Competing cybermediaries Export

@article{Cailaud_2001_CompetingCybermediaries, abstract = {We examine a price competition game between two intermediaries offering to match two sides of a market on the Internet. Competition is characterized by asymmetric network externalities. We account for some specificities of cybermediation, in particular access versus usage pricing and the possibility of using the services of several intermediaries. When only registration fees are used and agents register with at most one cybermediary, there exists an equilibrium where one firm corners the market with positive profits. Introducing either fees contingent on successful matching or the possibility of registration with two cybermediaries make these profits vanish. Other types of equilibria are discussed.}, author = {Caillaud, Bernard and Jullien, Bruno}, citeulike-article-id = {2987976}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00123-4}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-430XMS9-K/1/f14f7b9afc3c6da45eca0b5251af6579}, doi = {10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00123-4}, journal = {European Economic Review}, keywords = {io, market, network\_externality, paper\_02\_search\_engine\_competition, search\_engines, two\_sided}, month = {May}, number = {4-6}, pages = {797--808}, posted-at = {2008-07-11 12:03:00}, priority = {4}, title = {Competing cybermediaries}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00123-4}, volume = {45}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - Cailaud_2001_CompetingCybermediaries L3 - citeulike-article-id:2987976 N2 - We examine a price competition game between two intermediaries offering to match two sides of a market on the Internet. Competition is characterized by asymmetric network externalities. We account for some specificities of cybermediation, in particular access versus usage pricing and the possibility of using the services of several intermediaries. When only registration fees are used and agents register with at most one cybermediary, there exists an equilibrium where one firm corners the market with positive profits. Introducing either fees contingent on successful matching or the possibility of registration with two cybermediaries make these profits vanish. Other types of equilibria are discussed. IS - 4-6 JF - European Economic Review EP - 808 TI - Competing cybermediaries VL - 45 SP - 797 KW - io KW - market KW - network_externality KW - paper_02_search_engine_competition KW - search_engines KW - two_sided AU - Caillaud, Bernard AU - Jullien, Bruno PY - 2001/05// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00123-4 ER -