Competing for Endorsements Export

@article{citeulike:2947062, abstract = {Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria.}, author = {Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan}, citeulike-article-id = {2947062}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/117030}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/117030}, doi = {10.2307/117030}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {election, lobbying, political\_economy, special\_interest}, number = {3}, pages = {501--524}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 10:21:21}, priority = {4}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, title = {Competing for Endorsements}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/117030}, volume = {89}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2947062 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2947062 N2 - Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. IS - 3 JF - The American Economic Review EP - 524 TI - Competing for Endorsements PB - American Economic Association VL - 89 SP - 501 KW - election KW - lobbying KW - political_economy KW - special_interest AU - Grossman, Gene AU - Helpman, Elhanan PY - 1999/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/117030 ER -