Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity Export

@article{citeulike:490030, abstract = {A long-standing problem in biological and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. For many situations, kin selection1 is an adequate explanation, although kin-recognition may still be a problem. Explanations of cooperation between non-kin include continuing interactions that provide a shadow of the future (that is, the expectation of an ongoing relationship) that can sustain reciprocity2, 3, 4, possibly supported by mechanisms to bias interactions such as embedding the agents in a two-dimensional space4, 5, 6 or other context-preserving networks7. Another explanation, indirect reciprocity8, applies when benevolence to one agent increases the chance of receiving help from others. Here we use computer simulations to show that cooperation can arise when agents donate to others who are sufficiently similar to themselves in some arbitrary characteristic. Such a characteristic, or 'tag', can be a marking, display, or other observable trait. Tag-based donation can lead to the emergence of cooperation among agents who have only rudimentary ability to detect environmental signals and, unlike models of direct3, 4 or indirect reciprocity9, 10, no memory of past encounters is required.}, author = {Riolo, Rick L. and Cohen, Michael D. and Axelrod, Robert}, citeulike-article-id = {490030}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35106555}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/414441a0}, day = {22}, doi = {10.1038/35106555}, issn = {0028-0836}, journal = {Nature}, keywords = {agents, evolution, groupselection, tags}, month = {November}, number = {6862}, pages = {441--443}, posted-at = {2006-02-02 23:46:06}, priority = {0}, publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, title = {Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35106555}, volume = {414}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:490030 L3 - citeulike-article-id:490030 N2 - A long-standing problem in biological and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. For many situations, kin selection1 is an adequate explanation, although kin-recognition may still be a problem. Explanations of cooperation between non-kin include continuing interactions that provide a shadow of the future (that is, the expectation of an ongoing relationship) that can sustain reciprocity2, 3, 4, possibly supported by mechanisms to bias interactions such as embedding the agents in a two-dimensional space4, 5, 6 or other context-preserving networks7. Another explanation, indirect reciprocity8, applies when benevolence to one agent increases the chance of receiving help from others. Here we use computer simulations to show that cooperation can arise when agents donate to others who are sufficiently similar to themselves in some arbitrary characteristic. Such a characteristic, or 'tag', can be a marking, display, or other observable trait. Tag-based donation can lead to the emergence of cooperation among agents who have only rudimentary ability to detect environmental signals and, unlike models of direct3, 4 or indirect reciprocity9, 10, no memory of past encounters is required. IS - 6862 JF - Nature SN - 0028-0836 EP - 443 TI - Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity PB - Nature Publishing Group VL - 414 SP - 441 KW - agents KW - evolution KW - groupselection KW - tags AU - Riolo, Rick AU - Cohen, Michael AU - Axelrod, Robert PY - 2001/11/22/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35106555 ER -