CiteULike: hardin's Walker

Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence

James Walker — 2008-03-25T23:51:56-00:00

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 19, No. 3. (November 1990), pp. 203-211.

This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using experimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns from appropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm the prediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasing investment capital available to appropriators.

Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible

Elinor Ostrom — 2007-01-30T19:43:46-00:00

The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 2. (1992), pp. 404-417.

Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other).

THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Martin Sefton — 2008-03-12T03:02:18-00:00

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 4. (2007), pp. 671-690.

A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92)