Tag deference [10 articles]

Abstract

This article presents models of strategic behavior by agencies and courts where the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy choices from higher level review. The theory is based on the notion that decision instruments (for example, rulemaking and adjudication for agencies, statutory interpretation and reasoning process review for courts) pose differential costs and payoffs for both the initiating and reviewing actors, each of whom have resource constraints. ...

Abstract

Early school-aged children listened to stories that contained correct and incorrect facts. All ages answered more questions correctly after having heard the correct fact in the story. Only the older children, however, produced story errors on a later general knowledge test. Source errors did not drive the increased suggestibility in older children, as they were better at remembering source than were the younger children. Instead, different processes are involved in learning correct and incorrect facts from fictional sources. All ages benefited ...

Abstract

Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the deliverances of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another person, as a model for what to believe. The paper aims to clarify the nature of epistemic deference in probabilistic contexts, to explain the conditions under which deference is appropriate, and to examine deference to objective chances, as epitomized in David Lewis's Principal Principle. This latter analysis will show, in contrast with views that portray chance as an ideal inductive ...

Abstract

In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject ...