IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND PROPOSITIONS: AGAINST THE PARITY THESIS Export

@article{Berto09, abstract = {Accounts of propositions as sets of possible worlds have been criticized for conflating distinct impossible propositions. In response to this problem, some have proposed to introduce impossible worlds to represent distinct impossibilities, endorsing the thesis that impossible worlds must be of the same kind; this has been called the parity thesis. I show that this thesis faces problems, and propose a hybrid account which rejects it: possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions out of them. This hybrid account (1) distinguishes many intuitively distinct impossible propositions; (2) identifies impossible propositions with extensional constructions; (3) avoids resorting to primitive modality, at least so far as Lewisian modal realism does.}, address = {IHPST, Sorbonne-cole Normale Suprieure of Paris}, author = {Berto, Francesco}, citeulike-article-id = {4908651}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.627.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/122421479/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.627.x}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, keywords = {modality, ontology}, number = {9999}, posted-at = {2009-06-19 16:11:22}, priority = {0}, title = {IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND PROPOSITIONS: AGAINST THE PARITY THESIS}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.627.x}, volume = {9999}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - Berto09 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4908651 N2 - Accounts of propositions as sets of possible worlds have been criticized for conflating distinct impossible propositions. In response to this problem, some have proposed to introduce impossible worlds to represent distinct impossibilities, endorsing the thesis that impossible worlds must be of the same kind; this has been called the parity thesis. I show that this thesis faces problems, and propose a hybrid account which rejects it: possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions out of them. This hybrid account (1) distinguishes many intuitively distinct impossible propositions; (2) identifies impossible propositions with extensional constructions; (3) avoids resorting to primitive modality, at least so far as Lewisian modal realism does. IS - 9999 JF - The Philosophical Quarterly AD - IHPST, Sorbonne-cole Normale Suprieure of Paris TI - IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND PROPOSITIONS: AGAINST THE PARITY THESIS VL - 9999 KW - modality KW - ontology AU - Berto, Francesco PY - 2009/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.627.x ER -