Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game

@article{citeulike:2947094, abstract = {We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who approve winning proposals does not always consist of ideologically adjacent legislators. There is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved. We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, C71, C78.}, author = {Jackson, Matthew O. and Moselle, Boaz}, citeulike-article-id = {2947094}, doi = {10.1006/jeth.2000.2688}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {bargaining, coalition, game\_theory, parties, political\_economy}, month = {March}, number = {1}, pages = {49--87}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 10:37:01}, priority = {4}, title = {Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2688}, volume = {103}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2947094 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2947094 N2 - We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who approve winning proposals does not always consist of ideologically adjacent legislators. There is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved. We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, C71, C78. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Economic Theory EP - 87 TI - Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game VL - 103 SP - 49 KW - bargaining KW - coalition KW - game_theory KW - parties KW - political_economy AU - Jackson, Matthew AU - Moselle, Boaz PY - 2002/03// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2688 ER -