Seeing Is Believing Export

@article{Linder1997, abstract = {In this paper a formal framework is proposed in which various informative actions are combined, corresponding to the different ways in which rational agents can acquire information. In order to solve the various conflicts that could possibly occur when acquiring information from different sources, we propose a classification of the information that an agent possesses according to credibility. Based on this classification, we formalize what it means for agents to have seen or heard something, or to believe something by default. We present a formalization of observations, communication actions, and the attempted jumps to conclusions that constitutes default reasoning. To implement these informative actions we use a general belief revision action which satisfies the AGM postulates; dependent on the credibility of the incoming information this revision action acts on one or more parts of the classified belief sets of the agents. The abilities of agents formalize both the limited capacities of agents to acquire information, and the preference of one kind of information acquisition to another. A very important feature of our approach is that it shows how to integrate various aspects of agency, in particular the (informational) attitudes of dealing with information from observation, communication and default reasoning into one coherent framework, both model-theoretically and syntactically.}, author = {Van Linder, B. and Van Der Hoek, W. and Ch}, citeulike-article-id = {3149554}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, keywords = {belief-revision, intelligent-agents, knowledge-representation, procedural-reasoning-system}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {33--61}, posted-at = {2008-08-22 17:09:46}, priority = {2}, title = {Seeing Is Believing}, volume = {6}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - Linder1997 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3149554 N2 - In this paper a formal framework is proposed in which various informative actions are combined, corresponding to the different ways in which rational agents can acquire information. In order to solve the various conflicts that could possibly occur when acquiring information from different sources, we propose a classification of the information that an agent possesses according to credibility. Based on this classification, we formalize what it means for agents to have seen or heard something, or to believe something by default. We present a formalization of observations, communication actions, and the attempted jumps to conclusions that constitutes default reasoning. To implement these informative actions we use a general belief revision action which satisfies the AGM postulates; dependent on the credibility of the incoming information this revision action acts on one or more parts of the classified belief sets of the agents. The abilities of agents formalize both the limited capacities of agents to acquire information, and the preference of one kind of information acquisition to another. A very important feature of our approach is that it shows how to integrate various aspects of agency, in particular the (informational) attitudes of dealing with information from observation, communication and default reasoning into one coherent framework, both model-theoretically and syntactically. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Logic, Language and Information EP - 61 TI - Seeing Is Believing VL - 6 SP - 33 KW - belief-revision KW - intelligent-agents KW - knowledge-representation KW - procedural-reasoning-system AU - Van Linder, B AU - Van Der Hoek, W AU - Ch PY - 1997/January// ER -