Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms Export

@article{citeulike:843686, abstract = {Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioural data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminatedly explains punishment best.}, author = {Carpenter, Jeffrey and Matthews, Peter and Ong'ong'a, Okomboli}, citeulike-article-id = {843686}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/eaukngbh9vxcxvhq/fulltext.pdf}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, keywords = {games, reputation, sociology}, posted-at = {2006-09-15 01:09:21}, priority = {0}, title = {Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/eaukngbh9vxcxvhq/fulltext.pdf}, year = {2004} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:843686 L3 - citeulike-article-id:843686 N2 - Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioural data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminatedly explains punishment best. JF - Journal of Evolutionary Economics TI - Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms KW - games KW - reputation KW - sociology AU - Carpenter, Jeffrey AU - Matthews, Peter AU - Ong'ong'a, Okomboli PY - 2004/// UR - http://www.springerlink.com/content/eaukngbh9vxcxvhq/fulltext.pdf ER -