitable boundaries is probably the greatest "public goods game" played by humans. However, with >6 billion "players" taking part, the game seems to rule out individual altruistic behavior. Thus, climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse, a "tragedy of the commons" problem that emerges in many social dilemmas. We perform a previously undescribed type of public goods experiment with human subjects contributing to a public pool. In contrast to the standard protocol, here the common pool is not divided among the participants; instead, it is promised that the pool will be invested to encourage people to reduce their fossil fuel use. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that players can behave altruistically to maintain the Earth's climate given the right set of circumstances. We find a nonzero basic level of altruistic behavior, which is enhanced if the players are provided with expert information describing the state of knowledge in climate research. Furthermore, personal investments in climate protection increase substantially if players can invest publicly, thus gaining social reputation. This increase occurs because subjects reward other subjects' contributions to sustaining the climate, thus reinforcing their altruism. Therefore, altruism may convert to net personal benefit and to relaxing the dilemma if the gain in reputation is large enough. Our finding that people reward contributions to sustaining the climate of others is a surprising result. There are obvious ways these unexpected findings can be applied on a large scale. Stabilizing the earth's climate is not a losing game: supporting evidence from public goods experiments. M Milinski D Semmann HJ Krambeck J Marotzke doi:10.1073/pnas.0504902103 Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, Vol. 103, No. 11. (14 March 2006), pp. 3994-3998. 2006-10-16T02:15:03-00:00 Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 0027-8424 103 11 3994 3998 common_pool public_goods http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2594230 <i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 61, No. 3. (March 1995), pp. 225-238.</i><br /><br />We report the results of three experiments in which groups of players share a common resource pool whose size is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. We study a new information structure - called the positional order protocol - under which requests are made in an exogenously determined and commonly known order without disclosing the requests of previous players in the sequence. Mean individual requests under this protocol of play are compared with data gathered under the more familiar simultaneous protocol (simultaneously made requests) and sequential protocol (sequentially made requests with full disclosure of previous requests). Previously reported effects of the resource uncertainty on individual requests obtained under the simultaneous and sequential protocols are generalized across different group sizes. In contrast to the game-theoretical prediction, which does not distinguish between the simultaneous and positional order protocols, mean individual requests and position in the sequence are highly and significantly correlated. We conclude that position effects can be induced by temporal priority, even in the absence of differential information. Positional Order and Group Size Effects in Resource Dilemmas with Uncertain Resources David Budescu Ramzi Suleiman Amnon Rapoport doi:10.1006/obhd.1995.1018 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 61, No. 3. (March 1995), pp. 225-238. 2008-03-26T13:54:32-00:00 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 61 3 225 238 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2599188 <i>Group Processes Intergroup Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3. (1 July 2003), pp. 265-283.</i><br /><br />This study investigated the effect of group size uncertainty in a single-stage step-level common pool resource dilemma under a sequential (SEQ) and a Self-paced Sequential (SPS) protocol of play. In the uncertain group size condition, participants were told that their group was equally likely to be any size between three and seven persons. In the certain group size condition, the group size was always five. In the SEQ protocol, decisions were made in a pre-specified order such that each player knew his or her position in the sequence, as well as the combined requests of all the preceding players in the sequence. In the SPS protocol, participants could choose when to make their decisions. In both protocols, we replicated the position effects--individual requests are inversely related to the players' positions in the sequence with the first mover requesting most, and the last mover requesting the least. We also found that the position effect was stronger in SEQ than in SPS, and when group size was certain than when it was not. Relative to group size certainty, group size uncertainty decreased total requests and increased provision rates. 10.1177/13684302030063004 Effects of Group Size Uncertainty and Protocol of Play in a Common Pool Resource Dilemma Wing Au Man Ngai doi:10.1177/13684302030063004 Group Processes Intergroup Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3. (1 July 2003), pp. 265-283. 2008-03-26T17:01:00-00:00 Group Processes Intergroup Relations 6 3 265 283 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2599187 <i>Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2002), pp. 37-63.</i><br /><br />Experimental games are often used as models of social dilemmas in which small groups of players have unrestricted access to, and share, a common and finite resource of desirable goods in the absence of any binding coordination mechanism. Examples are fishing, hunting, and use of computational facilities. Experimental studies of social dilemmas employ different protocols of play that differ from each other in terms of the information available to the players when they register their requests from the common resource. In this study we focus on the sequential protocol, where each participant has complete information about his or her position and the total requests of the previous movers, and the positional protocol, where each player only knows his or her position, but has no information about the other's requests. Previous research has found a robust position effect: individual requests are inversely related to the players' positions in the sequence with the first mover requesting most, and the last mover requesting the least. In an attempt to characterize the nature and intensity of the position effect, we developed and tested a descriptive model with one free (individual specific) parameter. The parameter is estimated from the players' requests under the positional protocol (i.e. in the absence of any information about the other's requests) and, as such, quantifies the social norm of A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas David Budescu Wing Au doi:10.1002/bdm.402 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 1. (2002), pp. 37-63. 