Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes Export

@article{Kreps_83_bertrand_competition_yields_cournot_outcomes, abstract = {Bertrand's model of oligopoly, which gives perfectly competitive outcomes, assumes that: (1) there is competition over prices and (2) production follows the realization of demand. We show that both of these assumptions are required. More precisely, consider a two-stage oligopoly game where, first, there is simultaneous production, and, second, after production levels are made public, there is price competition. Under mild assumptions about demand, the unique equilibrium outcome is the Cournot outcome. This illustrates that solutions to oligopoly games depend on both the strategic variables employed and the context (game form) in which those variables are employed.}, author = {Kreps, David M. and Scheinkman, Jose A.}, citeulike-article-id = {2641289}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X(198323)14:2%3C326:QPABCY%3E2.0.CO;2-4}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, keywords = {after\_market, bertrand, cournot, demand, supply}, number = {2}, pages = {326--337}, posted-at = {2008-04-08 12:01:23}, priority = {2}, title = {Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X(198323)14:2%3C326:QPABCY%3E2.0.CO;2-4}, volume = {14}, year = {1983} }

TY - JOUR ID - Kreps_83_bertrand_competition_yields_cournot_outcomes L3 - citeulike-article-id:2641289 N2 - Bertrand's model of oligopoly, which gives perfectly competitive outcomes, assumes that: (1) there is competition over prices and (2) production follows the realization of demand. We show that both of these assumptions are required. More precisely, consider a two-stage oligopoly game where, first, there is simultaneous production, and, second, after production levels are made public, there is price competition. Under mild assumptions about demand, the unique equilibrium outcome is the Cournot outcome. This illustrates that solutions to oligopoly games depend on both the strategic variables employed and the context (game form) in which those variables are employed. IS - 2 JF - Bell Journal of Economics EP - 337 TI - Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes VL - 14 SP - 326 KW - after_market KW - bertrand KW - cournot KW - demand KW - supply AU - Kreps, David AU - Scheinkman, Jose PY - 1983/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X(198323)14:2%3C326:QPABCY%3E2.0.CO;2-4 ER -