CiteULike: kyrrew's library [9 articles]

Virtual entrepreneurs and 'griefers' spoil the fantasy of online worlds

Jim Giles — 2007-08-29T17:25:16-00:00

New Scientist, No. 2619. (1 September 2007), 28.

IT SHOULD have been a coming-of-age moment. In December 2006, Anshe Chung, the most prominent of Second Life's entrepreneurs, was interviewed about her burgeoning property portfolio[84], which she says is worth more than $1 million. It was a milestone to mark the emergence of a mature and corporate side to virtual worlds. But then, for a full 15 minutes, the virtual room in which she was being interviewed was invaded by flying penises[85].

Apomorphine-induced penile erection and yawning: site of action in brain.

MR Melis — 2007-08-21T12:15:44-00:00

Brain Res, Vol. 415, No. 1. (7 July 1987), pp. 98-104.

Microinjection of the dopamine (DA) agonist apomorphine into the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus (PVN) induced penile erection and yawning in rats. A significant effect was elicited by a dose of apomorphine as low as 5 ng. The symptomatology usually began within 5 min after the microinjection, lasted for 30-50 min, and was identical to that induced by the systemic administration of the drug. Stereotypy and hypermotility were never observed after apomorphine microinjection into the PVN, even at the highest dose tested (1 microgram). Microinjections of the same doses of apomorphine into the hypothalamic ventromedial and dorsomedial nucleus, preoptic area, caudate nucleus, nucleus accumbens and substantia nigra, were ineffective. LY 171555, a specific D2 Da receptor agonist, and (+)-3-PPP, but not (-)-3-PPP nor the specific D1 DA receptor agonist SKF 38393, were as effective as apomorphine when injected into the PVN. Apomorphine-induced penile erection and yawning were antagonized by pretreatment with neuroleptic drugs, such as haloperidol, (-)-sulpiride, a specific D2 DA antagonist, and SCH 23390, a specific D1 DA antagonist. The present results suggest that the PVN is the brain area where D2 DA agonists act to induce penile erection and yawning. Moreover, since the PVN contains the cell bodies of a group of incerto-hypothalamic DA neurons, the above results suggest for the first time a possible involvement of the incerto-hypothalamic DA system in the expression of penile erection and yawning.

Contagious yawning: the role of self-awareness and mental state attribution.

SM Platek — 2007-08-21T00:23:54-00:00

Brain Res Cogn Brain Res, Vol. 17, No. 2. (July 2003), pp. 223-227.

Contagious yawning is a common, but poorly understood phenomenon. We hypothesized that contagious yawning is part of a more general phenomenon known as mental state attribution (i.e. the ability to inferentially model the mental states of others). To test this hypothesis we compared susceptibility to contagiously yawn with performance on a self-face recognition task, several theory of mind stories, and on a measure of schizotypal personality traits. Consistent with the hypothesis, susceptibility to contagiously yawn was positively related to performance on self-face recognition and faux pas theory of mind stories, and negatively related to schizotypal personality traits. These data suggest that contagious yawning may be associated with empathic aspects of mental state attribution and are negatively affected by increases in schizotypal personality traits much like other self-processing related tasks.

Cognitive architecture and descent with modification

Gary Marcus — 2006-11-01T14:55:15-00:00

Cognition, Vol. 101, No. 2. (September 2006), pp. 443-465.

Against a background of recent progress in developmental neuroscience, some of which has been taken as challenging to the modularity hypothesis of Fodor (1983), this article contrasts two competing conceptions of modularity: sui generis modularity, according to which modules are treated as independent neurocognitive entities that owe nothing to one another, and descent-with-modification modularity, according to which current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. I argue that sui generis modularity is incompatible with a range of data, from the co-occurrence of deficits to the patterns of activation in neuroimaging studies, but that same range of data is compatible with descent-with-modification modularity. Furthermore, I argue that the latter conception of modularity may have important implications for the practice and conception of fields such as developmental disorders and linguistics.

The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology

Gerrans — 2006-09-06T11:22:57-00:00

pp. 305-321.

Evolutionary Psychology is based on the idea that the mind is a set of special purpose thinking devices or modules whose domain-specific structure is an adaptation to ancestral environments. The modular view of the mind is an uncontroversial description of the periphery of the mind, the input-output sensorimotor and affective subsystems. The novelty of EP is the claim that higher order cognitive processes also exhibit a modular structure. Autism is a primary case study here, interpreted as a developmental failure of a module devoted to social intelligence or Theory of Mind. In this article I reappraise the arguments for innate modularity of TOM and argue that they fail. TOM ability is a consequence of domain general development scaffolded by early, innately specified, sensorimotor abilities. The alleged Modularity of TOM results from interpreting the outcome of developmental failures characteristic of autism at too high a level of cognitive abstraction.