2008-03-26T17:00:02-00:00 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 15 1 37 63 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2587916 <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 19, No. 3. (November 1990), pp. 203-211.</i><br /><br />This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using experimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns from appropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm the prediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasing investment capital available to appropriators. Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence James Walker Roy Gardner Elinor Ostrom doi:10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 19, No. 3. (November 1990), pp. 203-211. 2008-03-25T23:51:56-00:00 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19 3 203 211 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2587857 <i>World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10. (October 2000), pp. 1719-1733.</i><br /><br />Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out Juan Cardenas John Stranlund Cleve Willis doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3 World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10. (October 2000), pp. 1719-1733. 2008-03-25T23:20:06-00:00 World Development 28 10 1719 1733 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2587846 <i>Environment, Development and Sustainability, Vol. 2, No. 3. (2000), pp. 305-322.</i><br /><br />The use of experimental settings to observe human behaviour in a controlled environment of incentives, rules and institutions, has been widely used by the behavioural sciences for sometime now, particularly by psychology and economics. In most cases the subjects are college students recruited for one to two hour decision making exercises in which, depending on their choices, they earn cash averaging US$ 20. In such exercises players face a set of feasible actions, rules and incentives (payoffs) involving different forms of social exchange with other people, and that in most cases involve some kind of externalities with incomplete contracts, such as in the case of common-pool resources situations. Depending on the ecological and institutional settings, the resource users face a set of feasible levels of extraction, a set of rules regarding the control or monitoring of individual use, and sometimes ways of imposing material or non-material costs or rewards to those breaking or following the rules. We brought the experimental lab to the field and invited about two hundred users of natural resources in three Colombian rural villages to participate in such decision making exercises and through these and other research instruments we learned about the ways they solve - or fail to - tragedies of the commons with different social institutions. Further, bringing the lab to the field allowed us to explore some of the limitations of existing models about human behaviour and its consequences for designing policies for conserving ecosystems and improving social welfare. How Do Groups Solve Local Commons Dilemmas? Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field Juan-Camilo Cardenas doi:10.1023/A:1011422313042 Environment, Development and Sustainability, Vol. 2, No. 3. (2000), pp. 305-322. 2008-03-25T23:15:26-00:00 Environment, Development and Sustainability 2 3 305 322 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1077102 <i>PNAS, Vol. 103, No. 51. (19 December 2006), pp. 19224-19231.</i><br /><br />Governing natural resources sustainably is a continuing struggle. Major debates occur over what types of policy "interventions" best protect forests, with choices of property and land tenure systems being central issues. Herein, we provide an overview of findings from a long-term interdisciplinary, multiscale, international research program that analyzes the institutional factors affecting forests managed under a variety of tenure arrangements. This program analyzes satellite images, conducts social-ecological measurements on the ground, and tests the impact of structural variables on human decisions in experimental laboratories. Satellite images track the landscape dimensions of forest-cover change within different management regimes over time. On-the-ground social-ecological studies examine relationships between forest conditions and types of institutions. Behavioral studies under controlled laboratory conditions enhance our understanding of explicit changes in structure that affect relevant human decisions. Evidence from all three research methods challenges the presumption that a single governance arrangement will control overharvesting in all settings. When users are genuinely engaged in decisions regarding rules affecting their use, the likelihood of them following the rules and monitoring others is much greater than when an authority simply imposes rules. Our results support a frontier of research on the most effective institutional and tenure arrangements for protecting forests. They move the debate beyond the boundaries of protected areas into larger landscapes where government, community, and comanaged protected areas are embedded and help us understand when and why deforestation and regrowth occur in specific regions within these larger landscapes. 10.1073/pnas.0607962103 Inaugural Article: Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory Elinor Ostrom Harini Nagendra doi:10.1073/pnas.0607962103 PNAS, Vol. 103, No. 51. (19 December 2006), pp. 19224-19231. 2007-01-30T19:21:48-00:00 PNAS 103 51 19224 19231 forrest http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1077227 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (1992), pp. 404-417.</i><br /><br />Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other). Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible Elinor Ostrom James Walker Roy Gardner The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (1992), pp. 404-417. 2007-01-30T19:43:46-00:00 The American Political Science Review 86 2 404 417 common_pool punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2582811 <i>Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 1. (2007), pp. 43-64.