A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence Export

@article{citeulike:1396370, abstract = {This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: Both are produced by the competition for political favors.}, author = {Becker, Gary S.}, citeulike-article-id = {1396370}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886017}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1886017}, doi = {10.2307/1886017}, issn = {00335533}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {lobbying, political\_economy, special\_interest}, number = {3}, pages = {371--400}, posted-at = {2008-12-18 11:29:35}, priority = {4}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, title = {A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886017}, volume = {98}, year = {1983} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1396370 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1396370 N2 - This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: Both are produced by the competition for political favors. IS - 3 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics SN - 00335533 EP - 400 TI - A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence PB - The MIT Press VL - 98 SP - 371 KW - lobbying KW - political_economy KW - special_interest AU - Becker, Gary PY - 1983/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886017 ER -