Multiple-Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders Export

@article{Benoit_01_multiobject_budget_constrained, abstract = {A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.}, author = {Beno\^{o}t, Jean-Pierre and Krishna, Vijay}, citeulike-article-id = {2637092}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/2695923}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {auctions, budget\_constraint, multi\_unit, sequential}, number = {1}, pages = {155--179}, posted-at = {2008-04-07 11:38:37}, priority = {0}, title = {Multiple-Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/2695923}, volume = {68}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - Benoit_01_multiobject_budget_constrained L3 - citeulike-article-id:2637092 N2 - A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously. IS - 1 JF - Review of Economic Studies EP - 179 TI - Multiple-Object Auctions With Budget Constrained Bidders VL - 68 SP - 155 KW - auctions KW - budget_constraint KW - multi_unit KW - sequential AU - Beno\^{o}t, Jean-Pierre AU - Krishna, Vijay PY - 2001/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/2695923 ER -