From selfish nodes to cooperative networks - emergent link-based incentives in peer-to-peer networks Export

@inproceedings{citeulike:490026, abstract = {For peer-to-peer (P2P) systems to operate effectively peers need to cooperate for the benefit of the network as a whole. Most existing P2P systems assume cooperation, relying on peers to perform tasks that are of no direct individual benefit. However, when large open systems are deployed such assumptions no longer hold because by adapting selfishly nodes may become "freeloaders" leaching resources from the network. We present initial results from simulations of an algorithm allowing nodes to adapt selfishly yet maintaining high levels of cooperation in both a Prisoners' dilemma and a flood-fill query scenario. The algorithm does not require centralized or third party reputation systems, the monitoring of neighbor behavior or the explicit programming of incentives and operates in highly dynamic and noisy networks. The algorithm appears to emerge its own incentive structure.}, author = {Hales, D.}, citeulike-article-id = {490026}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1334942}, comment = {My description here: http://elfishski.blogspot.com/2006/02/agents-tags-in-peer-to-peer.html}, journal = {Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2004. Proceedings. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference on}, keywords = {evolution, networks, p2p, tags}, pages = {151--158}, posted-at = {2006-02-02 23:22:10}, priority = {0}, title = {From selfish nodes to cooperative networks - emergent link-based incentives in peer-to-peer networks}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1334942}, year = {2004} }

TY - CONF ID - citeulike:490026 L3 - citeulike-article-id:490026 N2 - For peer-to-peer (P2P) systems to operate effectively peers need to cooperate for the benefit of the network as a whole. Most existing P2P systems assume cooperation, relying on peers to perform tasks that are of no direct individual benefit. However, when large open systems are deployed such assumptions no longer hold because by adapting selfishly nodes may become "freeloaders" leaching resources from the network. We present initial results from simulations of an algorithm allowing nodes to adapt selfishly yet maintaining high levels of cooperation in both a Prisoners' dilemma and a flood-fill query scenario. The algorithm does not require centralized or third party reputation systems, the monitoring of neighbor behavior or the explicit programming of incentives and operates in highly dynamic and noisy networks. The algorithm appears to emerge its own incentive structure. JF - Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2004. Proceedings. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference on EP - 158 TI - From selfish nodes to cooperative networks - emergent link-based incentives in peer-to-peer networks SP - 151 KW - evolution KW - networks KW - p2p KW - tags N1 - My description here: http://elfishski.blogspot.com/2006/02/agents-tags-in-peer-to-peer.html AU - Hales, D PY - 2004/// UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1334942 ER -