Strategic bidding in electricity generation supply markets Export

@inproceedings{citeulike:796105, abstract = {The authors formulate a general framework of a competitive electricity generation supply market (CEM), embodying the salient attributes of the Poolco concept. This framework serves two principal purposes: to solve the selection by the CEM operator of the winners in a sealed bid auction for the right to serve load in each period of the auction horizon; and to determine the profit-maximizing strategic bids of a generation supplier. The formulation represents the physical and operating considerations of the electric generation system, the multi-period nature of the auction as well as the market economics. The resulting large-scale nonlinear programming model has a structure that is effectively exploited for solution by Lagrangian relaxation. Under conditions of a perfectly competitive market, the strategic bids of a player can be derived analytically. Numerical results illustrate the effectiveness of the strategic bids. Directions for future research are discussed}, author = {Gross, G. and Finlay, D. J. and Deltas, G.}, citeulike-article-id = {796105}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=747472}, journal = {Power Engineering Society 1999 Winter Meeting, IEEE}, keywords = {bidding-strategies, electricity-markets, energy, new3}, pages = {309--315 vol.1}, posted-at = {2006-08-10 16:02:36}, priority = {2}, title = {Strategic bidding in electricity generation supply markets}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=747472}, volume = {1}, year = {1999} }

TY - CONF ID - citeulike:796105 L3 - citeulike-article-id:796105 N2 - The authors formulate a general framework of a competitive electricity generation supply market (CEM), embodying the salient attributes of the Poolco concept. This framework serves two principal purposes: to solve the selection by the CEM operator of the winners in a sealed bid auction for the right to serve load in each period of the auction horizon; and to determine the profit-maximizing strategic bids of a generation supplier. The formulation represents the physical and operating considerations of the electric generation system, the multi-period nature of the auction as well as the market economics. The resulting large-scale nonlinear programming model has a structure that is effectively exploited for solution by Lagrangian relaxation. Under conditions of a perfectly competitive market, the strategic bids of a player can be derived analytically. Numerical results illustrate the effectiveness of the strategic bids. Directions for future research are discussed JF - Power Engineering Society 1999 Winter Meeting, IEEE EP - 315 vol.1 TI - Strategic bidding in electricity generation supply markets VL - 1 SP - 309 KW - bidding-strategies KW - electricity-markets KW - energy KW - new3 AU - Gross, G AU - Finlay, DJ AU - Deltas, G PY - 1999/// UR - http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=747472 ER -