</i><br /><br />Abstract Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation have emphasized the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation have emphasized incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here, we develop a general approach--the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach--showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the microfoundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals. Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations Ernst Fehr Herbert Gintis doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812 Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 1. (2007), pp. 43-64. 2008-03-24T21:17:20-00:00 Annual Review of Sociology 33 1 43 64 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2582806 <i>The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4. (1993), pp. 93-112.</i> Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work Elinor Ostrom Roy Gardner The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4. (1993), pp. 93-112. 2008-03-24T21:15:20-00:00 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 4 93 112 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1309030 <i>The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2000), pp. 137-158.</i> Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms Elinor Ostrom The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2000), pp. 137-158. 2007-05-19T08:27:59-00:00 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 3 137 158 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/849771 <i>The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2000), pp. 159-181.</i> Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity Ernst Fehr Simon Gachter The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3. (2000), pp. 159-181. 2006-09-19T14:25:07-00:00 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 3 159 181 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2504707 <i>Science, Vol. 319, No. 5868. (7 March 2008), pp. 1345-1346.</i><br /><br />10.1126/science.1155333 BEHAVIOR: Punishment and Cooperation Herbert Gintis doi:10.1126/science.1155333 Science, Vol. 319, No. 5868. (7 March 2008), pp. 1345-1346. 2008-03-10T22:22:22-00:00 Science 319 5868 1345 1346 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2527852 <i>Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2. (1997), pp. 118-137.</i><br /><br />We examine whether public goods and common pool resources generate equivalent levels of cooperation when the payoffs are the same. Two theoretical perspectives seem to contradict each other on the equivalence issue. Prospect theory implies that settings involving common pool resources should generate higher levels of cooperation than settings involving public goods; expected utility theory implies that the two settings should generate the same levels of cooperation. We conduct three experiments to examine the predictions of nonequivalence by prospect theory, and find that common pool resources generate higher levels of cooperation on first trials in both static and dynamic contexts. If no interaction with other group members is added, the higher leves of cooperation in resource settings remain in static settings. In dynamic settings, however, where resourse itself changes, the higher levels of cooperation in resorce settings are short-lived. In both dynamic and static settings, the addition of group interaction seems to eliminate the initial differences in levels of cooperation. Comparing Public Goods with Common Pool Resources: Three Experiments Jane Sell Yeongi Son Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2. (1997), pp. 118-137. 2008-03-13T15:48:28-00:00 Social Psychology Quarterly 60 2 118 137 comparison http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2527832 <i>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2. (June 2003), pp. 217-247.</i><br /><br />For centuries, villages in the Alps employed a special system for managing their common properties. Individual users could inspect other users at their own cost and impose a predetermined sanction (a fine) when a free rider was discovered. The fine was paid to the user who found a violator. Experiments with the institutions demonstrate that this mechanism considerably improves efficiency of resource use. The classical model of identical selfish agents does not capture the data as well as a model with heterogeneous and linear other-regarding preferences. Altruism and especially potentially dysfunctional behavior, such as spite and mistakes, play important positive roles. Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution Marco Casari Charles Plott doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00098-7 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2. (June 2003), pp. 217-247. 2008-03-13T15:40:01-00:00 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 51 2 217 247 common_pool http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/833563 <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 5. (1 October 2006), pp. 646-663.</i><br /><br />Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, the authors argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, they experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto-optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges quickly to the respective Nash equilibrium. 10.1177/0022002706290433 The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods Versus Common-Pool Resources Jose Apesteguia Frank Maier-Rigaud doi:10.1177/0022002706290433 Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 5. (1 October 2006), pp. 646-663. 2006-09-07T10:59:09-00:00 Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 5 646 663 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2486357 <i>Science, Vol. 319, No. 5868. (7 March 2008), pp. 1362-1367.</i><br /><br />We document the widespread existence of antisocial punishment, that is, the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially. Our evidence comes from public goods experiments that we conducted in 16 comparable participant pools around the world. However, there is a huge cross-societal variation. Some participant pools punished the high contributors as much as they punished the low contributors, whereas in others people only punished low contributors. In some participant pools, antisocial punishment was strong enough to remove the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. We also show that weak norms of civic cooperation and the weakness of the rule of law in a country are significant predictors of antisocial punishment. Our results show that punishment opportunities are socially beneficial only if complemented by strong social norms of cooperation. 