Castor: Secure Code Updates Using Symmetric Cryptosystems Export

@proceedings{citeulike:3399222, abstract = {We present Castor, a secure code-update protocol for sensor networks that exploits symmetric cryptoystems. Through a synergistic combination of a one-way hash-chain, two one- way key-chains with the delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, and multiple message authentication codes (MACs), Castor enables untrusted sensor nodes to verify an update's authenticity and guarantees that no correct node will ever in- stall or forward a compromised part of a code-update im- age. We describe an implementation of Castor that hard- ens the TinyOS-based update protocol, Deluge, against node compromise. We experimentally compare Castor's compu- tational and communication costs with those of Deluge and with those of a contemporary secure update protocol, Sluice, that uses asymmetric cryptosystems (digital signatures) in- stead. Our results demonstrate that Castor incurs reasonable overheads as compared to Deluge, and lower resource usage as well as lower end-to-end update latency as compared to Sluice.}, author = {Kim, Donnie H. and Gandhi, Rajeev and Narasimhan, Priya}, booktitle = {Real-Time Systems Symposium, 2007. RTSS 2007. 28th IEEE International}, citeulike-article-id = {3399222}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RTSS.2007.42}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4408330}, doi = {10.1109/RTSS.2007.42}, journal = {Real-Time Systems Symposium, 2007. RTSS 2007. 28th IEEE International}, keywords = {cryptograhy, network-programming, security, wsn}, pages = {479--488}, posted-at = {2008-10-13 03:34:06}, priority = {0}, title = {Castor: Secure Code Updates Using Symmetric Cryptosystems}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RTSS.2007.42}, year = {2007} }

TY - CONF ID - citeulike:3399222 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3399222 N2 - We present Castor, a secure code-update protocol for sensor networks that exploits symmetric cryptoystems. Through a synergistic combination of a one-way hash-chain, two one- way key-chains with the delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, and multiple message authentication codes (MACs), Castor enables untrusted sensor nodes to verify an update's authenticity and guarantees that no correct node will ever in- stall or forward a compromised part of a code-update im- age. We describe an implementation of Castor that hard- ens the TinyOS-based update protocol, Deluge, against node compromise. We experimentally compare Castor's compu- tational and communication costs with those of Deluge and with those of a contemporary secure update protocol, Sluice, that uses asymmetric cryptosystems (digital signatures) in- stead. Our results demonstrate that Castor incurs reasonable overheads as compared to Deluge, and lower resource usage as well as lower end-to-end update latency as compared to Sluice. JF - Real-Time Systems Symposium, 2007. RTSS 2007. 28th IEEE International EP - 488 TI - Castor: Secure Code Updates Using Symmetric Cryptosystems T2 - Real-Time Systems Symposium, 2007. RTSS 2007. 28th IEEE International SP - 479 KW - cryptograhy KW - network-programming KW - security KW - wsn AU - Kim, Donnie AU - Gandhi, Rajeev AU - Narasimhan, Priya PY - 2007/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RTSS.2007.42 ER -