The eloquent ape: genes, brains and the evolution of language

Simon Fisher — 2005-12-21T22:57:49-00:00

Nature Reviews Genetics, Vol. 7, No. 1., pp. 9-20.

Web 2.0: hypertext by any other name?

David Millard — 2006-11-05T16:34:49-00:00

(2006), pp. 27-30.

Neural substrates for functionally discriminating self-face from personally familiar faces

Steven Platek — 2006-11-10T19:47:48-00:00

Human Brain Mapping, Vol. 27, No. 2. (2006), pp. 91-98.

Understanding the neurobiological substrates of self-recognition yields important insight into socially and clinically critical cognitive functions such as theory of mind. Experimental evidence suggests that right frontal and parietal lobes preferentially process self-referent information. Recognition of one's own face is an important parameter of self-recognition, but well-controlled experimental data on the brain substrates of self-face recognition is limited. The goal of this study was to characterize the activation specific to self-face in comparison with control conditions of two levels of familiarity: unknown unfamiliar face and the more stringent control of a personally familiar face. We studied 12 healthy volunteers who made ?unknown,? ?familiar,? and ?self? judgments about photographs of three types of faces: six different novel faces, a personally familiar face (participant's fraternity brother), and their own face during an event-related functional MRI (fMRI) experiment. Contrasting unknown faces with baseline showed activation of the inferior occipital lobe, which supports previous findings suggesting the presence of a generalized face-processing area within the inferior occipital-temporal region. Activation in response to a familiar face, when contrasted with an unknown face, invoked insula, middle temporal, inferior parietal, and medial frontal lobe activation, which is consistent with an existing hypothesis suggesting familiar face recognition taps neural substrates that are different from those involved in general facial processing. Brain response to self-face, when contrasted with familiar face, revealed activation in the right superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal and inferior parietal lobes, and left middle temporal gyrus. The contrast familiar vs. self produced activation only in the anterior cingulate gyrus. Our results support the existence of a bilateral network for both perceptual and executive aspects of self-face processing that cannot be accounted for by a simple hemispheric dominance model. This network is similar to those implicated in social cognition, mirror neuron matching, and face-name matching. Our findings also show that some regions of the medial frontal and parietal lobes are specifically activated by familiar faces but not unknown or self-faces, indicating that these regions may serve as markers of face familiarity and that the differences between activation associated with self-face recognition and familiar face recognition are subtle and appear to be localized to lateral frontal, parietal, and temporal regions. Hum. Brain Mapping, 2005. © 2005 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Self-face recognition and theory of mind in patients with schizophrenia and first-degree relatives

Farzin Irani — 2006-11-10T19:45:49-00:00

Schizophrenia Research, Vol. 88, No. 1-3. (December 2006), pp. 151-160.

ObjectiveThe hypothesized relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and self-face recognition as well as its potential genetic associations has not been previously explored in patients with schizophrenia and in first-degree relatives with schizotypal personality traits.MethodTen patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, 10 of their first-degree relatives and 10 healthy controls were included. To assess self-face recognition (SFR), participants were presented images of faces of themselves and others and asked to make rapid `unfamiliar', `familiar' and `self' judgments. As a measure of ToM, subjects were administered the Revised Mind in the Eyes Test (MET [Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I., 2001. The "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Test revised version: a study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J Child Psychol Psychiatry 42(2), 241-251.]). Schizotypal characteristics in relatives and controls were assessed using a modified version of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ [Raine, A., 1991. The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of schizotypal personality based on DSM-III-R criteria. Schizophrenia Bulletin 17(4), 555-564.]).ResultsPatients took longer and were less accurate on the SFR task than their relatives who in turn performed worse than healthy controls. Specific ToM deficits in schizophrenia were replicated. There was a relationship between accuracy rates on the MET and SFR tasks. High levels of schizotypal traits such as social anxiety, constricted affect and no close friends were important for both tasks.ConclusionsFace recognition deficits and ToM deficits in schizophrenia are apparent. The critical influence of high levels of select schizotypal traits is also highlighted. A deficit in relatives of schizophrenia patients raises the possibility that ToM and face recognition deficits may be candidate endophenotypes for schizophrenia. Support for the hypothesized link between ToM and face recognition is provided.