Incentives and Political Economy (Clarendon Lectures in Economics)

@book{citeulike:2949903, abstract = {Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas. \_}, author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques}, citeulike-article-id = {2949903}, howpublished = {ペーパーバック}, isbn = {0199248680}, keywords = {agency, contract, political\_economy}, month = {December}, posted-at = {2008-07-02 05:32:03}, priority = {5}, publisher = {Oxford Univ Pr}, title = {Incentives and Political Economy (Clarendon Lectures in Economics)}, url = {http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=citeulike07-20&path=ASIN/0199248680}, year = {2001} }

TY - BOOK ID - citeulike:2949903 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2949903 N2 - Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas. _ SN - 0199248680 TI - Incentives and Political Economy (Clarendon Lectures in Economics) PB - Oxford Univ Pr KW - agency KW - contract KW - political_economy AU - Laffont, Jean-Jacques PY - 2001/12/13/ UR - http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=citeulike09-20&path=ASIN/0199248680 ER -