The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements Export

@article{citeulike:2948659, abstract = {A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. We study the time structure of agreement sequences that satisfy participation and no-deviation constraints and are (constrained) efficient. We show that every such sequence must, after a finite number of dates, exhibit a continuation that maximizes the agent's payoff over all such efficient, self-enforcing sequences. Additional results are provided for situations with transferable payoffs.}, author = {Ray, Debraj}, citeulike-article-id = {2948659}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2692282}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692282}, doi = {10.2307/2692282}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {bargaining, coalition, contract}, number = {2}, pages = {547--582}, posted-at = {2008-07-01 16:42:11}, priority = {4}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2692282}, volume = {70}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2948659 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2948659 N2 - A principal and an agent enter into a sequence of agreements. The principal faces an interim participation constraint at each date, but can commit to the current agreement; in contrast, the agent has the opportunity to renege on the current agreement. We study the time structure of agreement sequences that satisfy participation and no-deviation constraints and are (constrained) efficient. We show that every such sequence must, after a finite number of dates, exhibit a continuation that maximizes the agent's payoff over all such efficient, self-enforcing sequences. Additional results are provided for situations with transferable payoffs. IS - 2 JF - Econometrica EP - 582 TI - The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements PB - The Econometric Society VL - 70 SP - 547 KW - bargaining KW - coalition KW - contract AU - Ray, Debraj PY - 2002/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2692282 ER -