Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma Export

@article{citeulike:3822439, abstract = {The existence of N-prisoners' dilemmas (conflict between individual and collective rationality) is a standard justification for collectivizing decision making through the state, but there is little theory about how different institutions operate to @'solve@' such dilemmas. The efficiency of majoritarian democracy, @'selfish dictatorship@' and uncoordinated individualism is explored using a simple nine-person game. Majoritarian democracy is found to produce equilibrium outcomes at the maximum social product available when the opportunity costs of @'cooperating@' are less than half the magnitude of the externalities, but to produce no such equilibrium when the opportunity costs are greater than that. Our research draws implications for the role of information in constitutional design, and of altruism.}, author = {Orbell, John M. and Wilson, L. A.}, citeulike-article-id = {3822439}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1954101}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1954101}, doi = {10.2307/1954101}, issn = {00030554}, journal = {The American Political Science Review}, keywords = {cooperation, theory-of-institutions}, number = {2}, pages = {411--421}, posted-at = {2008-12-23 22:19:44}, priority = {2}, publisher = {American Political Science Association}, title = {Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1954101}, volume = {72}, year = {1978} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3822439 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3822439 N2 - The existence of N-prisoners' dilemmas (conflict between individual and collective rationality) is a standard justification for collectivizing decision making through the state, but there is little theory about how different institutions operate to @'solve@' such dilemmas. The efficiency of majoritarian democracy, @'selfish dictatorship@' and uncoordinated individualism is explored using a simple nine-person game. Majoritarian democracy is found to produce equilibrium outcomes at the maximum social product available when the opportunity costs of @'cooperating@' are less than half the magnitude of the externalities, but to produce no such equilibrium when the opportunity costs are greater than that. Our research draws implications for the role of information in constitutional design, and of altruism. IS - 2 JF - The American Political Science Review SN - 00030554 EP - 421 TI - Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma PB - American Political Science Association VL - 72 SP - 411 KW - cooperation KW - theory-of-institutions AU - Orbell, John AU - Wilson, LA PY - 1978/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1954101 ER -