Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure Export

@article{citeulike:2999112, abstract = {We present a framework to analyze the effects of constitutional features on legislative voting with respect to cohesion and the distribution of payoffs. We then apply this framework to parliamentary democracies and show how a prominent feature of decision making in parliaments, the vote of confidence procedure, creates an incentive for ruling coalitions to vote together on policy issues that might otherwise split them. The key feature that creates cohesive voting is the fact that votes on bills are treated as votes on who controls floor access in future periods. As a consequence, legislative majorities capture more of the legislative rents from the minority in parliamentary democracies than in nonparliamentary settings.}, author = {Diermeier, Daniel and Feddersen, Timothy J.}, citeulike-article-id = {2999112}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585484}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585484}, doi = {10.2307/2585484}, issn = {00030554}, journal = {The American Political Science Review}, keywords = {coalition, game\_theory, legislature, political\_economy}, number = {3}, pages = {611--621}, posted-at = {2008-07-14 16:27:02}, priority = {4}, publisher = {American Political Science Association}, title = {Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585484}, volume = {92}, year = {1998} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2999112 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2999112 N2 - We present a framework to analyze the effects of constitutional features on legislative voting with respect to cohesion and the distribution of payoffs. We then apply this framework to parliamentary democracies and show how a prominent feature of decision making in parliaments, the vote of confidence procedure, creates an incentive for ruling coalitions to vote together on policy issues that might otherwise split them. The key feature that creates cohesive voting is the fact that votes on bills are treated as votes on who controls floor access in future periods. As a consequence, legislative majorities capture more of the legislative rents from the minority in parliamentary democracies than in nonparliamentary settings. IS - 3 JF - The American Political Science Review SN - 00030554 EP - 621 TI - Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure PB - American Political Science Association VL - 92 SP - 611 KW - coalition KW - game_theory KW - legislature KW - political_economy AU - Diermeier, Daniel AU - Feddersen, Timothy PY - 1998/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585484 ER -