Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation

@article{citeulike:2947648, abstract = {The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49.}, author = {Norman, Peter}, citeulike-article-id = {2947648}, doi = {10.1006/jeth.2001.2846}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {bargaining, coalition, political\_economy}, month = {February}, number = {2}, pages = {322--353}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 12:05:16}, priority = {4}, title = {Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2846}, volume = {102}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2947648 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2947648 N2 - The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilib- ria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In contrast, a generic uniqueness result applies when introducing heterogenous time preferences. The unique backwards induction equilibrium in the perturbed game is nonstationary, and neither the original (symmetric) nor the perturbed game provides guidance for equilibrium selection in the infinite game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C78, D72, D78, H49. IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Theory EP - 353 TI - Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation VL - 102 SP - 322 KW - bargaining KW - coalition KW - political_economy AU - Norman, Peter PY - 2002/02// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2846 ER -