10.1126/science.1153808 Antisocial Punishment Across Societies Benedikt Herrmann Christian Thoni Simon Gachter doi:10.1126/science.1153808 Science, Vol. 319, No. 5868. (7 March 2008), pp. 1362-1367. 2008-03-07T17:54:27-00:00 Science 319 5868 1362 1367 punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1580293 <i>Economic Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1. (20 October 2007), pp. 145-167.</i><br /><br />Abstract  We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment Laurent Denant-Boemont David Masclet Charles Noussair doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0 Economic Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1. (20 October 2007), pp. 145-167. 2007-08-21T14:05:05-00:00 Economic Theory 33 1 145 167 punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2517502 <i>Economic Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 4. (2007), pp. 671-690.</i><br /><br />A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92) THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS Martin Sefton Robert Shupp James Walker doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x Economic Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 4. (2007), pp. 671-690. 2008-03-12T03:02:18-00:00 Economic Inquiry 45 4 671 690 punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/243749 <i>Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2. (June 2005), pp. 107-115.</i> On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments Marco Casari doi:10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9 Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2. (June 2005), pp. 107-115. 2005-07-03T05:16:41-00:00 Experimental Economics 1386-4157 8 2 107 115 Kluwer Academic Publishers punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1309321 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 663-672.</i><br /><br />According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria. Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox Joan Esteban Debraj Ray The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 663-672. 2007-05-19T17:29:31-00:00 The American Political Science Review 95 3 663 672 group_size http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2515326 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 2. (1974), pp. 707-716.</i> Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size John Chamberlin The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 2. (1974), pp. 707-716. 2008-03-11T15:25:56-00:00 The American Political Science Review 68 2 707 716 group_size http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2505223 <i>The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 6. (1979), pp. 1335-1360.</i><br /><br />For an experiment on the problem of collective action, randomly selected high school students were randomly assigned to groups which were confronted with an investment opportunity. Each subject could invest resources provided by the experimenter in either a private good, which returned a fixed amount of money to the individual per token invested, or a public good. The public good returned money to the group and, beyond a given provision point, returned much more money per token invested than did the private good. All money from the public good was divided according to a present formula. Thus, subjects could "free ride" on the public good, if other group members invested in it, by taking their share of it and keeping their own resources for themselves. Groups were randomly designated as either large or small, and unequal or equal in the distribution of interest and of resources within the group. Results indicate that the effects of free riding were much weaker than would be predicted from most economic theory. As predicted from the theory, however, small groups containing an individual whose interest in the public good exceeded the cost of its provision (i.e., small, unequal-interest groups) invested more in the public good than any other type of group. No additional significant effects of group size or interest or resource distribution were found. Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem Gerald Marwell Ruth Ames The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 6. (1979), pp. 1335-1360. 2008-03-11T01:37:09-00:00 The American Journal of Sociology 84 6 1335 1360 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2505198 <i>The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 4. (1980), pp. 926-937.</i><br /><br />Our recent experimental research called into question the predictive utility of the free-rider hypothesis regarding the provision of public goods by groups. However, several critical questions regarding the generality of the findings may be raised. This paper reports three systematic replications of the previous research which deal with the most pressing of these questions. Study I shows that the presence of a "provision point" in the payoff structure does not substantially affect the results. Study II indicates that a fivefold increase in the amount of money at stake in the relevant decision does affect behavior but not sufficiently to salvage a strong version of the free-rider hypothesis. Study III shows that experienced subjects do not behave very differently from inexperienced ones in this situation. Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem Gerald Marwell Ruth Ames The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 4. (1980), pp. 926-937. 2008-03-11T01:30:34-00:00 The American Journal of Sociology 85 4 926 937 no-tag http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2481217 <i>pp. 671-690.</i><br /><br />A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92) THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS Martin Sefton pp. 671-690. 2008-03-07T01:27:25-00:00 671 690 public_goods punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/91544 <i>Nature, Vol. 415, No. 6868. (10 January 2002), pp. 137-140.</i> Altruistic punishment in humans Ernst Fehr Simon Gachter doi:10.1038/415137a Nature, Vol. 415, No. 6868. (10 January 2002), pp. 137-140. 2005-02-10T02:07:32-00:00 Nature 415 6868 137 140 publc_good punishment http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2480876 <i>The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 5. (1993), pp. 1317-1327.</i><br /><br />This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods. An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis James Andreoni The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 5. (1993), pp. 1317-1327. 2008-03-06T23:27:25-00:00 The American Economic Review 83 5 1317 1327 group_size public_goods