License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers Export

@article{Giebe_08_License_Auctions_With_Royalty_Contracta, abstract = {This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.}, author = {Giebe, Thomas and Wolfstetter, Elmar}, citeulike-article-id = {2648875}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.010}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4R0KT53-1/2/7600260b78afd2b8ab3e28b42ce8d2ff}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.010}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {after\_market, auctions, cost\_reducing\_investment, cournot, multi\_unit, patent}, month = {May}, number = {1}, pages = {91--106}, posted-at = {2008-04-10 11:41:05}, priority = {2}, title = {License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.010}, volume = {63}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - Giebe_08_License_Auctions_With_Royalty_Contracta L3 - citeulike-article-id:2648875 N2 - This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers of the auction makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant. IS - 1 JF - Games and Economic Behavior EP - 106 TI - License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers VL - 63 SP - 91 KW - after_market KW - auctions KW - cost_reducing_investment KW - cournot KW - multi_unit KW - patent AU - Giebe, Thomas AU - Wolfstetter, Elmar PY - 2008/05// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.010 ER -