MarkPezzo's cognitive [6 articles]

Abstract

Studied the determinants of spontaneous counterfactual processing (i.e., constructing a mental simulation that contradicts events of the real world). 128 adults, primarily university students, were asked (1) to read scenarios of events that varied with regard to their valence (positive vs negative) and expectancy (normal vs unusual) and (2) to review these events from the perspective of the protagonist. Ss' reflections on the events were coded into 4 categories: (1) counterfactual processing, (2) future-oriented change of behavior, (3) causal attribution without ...

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Accession Number: 1995-87826-001. First Author & Affiliation: Klauer, Karl C.; Ruprecht-Karls-U Heidelberg, Psychologisches Inst, Germany. Other Journal Title: Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie. Other Publishers: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. Release Date: 19951101. Correction Date: 20080114. Publication Type: Journal (0100) Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Media Covered: Print. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: German. Major Descriptor: Cognitive Processes. Classification: Cognitive Processes (2340) . Population: Human (10) . Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300) . Methodology: Empirical Study

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Tested a motivated processing model of the hindsight bias or "knew-it-all-along" effect. Hindsight occurs when people exaggerate the extent to which they could have predicted the occurrence of an event. Although typically thought to be a "cold" cognitive process which automatically focuses attention on outcome-consistent information, some research suggests that, with sufficient motivation, subjects can ignore outcome information. The present study examined whether outcomes having negative connotations for the self might be less susceptible to the hindsight bias (e.g., an outcome

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Hindsight bias, or the knew-it-all-along effect, is the tendency for individuals with outcome knowledge to overestimate the predictability of the reported outcome (Fischhoff, 1975; Wood, 1978). Despite a large body of research investigating hindsight bias in the verbal domain, very little work has examined whether an analogous bias exists for visual tasks. The research reported here seeks to correct this deficit. In four experiments observers equipped with visual target information predicted the performance of a naïve self or peer. Experiment-1 observers

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A common finding in previous research on judgment under uncertainty is that when participants are presented with the correct answer to a general knowledge item or feedback about the actual outcome of an event they respond as if they "knew-it-all-along", as if the presented answer or outcome was easy to predict. The present thesis consists of ten experiments and offers a new theoretical model of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as hindsight bias. The findings of Study I indicated that the

Abstract

Conceptualizes ruminations as both virtue and vice. We first describes two predominant views of ruminations. Both emphasize a repetitive or recurrent nature; however, one view defines ruminations as negative thoughts about the past, whereas the other depicts them as thoughts about future goals. After discussing this work, we outline a model of imaginative mental simulations that incorporates these two perspectives and moves beyond them. Viewed within this broader integrative framework, the virtues and vices of engaging in various mental simulations may ...

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Accession Number: 2003-06255-007. First Author & Affiliation: Sanna, Lawrence J.; Dept of Psychology, U North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, US. Release Date: 20030714. Publication Type: Book (0200) Edited Book (0280). Media Covered: Print. Document Type: Chapter. ISBN: 1-59147-013-7, hardcover. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Imagination; Models; Personality; Rumination (Cognitive Process). Minor Descriptor: Future. Classification: Personality Traits & Processes (3120) . Population: Human (10) . Intended Audience: Psychology: Professional & Research (PS). References Available: Y.