Mechanism Design for Optimal Consensus Problems Export

@inproceedings{BausoGiarrePesenti_CDC06, abstract = {We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with switching topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors' state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents' initial state. We show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal protocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value}, author = {Bauso, D. and Giarre, L. and Pesenti, R.}, booktitle = {Decision and Control, 2006 45th IEEE Conference on}, citeulike-article-id = {3458139}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2006.377206}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4177098}, doi = {10.1109/CDC.2006.377206}, journal = {Decision and Control, 2006 45th IEEE Conference on}, keywords = {consensus, differential\_games, distributed\_algorithms, optimal\_control}, pages = {3381--3386}, posted-at = {2008-10-28 17:16:29}, priority = {4}, title = {Mechanism Design for Optimal Consensus Problems}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2006.377206}, year = {2006} }

TY - CONF ID - BausoGiarrePesenti_CDC06 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3458139 N2 - We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with switching topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors' state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents' initial state. We show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal protocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value JF - Decision and Control, 2006 45th IEEE Conference on EP - 3386 TI - Mechanism Design for Optimal Consensus Problems T2 - Decision and Control, 2006 45th IEEE Conference on SP - 3381 KW - consensus KW - differential_games KW - distributed_algorithms KW - optimal_control AU - Bauso, D AU - Giarre, L AU - Pesenti, R PY - 2006/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2006.377206 ER -