Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers Export

@article{Caillaud_2003_Chicken&Egg, abstract = {We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the Internet: the presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries, and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users' identity and on usage. Efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures. Intermediaries have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power. We analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation service providers.}, author = {Caillaud, Bernard and Jullien, Bruno}, citeulike-article-id = {3210373}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593720}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593720}, doi = {10.2307/1593720}, issn = {07416261}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, keywords = {competition, market, network\_externality, oligopoly, paper\_02\_search\_engine\_competition, prices, search\_engines, two\_sided}, number = {2}, pages = {309--328}, posted-at = {2008-09-09 15:52:00}, priority = {4}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation}, title = {Chicken \& Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593720}, volume = {34}, year = {2003} }

TY - JOUR ID - Caillaud_2003_Chicken&Egg L3 - citeulike-article-id:3210373 N2 - We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the Internet: the presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries, and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users' identity and on usage. Efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures. Intermediaries have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power. We analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation service providers. IS - 2 JF - The RAND Journal of Economics SN - 07416261 EP - 328 TI - Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers PB - Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation VL - 34 SP - 309 KW - competition KW - market KW - network_externality KW - oligopoly KW - paper_02_search_engine_competition KW - prices KW - search_engines KW - two_sided AU - Caillaud, Bernard AU - Jullien, Bruno PY - 2003/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593720 ER -