Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: A Multiretailer Inventory Application Export

@article{BausoGiarrePesenti_TAC08, abstract = {We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a sequence of joint decisions, each one obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement on the part of a single player. We also specialize the game to a multiretailer inventory system.}, author = {Bauso, D. and Giarre, L. and Pesenti, R.}, booktitle = {Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on}, citeulike-article-id = {3444502}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2008.919546}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4522601}, doi = {10.1109/TAC.2008.919546}, journal = {Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on}, keywords = {consensus, dynamic\_games, dynamical\_programming, nash\_certainty\_equivalence}, number = {4}, pages = {998--1003}, posted-at = {2008-10-23 22:11:57}, priority = {2}, title = {Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: A Multiretailer Inventory Application}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2008.919546}, volume = {53}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - BausoGiarrePesenti_TAC08 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3444502 N2 - We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a sequence of joint decisions, each one obtained from the previous one by an unilateral improvement on the part of a single player. We also specialize the game to a multiretailer inventory system. IS - 4 JF - Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on EP - 1003 TI - Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: A Multiretailer Inventory Application VL - 53 T2 - Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on SP - 998 KW - consensus KW - dynamic_games KW - dynamical_programming KW - nash_certainty_equivalence AU - Bauso, D AU - Giarre, L AU - Pesenti, R PY - 2008/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2008.919546 ER -