The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts Export

@article{citeulike:3814432, abstract = {The evolution of behaviour patterns used in animal conflicts is discussed, using models based on the theory of games. The paper extends arguments used by Maynard Smith \& Price (1973) showing that ritualized behaviour can evolve by individual selection. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is defined. Two types of ritualized contests are distinguished, ” tournaments” and ” displays”; the latter, defined as contests without physical contact in which victory goes to the contestant which continues longer, are analyzed in detail. Three main conclusions are drawn. The degree of persistence should be very variable, either between individuals or for the same individual at different times; a negative exponential distribution of persistence times is predicted. Individuals should display with constant intensity, independent of how much longer they will in fact continue. An initial asymmetry in the conditions of a contest can be used to settle it, even if it is irrelevant to the outcome of a more protracted conflict if one were to take place.}, author = {Maynard smith, J.}, citeulike-article-id = {3814432}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0022519374901106}, doi = {10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6}, issn = {00225193}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, keywords = {animal-conflict, behavior, biology, evolution, game-theory, status}, month = {September}, number = {1}, pages = {209--221}, posted-at = {2008-12-20 12:48:48}, priority = {2}, title = {The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6}, volume = {47}, year = {1974} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3814432 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3814432 N2 - The evolution of behaviour patterns used in animal conflicts is discussed, using models based on the theory of games. The paper extends arguments used by Maynard Smith & Price (1973) showing that ritualized behaviour can evolve by individual selection. The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, is defined. Two types of ritualized contests are distinguished, “tournaments” and “displays”; the latter, defined as contests without physical contact in which victory goes to the contestant which continues longer, are analyzed in detail. Three main conclusions are drawn. The degree of persistence should be very variable, either between individuals or for the same individual at different times; a negative exponential distribution of persistence times is predicted. Individuals should display with constant intensity, independent of how much longer they will in fact continue. An initial asymmetry in the conditions of a contest can be used to settle it, even if it is irrelevant to the outcome of a more protracted conflict if one were to take place. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 00225193 EP - 221 TI - The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts VL - 47 SP - 209 KW - animal-conflict KW - behavior KW - biology KW - evolution KW - game-theory KW - status AU - Maynard smith, J PY - 1974/09// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 ER -