Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies Export

@article{citeulike:4544146, abstract = {In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright–Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/ n , or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n × n games in the limit of weak selection.}, author = {Antal, Tibor and Traulsen, Arne and Ohtsuki, Hisashi and Tarnita, Corina E. and Nowak, Martin A.}, citeulike-article-id = {4544146}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519309000721}, doi = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010}, issn = {00225193}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, keywords = {game}, month = {June}, number = {4}, pages = {614--622}, posted-at = {2009-05-19 03:00:38}, priority = {2}, title = {Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010}, volume = {258}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4544146 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4544146 N2 - In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright–Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/ n , or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n × n games in the limit of weak selection. IS - 4 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 00225193 EP - 622 TI - Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies VL - 258 SP - 614 KW - game AU - Antal, Tibor AU - Traulsen, Arne AU - Ohtsuki, Hisashi AU - Tarnita, Corina AU - Nowak, Martin PY - 2009/06/21/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.02.010 ER -