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Ending Rules in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions: Insights from Auctions on the Internet Export

Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series (May 2008)

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I use a simultaneous, unit demand, heterogeneous good, ascending auction framework to explain several empirical regularities observed in Internet auctions. In particular, I demonstrate the incentive to snipe in `hard close' eBay style auctions and the absence of such an incentive in auctions with extendable end times. I am able to support both early and late bidding in the same framework: with early bids used as a matching mechanism and last-minute bids serving to discourage manipulative behaviour.


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