Replicator Dynamics with Government's Intervention by Collection and Reallocation of Payoffs Export

@article{citeulike:1750363, abstract = {In a community which consists of a large number of people interacting with each other, social dilemma is an important problem. This problem occurs when the payoff of each person conflicts with the total payoff of the community which he/she belongs to. Evolutionary game theory has been used as a powerful mathematical framework to analyze such a social problem. Recently, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable goal state by using collections and reallocations of payoffs. In this paper, we investigate this model, and show conditions for the goal state to be a locally or a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point, respectively. We also propose a government's strategy depends on population states which can stabilize the goal state globally. Key Words: replicator dynamics, intervention, payoff collection, payoff reallocation}, author = {Kanazawa, Takafumi and Ushio, Toshimitsu and Goto, Hayato}, citeulike-article-id = {1750363}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.10.2170}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://ietfec.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/E90-A/10/2170}, doi = {10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.10.2170}, journal = {IEICE Trans A: Fundamentals}, keywords = {dynamics, replicator}, month = {October}, pages = {2170--2177}, posted-at = {2007-10-10 13:39:23}, priority = {2}, title = {Replicator Dynamics with Government's Intervention by Collection and Reallocation of Payoffs}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.10.2170}, volume = {E90-A}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1750363 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1750363 N2 - In a community which consists of a large number of people interacting with each other, social dilemma is an important problem. This problem occurs when the payoff of each person conflicts with the total payoff of the community which he/she belongs to. Evolutionary game theory has been used as a powerful mathematical framework to analyze such a social problem. Recently, the authors have proposed replicator dynamics with reallocation of payoffs. In this model, the government is willing to lead the population to a desirable goal state by using collections and reallocations of payoffs. In this paper, we investigate this model, and show conditions for the goal state to be a locally or a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium point, respectively. We also propose a government's strategy depends on population states which can stabilize the goal state globally. Key Words: replicator dynamics, intervention, payoff collection, payoff reallocation JF - IEICE Trans A: Fundamentals EP - 2177 TI - Replicator Dynamics with Government's Intervention by Collection and Reallocation of Payoffs VL - E90-A SP - 2170 KW - dynamics KW - replicator AU - Kanazawa, Takafumi AU - Ushio, Toshimitsu AU - Goto, Hayato PY - 2007/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.10.2170 ER -