Communication and bargaining in the spatial model Export

@article{citeulike:1063403, abstract = {Abstract\ \ This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private information in policymaking institutions that involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core (when it is well-defined) and the extent to which a fictitious sender-receiver game possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and Duggan's (Am polit Sci Rev 94(1) 73–88, 2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking environments with private information and communication when some combination of non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are satisfied.}, author = {Meirowitz, Adam}, citeulike-article-id = {1063403}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/182/2007/00000035/00000002/00000052}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/kq675456676r9564}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3}, issn = {0020-7276}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, keywords = {bargaining, political\_economy, social\_choice}, month = {January}, number = {2}, pages = {251--266}, posted-at = {2009-10-18 15:43:37}, priority = {4}, publisher = {Springer}, title = {Communication and bargaining in the spatial model}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3}, volume = {35}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1063403 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1063403 N2 - Abstract  This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private information in policymaking institutions that involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core (when it is well-defined) and the extent to which a fictitious sender-receiver game possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and Duggan’s (Am polit Sci Rev 94(1) 73–88, 2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking environments with private information and communication when some combination of non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are satisfied. IS - 2 JF - International Journal of Game Theory SN - 0020-7276 EP - 266 TI - Communication and bargaining in the spatial model PB - Springer VL - 35 SP - 251 KW - bargaining KW - political_economy KW - social_choice AU - Meirowitz, Adam PY - 2007/01/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3 ER -